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1 Introduction and Overview 
Given the continuous importance of external growth opportunities, corporate 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have become an increasing and popular field of 
research in the discipline of finance and strategic management. The most frequent 
question raised and analyzed – not only in academics but also in economics – is 
whether M&A create or destroy value, i.e. are M&A profitable for the companies 
involved or not? According to the Institute for Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances 
(IMAA) the total number of announced M&A transactions worldwide grew 
considerably since the beginning of the 90s. To be more accurate, from 12,594 
transactions in 1990 to 48,577 in 2018. This is almost a quadrupling of the number of 
M&A. In the same time period the total deal value increased by +550% from 0.6 
trillion USD to 3.9 trillion USD (IMAA, 2019). Despite the complexity and constantly 
high failure rates, this development demonstrates a remarkable popularity of M&A 
among corporate decision-makers. Acquisitions and mergers are a complicated and 
time-consuming challenge and therefore not easy to manage. An ideal-typical 
acquisition process comprises three stages. The conception period, the transaction 
phase and the post-merger integration (PMI). The general opinion about M&A is that 
PMI determines the success and failure of a transaction, yet research on this topic is 
still limited (Schweiger and Very, 2003). A lot of published research articles focus 
instead on the transaction phase by empirically studying the impact of deal and firm 
characteristics on either the short-run or long-term development of certain financial 
metrics (King et al., 2004). 
The three papers in this doctoral thesis highlight the post-merger integration 
period in M&A with a strict focus on primary stakeholder groups of the merging 
firms, and on PMI management itself. The presented dissertation therefore bridges 
the gap between finance and strategic management disciplines by integrating all 
relevant stakeholders and not only shareholders of a company into the derived 
theoretical framework to explain M&A performance (as suggested by the stakeholder 
theory of the firm, refer to Freeman, 2010; Parmer et al., 2010). The main argument 
represented in this work lies in the decisiveness of post-merger conflicts among 
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stakeholders that emerge due to the profound effects that M&A cause. A violation of 
stakeholder interests and the subsequent stakeholder resistance against the merger or 
acquisition have a tremendous negative impact on synergies and merger outcome. 
Change in general, but M&A in particular, can transform the overall organization. 
Transformation or reorganization leads to an environment characterized by anxiety 
and uncertainty which in turn influences stakeholder behavior. If then certain 
stakeholders decide not to cooperate but instead to combat, merger synergies will be 
difficult to achieve. Therefore, a successful PMI with a clear stakeholder orientation 
helps to align their major interests and to diminish opportunities for conflict. 
 
The Post-Merger Stakeholder Conflict Hypothesis and the Mitigating Role of PMI 
in M&A 
The first paper of this dissertation reapplies Hirshleifer’s paradox of power 
(Hirshleifer, 1991) to corporate acquisitions and mergers with a rigorous focus on 
stakeholder interests. Hirshleifer shows, against the conventional wisdom, that in 
power struggles, the poorer party improves its position relative to the stronger rival 
instead of the other way around. The author explains that this is due to the rational 
incentive for the weaker side to fight harder and invest more resources into conflictual 
behavior. Yet, the outcome of the conflict process depends on the conflict’s 
decisiveness which means that the weaker party cannot improve its wealth position 
when conflict escalates. The first paper adopts this mindset and establishes the 
theoretical framework of post-merger stakeholder conflicts in M&A to explain the 
effects of non-productive, i.e. refusing, stakeholder commitment on anticipated 
merger synergies. As a consequence of the emergence of stakeholder conflict, severe 
synergy impairment and thus, a poor post-acquisition performance occurs unless 
corrective actions are adopted by the acquirer management. Therefore, the theory 
further integrates PMI as a mitigating mechanism in M&A. It explains how a strict 
stakeholder orientation during the whole integration process helps to resolve conflict 
within certain stakeholder groups, thus stopping the commonly known wealth 
transfers from the acquirer to the target firm. The paper also points out the different 
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synergy expectations and risks of synergy impairment dependent of whether the 
transaction is classified as a merger of equals or as a superior or even as an extreme 
superior merger. It therefore stresses the importance of PMI quality in terms of 
stakeholder orientation. Because high-quality PMI measures are not free, an effective 
stakeholder-oriented integration process is worth conducting as long as net merger 
synergies exceed unresolved impairment and direct PMI cost.  
 
Synergy Deterioration through Stakeholder Conflict in M&A and its Effect on 
Long-Term Acquirer Performance 
The second paper justifies the existence of the developed post-merger stakeholder 
conflict hypothesis in the preceding paper through the empirical analysis of a large 
data sample of completed M&A transactions. Therefore, the paper firstly re-examines 
the long-term financial and operating performance of US acquirers. It applies a more 
accurate benchmarking methodology to compute unbiased long-run abnormal 
returns based on the approach outlined in Barber and Lyon (1997) and Barber et al. 
(1999). The empirical findings confirm the existing evidence of poor M&A 
performance of acquiring firms (Agrawal et al., 1992). Secondly, the paper identifies 
and tests stakeholder conflict factors (SCF) that encourage post-merger stakeholder 
struggles with subsequent synergy impairments. Those SCF are linked to the model 
parameters of the stakeholder conflict hypothesis derived in the first paper: 
integration capacity, merger complementarity, and decisiveness of conflict. The 
empirical results reveal that cross-border M&A with targets in nearby countries, and 
with little capacity for PMI tasks, show the highest tendency for stakeholder conflicts 
leading to detrimental post-merger wealth developments. Moreover, the paper 
empirically analyzes whether there exists a relationship between target size and 
acquirer M&A performance. Yet, the impact of deal size seems to be positive, a 
significant negative impact of smaller targets on M&A profitability cannot be found. 
Nevertheless, the acquisition of large targets bears higher synergy potential. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to emphasize the importance of a stakeholder-oriented PMI 
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in M&A to overcome the disadvantages of the violation of primary stakeholder 
interests.  
 
Post-Merger Stakeholder Conflict and the Impact of Integration Quality on 
Acquirer M&A Profitability 
The third paper empirically tests whether PMI quality influences acquirers’ long-term 
M&A performance. Therefore, this paper defines four major dimensions which are 
important to evaluate the acquiring firm’s stakeholder orientation during the 
integration process: management attention, stakeholder information, integration 
support, and risk awareness. Each dimension is explained by a PMI sub-index which 
comprises two to three criteria. The criteria are measured by textual analysis of 
publicly accessible data sources. The empirical findings of this paper are clear: PMI 
quality plays a decisive role within the value-creation process of corporate 
acquisitions. On average, high-quality integrators significantly outperform acquirers 
with poor PMI effort. Both three-year abnormal stock price and operating 
performance are considerably higher (compared to portfolio returns of nonevent 
reference firms matched by size and book-to-market ratio). Moreover, the paper 
investigates the indirect impact of PMI quality on stakeholder commitment. For 
example, employee productivity and customer demand positively influence long-
term M&A profitability. Based on these findings, the mitigating role of PMI in M&A 
as outlined within the post-merger stakeholder conflict hypothesis can be confirmed. 
Finally, this paper analyzes factors that drive PMI quality. It shows that acquirer 
synergy expectation, pre-deal M&A activity, organic growth perspectives, and deal 
size influence the stakeholder orientation in PMI. 
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2  
The Post-Merger Stakeholder Conflict Hypothesis and 
the Mitigating Role of PMI in M&A 
 
Abstract  
This paper theoretically reapplies Hirshleifer’s (1991) paradox of power to 
stakeholder conflicts as a primary source of synergy impairment in mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A). It further extends the theoretical framework through 
focus on post-merger integration (PMI) as a mitigating factor in post-M&A 
value-decreasing combats. It outlines that mergers aiming for synergy can 
cause conflictual instead of cooperative actions within primary stakeholder 
groups due to violation of their interests. If acquirer management fails to 
counteract with high-quality PMI measures, the transaction will destroy 
stakeholder wealth due to deterioration of synergy. A stakeholder-oriented 
PMI is worth conducting up to the point where the net merger synergy still 
exceeds unresolved synergy impairment plus the direct cost of PMI. Applying 
the Cournot-Nash solution concept, the theory confirms that synergy 
potential grows with increasing target size. This means that so-called “merger 
of equals” have the highest synergy expectation and at the same time the 
lowest risk of synergy impairment due to missing incentives for the target 
stakeholders to oppose an acquisition. Nevertheless minor relative deal size 
encourages stakeholder conflict due to beneficial wealth transfers in favor of 
the target firm, provided that the conflict does not escalate. 
Keywords: Mergers, acquisitions, post-merger integration, synergy 
impairment, stakeholder conflict 
  
14 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Why do so many mergers and acquisitions still fail? Answering this question remains 
a challenging undertaking in finance and strategic management research of corporate 
takeovers and mergers. In particular, the impact of M&A on an acquiring firm’s 
performance seems to be inconclusive through the lack of robust determinants that 
can predict its post-merger returns (King et al., 2004). Economic theory provides us 
with many possible rationales for the occurrence of mergers and the positive value 
effects that might result from them. Yet, empirical research reveals continuously high 
failure rates for acquiring firms (Agrawal et al., 1992; Loughran and Vijh, 1997; 
Megginson et al., 2004; Cui, 2018). Existing hypotheses that predict non-value-
maximizing M&A performance therefore mainly focus on agency issues resulting 
from the separation of ownership and control in public enterprises. However, these 
theories mainly argue that specific managerial conditions during the conception and 
transaction phase of an acquisition process influence financial performance with a 
strict focus on shareholder value. The center of research is the managerial decision to 
execute an acquisition or merger, i.e. the period from deal announcement to its 
completion and the identification of circumstances that are not beneficial for long-
term value creation in M&A (for example, empire building motives or CEO hubris).  
Unfortunately, a comprehensive theoretical explanation with focus on the post-
acquisition integration process and the synergies to be captured therein is still 
missing. There clearly exists a gap of thorough understanding of why so many 
mergers fail post-merger to achieve anticipated synergies as well as the main reasons 
behind this development. Furthermore there is no answer for the arguably most 
interesting question of how synergy deteriorating post-merger developments can be 
stopped. 
This article argues that M&A transactions of material size inevitably lead to radical 
organizational changes and to an environment characterized by uncertainty and 
anxiety among primary stakeholders of the involved firms. As a consequence, major 
stakeholder interests are negatively influenced in the post-acquisition period. If the 
impact is strong enough, stakeholders within certain groups (for example, employees, 
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customers, suppliers, etc.) will start to protect their claims by competing against the 
other firm’s stakeholders within this group by devoting part of their resources to non-
productive and merger-refusing activities. As a result, a conflict between merging 
firms’ stakeholder emerges. This paper shows that such stakeholder conflicts during 
PMI in general heavily impair merger synergy expectations. Moreover, it points out 
that there is a higher probability of struggle in M&A between two unequally endowed 
stakeholders because of the existing incentive for the weaker party to devote part of 
its resources to non-cooperative activity. Finally, the analysis uncovers that a 
stakeholder-oriented PMI resolves stakeholder conflict and by association prevents 
synergy impairment. 
For the hypothesis development, the paper applies the theoretical mindset of 
Hirshleifer’s paradox of power (Hirshleifer, 1991) to mergers and acquisitions. 
Central parameters that encourage post-merger stakeholder conflicts, and thus 
influence synergy realization and value creation in M&A, are defined. In addition, 
the theory developed in this paper integrates PMI as a mitigating factor in M&A to 
emphasize the importance of a stakeholder-oriented integration in making mergers 
successful.  
This paper contributes to the existing finance literature on M&A in several ways. 
Firstly, it develops a theoretical framework – namely the “post-merger stakeholder 
conflict hypothesis” – that approaches the central question of why so many M&A 
transactions fail and therefore do not create post-acquisition value. Within the theory, 
it emphasizes the firms’ primary stakeholder interests and the impairment of 
anticipated merger synergy due to its violation. Secondly, it shows that the power 
relations (i.e. merger of equals vs. superior M&A) play a crucial role in conflict 
situations creating different incentives for the minor entity (the target company) to 
oppose the transaction. Thirdly, it theorizes the value-enhancing effect of a high-
quality PMI and its mitigating mechanism in stakeholder conflict situations. This 
paper points out the importance of stakeholder orientation during the integration 
process, emphasizing that PMI quality matters to (re-)align stakeholder interests and 
in turn to prevent synergy impairments in the post-acquisition period. To the best of 
the author’s knowledge, there does not exist any theory or hypothesis that deals with 
16 
 
post-acquisition stakeholder problems, value-deteriorating synergy impairments, 
and PMI as a mitigating mechanism. Thus, this article contributes to the M&A 
literature in a significant way. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 gives an overview of 
existing M&A theories and latest developments. Section 2.3 presents the basic 
assumptions and definitions of the hypothesis to be derived and models equilibrium 
conditions in case of post-merger stakeholder conflict. Section 2.4 integrates PMI as a 
mitigating factor into the theoretical framework. Section 2.5 illustrates post-merger 
stakeholder conflict and the application of the developed theory. The final Section 2.6 
concludes the article.  
2.2 Theories on Mergers and Recent Developments 
There are two primary rationales that M&A theorists refer to: economic hypotheses 
that incorporate value-increasing motives and agency-oriented hypotheses that 
predict value-decreasing M&A performance. Former theories consist of, among 
others, the transaction cost theory whereby an acquisition is beneficial up to the point 
where the transaction cost can be reduced compared to the market solution, i.e. 
classical make-or-buy decision, hence, explaining vertical M&A (Coase, 1937 and 
1960; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Williamson, 1991). Secondly, the monopoly 
hypothesis justifies value-creative M&A through the extension of market power by 
acquiring competitors or executing conglomerate mergers (Stillman, 1983; Trautwein, 
1990). Next, a strategy-based view on M&A predicts positive outcomes through 
creation of long-term competitive advantage. For example, through the acquisition of 
know-how, technology, market access, cost leadership, etc. (Porter, 1979, 1987 and 
1991; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). Finally, the theory of operational and financial 
synergies forecasts positive M&A performance through economies of scale and scope, 
and effective allocation of financial resources within an internal capital market 
(Trautwein, 1990; Seth et al., 2000).  
In general the agency-oriented theories are based on the principal-agent conflict to 
explain negative M&A profitability as a consequence of opportunistic management 
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behavior. Within this theoretical framework hidden characteristics, hidden intention, 
and in particular hidden action are responsible for agency cost and information 
asymmetry (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen and Smith, 1985; Akerlof, 1970). As a 
first implication, prestige, power, and empire building motives encourage managers 
to engage in value-decreasing acquisitions or mergers (Mueller, 1969; Jensen, 1988). 
The free-cash-flow hypothesis assumes that managers rather conduct non-profitable 
M&A to strengthen the assets under their control than distributing excess liquidity to 
shareholders (Jensen, 1986 and 1988). A further hypothesis emphasizes hubris of 
managers, i.e. the irrational behavior of CEOs which leads to a systematic 
overestimation and overpayment in M&A transactions (Roll, 1986; Hayward and 
Hambrick, 1997). Nevertheless, agency cost can be also reduced in M&A, based on 
the hypothesis for market of corporate control, whereby inefficient target 
management teams are replaced by an experienced acquirer management, eventually 
contributing to a positive M&A performance (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1988). 
However, the above mentioned theories on M&A occurrence and its prediction of 
either positive or negative outcomes are limited and incomplete to the extent that they 
do not theorize post-merger problems that threaten the realization of anticipated 
merger synergies. If one assumes that acquirer management behaves rationale and in 
favor of its principals, i.e. its shareholders, there will still remain sources of conflict 
within the integration process. Almost every article investigating M&A performance 
acknowledges that PMI is a critical and highly sensitive process to value creation in 
M&A. Of course, it seems obvious that high premiums paid for a target significantly 
reduce the probability of a successful merger (Sirower, 1997). Yet, empirical evidence 
on long-term M&A performance also finds significant negative long-run outcomes 
even in the absence of high premiums (Agrawal et al., 1992). This fact leads to the 
assumption that available synergy potentials cannot be effectively realized due to the 
existence of any other center of conflict in the integration period. Conn et al. (2004) 
introduce the “indigestion hypothesis” which in general argues that acquiring firms are 
not able to successfully integrate a target once there are previous transactions which 
still need to be integrated. However, the authors do also neglect to theorize possible 
18 
 
reasons behind it. The present article claims that a highly underestimated center of 
conflict is post-merger stakeholder conflicts which arise due to violation of primary 
stakeholder interests. The reasons for the violation of their interests are manifold. 
Schweiger and Very (2003) document five major integration issues that impair 
expected synergies: (i) uncertainty and ambiguity due to lack of information and 
inconsistent information, (ii) organizational problems because of power status and 
political behavior, (iii) voluntary departure of key employees due to acquirer 
arrogance, (iv) loss of customers caused by concerns about existing contracts and 
agreements, and (v) poor integration of cultural differences. All of these problems 
represent potential sources of stakeholder conflict which can be mitigated through 
stakeholder-oriented PMI measures. As demanded by Schweiger and Very (2003) 
“Future research should also examine the complex relationship between integration and 
financial outcomes”, this paper attempts to integrate PMI stakeholder orientation and 
its mitigating effect into the theory building. 
Apart from finance research with its missing focus on stakeholder problems in 
M&A, strategic management literature provides valuable contributions to this topic 
of interest. On the one hand, Tantallo and Priem (2016) focus on stakeholder synergy 
as a value creation opportunity. They extend the existing stakeholder theory by 
developing a new theoretical framework that provides a perspective on how value 
can be created for multiple important stakeholders simultaneously, i.e. without just 
transferring wealth from one stakeholder group to any other one. Thereby, they 
counter the assumptions of competing stakeholder goals and the prioritization of 
shareholder value maximization. In the context of M&A, this approach addresses the 
prevailing empirical evidence of the transfer of existing value from the acquiring firm 
to the target (i.e. target shareholders benefit at the expense of acquirer stakeholders). 
The so-called “stakeholder-synergy” results from multi-attribute utility functions 
which enable the management to create value for several stakeholders at once without 
adversely affecting other stakeholders. In addition, this leads to higher stakeholder 
commitment and cooperation. The authors also point out that a firm’s management 
has to continually attend to its essential stakeholder groups to achieve stakeholder 
synergies and to reach sustainable, long-term financial performance.  
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On the other hand, Bettinazzi and Zollo (2017) deal with acquisition performance 
and how it is affected by a firm’s orientation towards its stakeholders. They point out 
the advantages and disadvantages of stakeholder orientation in the pre-acquisition 
and post-acquisition phase. In their study of 1,884 US acquisitions from 2002-2010 the 
authors find a positive impact of stakeholder focus and support a positive moderating 
effect of business relatedness and degree of integration on performance. Therefore, 
they recommend that future M&A research abandons the strict assumption of 
primacy to the interests of shareholders over those of other stakeholders. The authors 
further prompt the investigation of the effect of PMI on M&A performance in 
conjunction with the acquiring firm’s ability to integrate stakeholder interests, for 
example with regard to integration planning, and PMI implementation. 
2.3 The Post-Merger Stakeholder Conflict Hypothesis 
2.3.1 Central Model Assumptions 
The fundamental assumptions of the derived theoretical framework are that 
acquiring firm managers are rational and fully informed and that their corporate 
acquisitions are perceived to be synergistic. In the following, two firms, Firm 1 and 
Firm 2, are considered to engage in a merger or acquisition. Each of the two firms 
consists of primary stakeholder groups 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2, where 𝑆𝑖 = {1, 2, 3, . . . , 𝑁} 
equals the set of essential stakeholders of firm 𝑖 = 1, 2.1 For example, Stakeholder 
Group 1 consists of employees, Group 2 of stockholders, Group 3 of customers and 
so on, until Stakeholder Group 𝑁 which covers for instance suppliers. These 
stakeholders do also behave rational and solely aim to maximize their total merged 
firm wealth. They have either a direct or an indirect impact on the firms future cash 
flows and consequently, on the anticipated synergies of the underlying M&A 
transaction. Pre-merger, every stakeholder group 𝑠𝑖 owns a certain amount of 
stakeholder wealth 𝜔𝑠𝑖 = 𝑥𝑠𝑖𝑉𝑖, with 𝑥𝑠𝑖 as a percentage share on the firm’s enterprise 
                                                     
1 To reduce complexity, it is assumed that acquirer and target consist of the same primary stakeholder 
groups (basically employees, customers, suppliers, management, debt-holders, shareholders etc.). 
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value 𝑉𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2.2 This of course is an abstraction because in general, only 
shareholders and debt-holders have a capital stake in the company. However, other 
stakeholder groups (for example, employees, management, suppliers, or customers) 
that do not provide capital, yet are important for adding value to the firm, may impact 
a firm’s enterprise value, or more specifically a firm’s market value because value can 
be considered as a function of the contribution of certain stakeholder-specific input 
factors, such as labor capital, buying behavior, delivery promise or quality. Therefore, 
one can argue that these stakeholders also own part of the firm due to their ability to 
either directly or indirectly influence the firm’s market value (dependent of the 
respective stakeholder’s power). For example, one considers an important key 
customer of a company who is aware of his impact to push down the company’s share 
price by quitting his business relationship that is of high earnings contribution. Or a 
highly skilled top manager who has served a company for years, contributing to its 
growth, and then suddenly leaves the company. 
While merging, each stakeholder group uses its initial wealth as a resource 
endowment 𝑅𝑠𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2 for synergistic combination within the combined entity to 
reach a higher total post-merger stakeholder wealth ?̃?𝑠 = ?̃?𝑠1 + ?̃?𝑠2. In the case where 
members of a specific stakeholder group see their interests at risk due to the merger, 
they devote part of their resources to non-cooperative instead of cooperative activity. 
As a consequence, stakeholders 𝑠1 and 𝑠2 start to compete by conflict in M&A, 
provided that one assumes one-sided submission to be excluded in the theoretical 
framework (i.e. if a stakeholder group decides to fight against other groups, the other 
parties will fight back). Emerging conflict in this context is understood as a negative 
event, i.e. it is assumed that the outcome of a conflict to be always negative unless it 
can be resolved. Therefore, stakeholder conflict impairs the anticipated stakeholder 
synergy potential 𝜃𝑠
+ so that the combined post-merger stakeholder wealth ?̃?𝑠 will 
be even lower than pre-merger stakeholder wealth 𝜔𝑠, i.e. ?̃?𝑠 < 𝜔𝑠 if conflict escalates 
                                                     
2 The enterprise value of a firm is defined as the sum of its market value of equity (market 
capitalization) and net debt (short-term and long-term interest bearing debt plus minority interest plus 
preferred stock minus cash and cash equivalents). 
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and remains unsolved. By implication, this means that dis-synergy 𝜃𝑠
− can occur. If 
this happens to all primary stakeholder groups 𝑠 ∈ ?̇? = 𝑆1 ∪ 𝑆2 = {1, 2, 3, . . . , 𝑁}, of the 
combined firm, there will be no merger synergy at all, and thus, the outcome of the 
merger will be highly negative.  
The sum of each stakeholder group’s post-merger wealth equals the total 
enterprise value of the merged firm ?̃?, which consists of Firm 1 and 2 pre-merger 
values 𝑉1, 𝑉2 plus the realized merger synergy 𝜃. 
                ∑?̃?𝑠
𝑁
𝑠∈?̇?
= ?̃?1 + ?̃?2 +⋯+ ?̃?𝑁 = ?̃? = ?̃?1 + ?̃?2 = 𝑉1 + 𝑉2 + 𝜃, 
where ?̃?1 = ∑ ?̃?𝑠1
𝑁
𝑠1∈𝑆1
= 𝑉1 + 𝑞𝜃 and ?̃?2 = ∑ ?̃?𝑠2 = 𝑉2 + (1 − 𝑞)𝜃
𝑁
𝑠2∈𝑆2
, with 𝑞 as a 
proportionate share factor. 
2.3.2 Modelling Post-Merger Stakeholder Conflict 
Multi-Stakeholder Conflict 
At first the general model of a multi-stakeholder conflict in M&A is outlined. It 
describes a situation where 𝑛 out of 𝑁 primary stakeholder groups with 1 ≤ 𝑛 ≤ 𝑁 ∈
𝐼𝑁+ compete by conflict post-merger. This divides the merged firm’s set of 
stakeholder groups ?̇? into ?̇?𝐹 = ?̇?1
𝐹 ∪ ?̇?2
𝐹 which conists of 𝑛 out of 𝑁 groups that fight 
and the subset ?̇?𝐶 = ?̇?1
𝐶 ∪ ?̇?2
𝐶 that comprises the remaining (𝑁 − 𝑛) stakeholders that 
behave cooperative and are not involved in the conflict. It is shown later in the 
proceeding work that the limiting case of 𝑛 = 1 (analysis of intra-stakeholder conflicts 
within each independent stakeholder group) is sufficient for theorizing post-
acquisition conflict in M&A because each stakeholder group competes by conflict 
within its own market that equals a duopoly (for example, labor, equity, debt or 
product demand). 
The paper applies the Cournot-Nash solution concept by assuming that there 
exists an equilibrium in post-merger conflicts between stakeholders, as it does in 
regular market economies. Each firm’s 𝑖 = 1, 2 stakeholder group 𝑠𝑖 ∈ ?̇?𝑖
𝐹 determines 
simultaneously the resources to be devoted to combative activity in cases where a 
(1) 
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post-merger conflict arises. This implicates that certain stakeholders see their main 
interests at risk and start to act non-cooperatively or non-productively during the 
post-merger integration period, i.e. they oppose the merger. 
 Each stakeholder group uses its pre-merger wealth as a resource endowment 
which is either devoted to cooperative activity 𝐶𝑠𝑖 or combative actions 𝐹𝑠𝑖: 
    𝜔𝑠𝑖 = 𝑅𝑠𝑖 with  𝑅𝑠𝑖 = 𝐶𝑠𝑖 + 𝐹𝑠𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, 2 and 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖  
where 𝜔 = 𝑅 = ∑ ∑ 𝑅𝑠𝑖
𝑁
𝑠𝑖∈𝑆𝑖
2
𝑖=1 = 𝑉 = 𝑉1 + 𝑉2 equals the sum across all acquirer and 
target firm stakeholders’ initial resource endowments. This in turn equals the sum of 
the pre-merger enterprise values of the Acquirer 𝑉1 and the Target 𝑉2. 
The respective merger synergy that can be achieved in a multi-stakeholder conflict 
through synergistic combination of productive resources 𝐶𝑠𝑖, is formalized in the 
following merger synergy function:  
?̃?(𝐶𝑠𝑖 , 𝐴, 𝑑, 𝑛) = 𝐴(∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑠𝑖
1
𝑑
𝑛
𝑠∈?̇?𝐹
2
𝑖=1
)
𝑑
+ 𝐴(∑ ∑ 𝑅𝑠𝑖
1
𝑑
(𝑁−𝑛)
𝑠∈?̇?𝐶
2
𝑖=1
)
𝑑
 
 ?̃?𝜂=1                             ?̃?𝜂=0 
The first term of equation (3) is the part under conflict (denoted with 𝜂 = 1), where 
𝐶𝑠𝑖 = 𝑅𝑠𝑖 − 𝐹𝑠𝑖, 𝐹𝑠𝑖 > 0 for all 𝑠 ∈ ?̇?
𝐹 . The second term represents the outcome under 
no-conflict (denoted with 𝜂 = 0), where 𝐶𝑠𝑖 = 𝑅𝑠𝑖 for all 𝑠 ∈ ?̇?
𝐶. Only the first term is 
at risk of synergy impairment and the resulting synergy (dis-synergy) is shared by 
the 𝑛 stakeholder groups in conflict. The second term is shared by the (𝑁 − 𝑛) 
remaining stakeholder groups that behave peaceful. In the following, the theoretical 
framework focuses on the analysis of the conflict term (𝜂 = 1):  
               ?̃?𝜂=1(𝐶𝑠𝑖 , 𝐴, 𝑑, 𝑛) = 𝐴(∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑠𝑖
1
𝑑
𝑛
𝑠∈?̇?𝐹
2
𝑖=1
)
𝑑
 
The parameter 𝐴 ≤ 1 measures the utilization of integration capacity, i.e. resources 
provided to manage the entire integration process. To tap the full synergy potential 
of a M&A transaction the ideal integration capacity utilization rate equals 𝐴 = 1.  The 
(3) 
(2) 
(3.1) 
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factor 𝑑 with 1 < 𝑑 ≤ 2 is a M&A complementarity index that in general comprises 
three dimensions. Firstly, complementarity of businesses, products, and markets 
(organizational dimension). Secondly, complementarity of economic sphere, legal 
systems, economic laws, and regulations (economic dimension). Thirdly, 
complementarity of culture, values, language and business practices (sociocultural 
dimension). High complementarity in each of these dimensions fosters synergistic 
combination of stakeholder resources. Therefore, this analysis does not consider the 
case where 𝑑 = 1 because the focus is on synergistic M&A only.  
In addition, a merger causes a fixed transaction cost 𝑇 including the premium paid. 
For simplification, it is assumed that all primary stakeholder groups 𝑁 of the 
combined entity equally share the cost. The resulting stakeholder merger cost 
function is as follows:  
             𝑐𝑠𝑖(𝑁) =
𝑇
2𝑁
 
for all 𝑖 = 1, 2 and 𝑠𝑖  ∈ 𝑆𝑖 and 𝑐(𝑁) =
𝑇
𝑁
 for all 𝑠 ∈ ?̇?. 
Furthermore, a stakeholder conflict function is defined that incorporates 
decisiveness of conflict represented by the factor 𝑚 ≥ 1. As conflict tends to escalate 
(𝑚 is high), the post-merger synergy impairment and thus, wealth destruction 
increases. In the multi-stakeholder conflict case, the function is defined as follows:  
𝑞𝑠𝑖
𝜂=1
(𝐹𝑠𝑖 ,𝑚, 𝑛) =
𝐹𝑠𝑖
𝑚
∑ ∑ 𝐹𝑠𝑖
𝑚𝑛
𝑠∈?̇?𝐹
2
𝑖=1
 
with ∑ ∑ 𝑞𝑠𝑖
𝜂=1𝑛
𝑠∈?̇?𝐹
2
𝑖=1 = 1 and 𝐹𝑠𝑖 > 0 for all 𝑠𝑖 ∈ ?̇?𝑖
𝐹 . 3 
Finally, the post-merger stakeholder wealth function for the stakeholders in 
struggle results in:  
    ?̃?𝑠𝑖
𝜂=1
= ?̃?𝜂=1(𝐶𝑠𝑖 , 𝐴, 𝑑, 𝑛) ∗ 𝑞𝑠𝑖
𝜂=1
(𝐹𝑠𝑖 , 𝑚, 𝑛) − 𝑐𝑠𝑖(𝑁) 
                                                     
3 Stakeholders that are not involved in conflict, i.e. the remaining (𝑁 − 𝑛) stakeholder groups, put all 
of their given resources into cooperative activity, thus sharing their part of wealth ?̃?𝑠𝑖
𝜂=0
 of equation (3) 
with the proportionate factor 𝑞𝑠𝑖
𝜂=0
(𝑅𝑠𝑖 , 𝑛) =
𝑅𝑠𝑖
∑ ∑ 𝑅𝑠𝑖
(𝑁−𝑛)
𝑠∈?̇?𝐶
2
𝑖=1
. 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
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⇔ ?̃?𝑠𝑖
𝜂=1
= 𝐴(∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑠𝑖
1
𝑑
𝑛
𝑠∈?̇?𝐹
2
𝑖=1
)
𝑑
∗
𝐹𝑠𝑖
𝑚
∑ ∑ 𝐹𝑠𝑖
𝑚𝑛
𝑠∈?̇?𝐹
2
𝑖=1
−
𝑇
2𝑁
. 
The total post-merger wealth of the combined firm equals:4   
?̃? = ?̃?1 + ?̃?2 = ∑ ?̃?𝑠1
𝑁
𝑠1∈𝑆1
+ ∑ ?̃?𝑠2
𝑁
𝑠2∈𝑆2
=∑ ∑ ?̃?𝑠𝑖
𝑁
𝑠𝑖∈𝑆𝑖
= 𝑉1 + 𝑉2 + 𝜃
2
𝑖=1
. 
It consists of the sum of all Firm 1 and 2 primary stakeholders’ post-merger wealth 
which equals their pre-merger wealth 𝑉1, 𝑉2 plus the realized merger synergy 𝜃 under 
conflict.  
In the multi-stakeholder post-merger conflict case each stakeholder group in 
struggle 𝑠𝑖 ∈ ?̇?𝑖
𝐹 , 𝑖 = 1, 2 faces the following optimization problem:  
𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝐹𝑠𝑖∈[0,𝑅𝑠𝑖]
 ?̃?𝑠𝑖
𝜂=1
= 𝐴(∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑠𝑖
1
𝑑
𝑛
𝑠∈?̇?𝐹
2
𝑖=1
)
𝑑
∗
𝐹𝑠𝑖
𝑚
∑ ∑ 𝐹𝑠𝑖
𝑚𝑛
𝑠∈?̇?𝐹
2
𝑖=1
−
𝑇
2𝑁
 
The respective reaction curve equations can be derived from the condition 
𝛿?̃?𝑠𝑖
𝜂=1
𝛿𝐹𝑠𝑖
= 0: 
𝐹𝑠𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝑠𝑖
1−𝑑
𝑑
(∑ ∑ 𝐹𝑠𝑖
𝑚𝑛
𝑠∈?̇?𝐹
2
𝑖=1 ) − 𝐹𝑠𝑖
𝑚
=
𝑚∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑠𝑖
1
𝑑𝑛
𝑠∈?̇?𝐹
2
𝑖=1
∑ ∑ 𝐹𝑠𝑖
𝑚𝑛
𝑠∈?̇?𝐹
2
𝑖=1
 
The intersection between all stakeholder reaction curves represents the state of 
optimal combative resources, where each stakeholder maximizes his post-merger 
wealth.  
Intra-Stakeholder Conflict 
The derived model of multi-stakeholder conflict, where 𝑛 stakeholder groups 
compete by conflict in M&A can be simplified to a model of so called “intra-
stakeholder conflict” (one stakeholder group 𝑛 = 1 instead of multiple stakeholders 
𝑛 > 1). It is assumed that acquirer and target firms’ stakeholder of group 𝑠 ∈ ?̇? =
{1, 2, 3,… ,𝑁} have mutually exclusive interests and compete within their own 
                                                     
4 Where ?̃?𝑖 = ∑ ?̃?𝑠𝑖
𝑁
𝑠𝑖∈𝑆𝑖
= (∑ ?̃?𝑠𝑖
𝜂=1𝑛
𝑠𝑖∈?̇?𝑖
𝐹 + ∑ ?̃?𝑠𝑖
𝜂=0(𝑁−𝑛)
𝑠𝑖∈?̇?𝑖
𝐶 ) = ?̃?𝑖
𝜂=1
+ ?̃?𝑖
𝜂=0
, for 𝑖 = 1, 2. 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
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universe that equals a duopoly (for example, labor in the case of stakeholder group 
employees, or product demand in the case of customers) by steering homogeneous 
resources (for example, employee’s productivity, or customer buying behavior). This 
simplifies the formalization of post-merger stakeholder conflict in M&A due to the 
assumption that all conflicts between acquirer and target stakeholder occur within 
independent stakeholder groups, for example, acquirer suppliers vs. target suppliers, 
or acquirer employees vs. target employees (duopolistic competition). As a result, the 
synergy or dis-synergy outcome of each group’s intra-stakeholder conflict can be 
added up to determine the merged firm’s total impaired post-merger wealth. This 
approach is in line with real-life scenarios because it is, for example, the employees 
or the suppliers and a company’s relationship to those stakeholders that enable a firm 
to successfully generate intangible assets or competitive advantage.  
In the following, the paper continues with the case of 𝑛 = 1 (intra-stakeholder 
conflict) to specify the equations defined in Section 2.3.2. Yet, it is essential to firstly 
consider the situation where no conflict among acquirer and target stakeholders 
within a specific stakeholder group arises (𝜂 = 0). As a result of such a two-sided 
peaceful behavior, the stakeholder group contributes to the synergy creation in the 
post-acquisition period of the M&A transaction. Secondly, the focus lies on post-
merger stakeholder conflicts (𝜂 = 1) that impair synergy potential within stakeholder 
groups, finally ending up with dis-synergy. 
No conflict case (𝜂 = 0): 
If no conflict between primary stakeholders of the merging companies arises post-
merger, each stakeholder group of Firm 1 and 2 will use one hundred percent of its 
resource endowments 𝑅𝑠𝑖 = 𝜔𝑠𝑖  for synergistic combination in order to increase its 
post-merger wealth ?̅̃?𝑠𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1,2. This describes the situation where acquirer or target 
stakeholders do not fight as long as their counterpart from the other firm does not 
fight. 
The combined firm’s post-merger stakeholder wealth function ?̅̃?𝑠 for the no-
conflict case is defined as:  
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?̅̃?𝑠 = ?̅̃?𝑠1 + ?̅̃?𝑠2 = [𝐴(𝑅𝑠1
1
𝑑 + 𝑅𝑠2
1
𝑑 )𝑑] −
𝑇
𝑁
, 
with 1 < 𝑑 ≤ 2, 𝐴 ≤ 1,
𝑇
𝑁
> 0,𝐹𝑠𝑖 = 0 for all 𝑠𝑖 ∈ ?̇?, where ?̅̃?𝑠1 = ?̅?𝑠1 [𝐴(𝑅𝑠1
1
𝑑 + 𝑅𝑠2
1
𝑑 )𝑑] −
𝑇
2𝑁
, and ?̅̃?𝑠2 = ?̅?𝑠2 [𝐴(𝑅𝑠1
1
𝑑 + 𝑅𝑠2
1
𝑑 )𝑑] −
𝑇
2𝑁
, with ?̅?𝑠1 =
𝑅𝑠1
𝑅𝑠1+𝑅𝑠2
, ?̅?𝑠2 =
𝑅𝑠2
𝑅𝑠1+𝑅𝑠2
 and ?̅?𝑠1 = ?̅?𝑠2 =
0.5 if 𝑅𝑠1 = 𝑅𝑠2 and ?̅?𝑠1 > ?̅?𝑠2 if 𝑅𝑠1 > 𝑅𝑠2. 
The net synergy potential of the merged firm’s stakeholder group 𝑠 𝜖 ?̇? results from 
the difference between post-merger and pre-merger wealth and in case of no conflict, 
equals the following realized synergy:  
𝜃𝑠
+ = 𝜃𝑠 = ?̅̃?𝑠 −𝜔𝑠 
where ∑ 𝜃𝑠
+ =𝑁𝑠∈?̇? 𝜃
+ = 𝜃 equals the total merger synergy if there appears no conflict 
within any stakeholder group (this situation would be the best case with a maximum 
outcome for the merging partners). Similarly, the net synergy potential for the 
stakeholder group 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 of firm 𝑖 = 1, 2 equals:  
𝜃𝑠𝑖
+ = ?̅̃?𝑠𝑖 −𝜔𝑠𝑖 = ?̅?𝑠𝑖 ?̅̃?𝑠 −𝜔𝑠𝑖 = ?̅?𝑠𝑖(?̅̃?𝑠 −𝜔𝑠) = ?̅?𝑠𝑖𝜃𝑠
+ 
where ∑ 𝜃𝑠𝑖
+2
𝑖=1 = 𝜃𝑠
+ is the merged firm’s stakeholder synergy. The following 
condition holds: 𝜃𝑠
+ > 𝜃𝑠𝑖
+ > 0 for 𝑖 = 1, 2. 
Conflict case (𝜂 = 1): 
In the case where post-merger intra-stakeholder conflicts arise, each acquirer and 
target stakeholders of a primary stakeholder group devote part of their given 
resources to non-cooperative, i.e. combative activity 𝐹𝑠𝑖 = 𝛼𝑠𝑖𝑅𝑠𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, 2. A one-sided 
submission of either party is excluded in the theory, and in any case, it is not 
applicable in the context of post-merger intra-stakeholder conflicts. In this situation, 
the remaining part of the resources are utilized for cooperative, i.e. productive activity 
𝐶𝑠𝑖 = (1 − 𝛼𝑠𝑖)𝑅𝑠𝑖 = 𝑅𝑠𝑖 − 𝐹𝑠𝑖, so that 𝑅𝑠𝑖 = 𝐶𝑠𝑖 + 𝐹𝑠𝑖 for 𝑖 = 1, 2.  
The combined firm’s post-merger stakeholder wealth function ?̃?𝑠 for the intra-
stakeholder conflict case (𝑛 = 1) is as following:  
?̃?𝑠 = ?̃?𝑠1 + ?̃?𝑠2 = [𝐴(𝐶𝑠1
1
𝑑 + 𝐶𝑠2
1
𝑑 )𝑑] −
𝑇
𝑁
, 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
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with 1 < 𝑑 ≤ 2, 𝐴 ≤ 1,
𝑇
𝑁
> 0 𝐹𝑠𝑖 > 0 for all 𝑠𝑖 ∈ ?̇?, where ?̃?𝑠1 = 𝑞𝑠1 [𝐴(𝐶𝑠1
1
𝑑 + 𝐶𝑠2
1
𝑑 )𝑑] −
𝑇
2𝑁
, 
and ?̃?𝑠2 = 𝑞𝑠2 [𝐴(𝐶𝑠1
1
𝑑 + 𝐶𝑠2
1
𝑑 )𝑑] −
𝑇
2𝑁
, with 𝑞𝑠1 =
𝐹𝑠1
𝑚
𝐹𝑠1
𝑚+𝐹𝑠2
𝑚, 𝑞𝑠2 =
𝐹𝑠2
𝑚
𝐹𝑠1
𝑚+𝐹𝑠2
𝑚 = (1 − 𝑞𝑠1) are the 
post-merger stakeholder conflict functions.  
Consequently, if conflict remains unsolved, a net dis-synergy in form of a net 
wealth impairment will occur for the combined entity’s stakeholder 𝑠 𝜖 ?̇?: 𝜃𝑠
− = ?̃?𝑠 −
𝜔𝑠, where ∑ 𝜃𝑠
− =𝑁𝑠∈?̇? 𝜃
− equals the total merger dis-synergy under unresolved post-
merger stakeholder conflict. This describes the worst case where the participants in 
all primary stakeholder groups compete by conflict. Similarly, the net dis-synergy for 
the stakeholder group 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 of firm 𝑖 = 1, 2 results in:  
𝜃𝑠𝑖
− = ?̃?𝑠𝑖 −𝜔𝑠𝑖 = 𝑞𝑠𝑖?̃?𝑠 −𝜔𝑠𝑖 = 𝑞𝑠𝑖(?̃?𝑠 −𝜔𝑠) = 𝑞𝑠𝑖𝜃𝑠
−, 
where ∑ 𝜃𝑠𝑖
−2
𝑖=1 = 𝜃𝑠
− is the respective merged firm’s stakeholder dis-synergy. It holds: 
𝜃𝑠
− < 𝜃𝑠𝑖
− < 0 for 𝑖 = 1, 2 and 𝑞𝑠1 = 𝑞𝑠2 = 0.5 if 𝑅𝑠1 = 𝑅𝑠2  and 𝑞𝑠1 > 𝑞𝑠2 if 𝑅𝑠1 > 𝑅𝑠2. 
Summarized, the post-merger stakeholder wealth function for stakeholder group 
𝑠 ∈ ?̇? = {1, 2, 3, … ,𝑁} of the merged firm can be expressed as:  
?̃?𝑠(𝜂) = {
𝜔𝑠 + 𝜃𝑠
+: 𝜂 = 0, 𝐶𝑠𝑖 = 𝑅𝑠𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, 2, 𝜃𝑠
+ > 0 
𝜔𝑠 + 𝜃𝑠
−: 𝜂 = 1, 𝐶𝑠𝑖 = 𝑅𝑠𝑖 − 𝐹𝑠𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, 2, 𝜃𝑠
− < 0 
 
It is assumed that each stakeholder group 𝑠 ∈ ?̇? can be treated independently from 
the other stakeholder groups of the merged entity. For that reason, the total post-
merger wealth of the combined firm can be derived by simply adding up the resulting 
positive (in case of synergy) or negative (in case of dis-synergy) wealth effects of all 
stakeholder groups 𝑁. It follows:  
?̃? = 𝜔 +∑𝜃𝑠
𝑁
𝑠∈?̇?
= 𝜔 + 𝜃 
where 𝜃𝑠 is either positive (𝜃𝑠
+ > 0) in case of no conflict or negative (𝜃𝑠
− < 0) in case 
of conflict. Thus, the total realized merger synergy 𝜃 can also be either positive or 
negative resulting in a higher (?̃? > 𝜔 > 0) or lower (0 < ?̃? < 𝜔) total post-merger 
wealth.  
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
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In the extreme cases of conflict or no-conflict across all primary stakeholder groups 
of the combined firm, the following upper and lower bounds can be defined:  
     𝜃+ = ∑ 𝜃𝑠
+𝑁
𝑠∈?̇?  for all 𝑁 ⇒?̃?
+ (maximum) 
     𝜃− = ∑ 𝜃𝑠
−𝑁
𝑠∈?̇?  for all 𝑁⇒?̃?
− (minimum)  
In the next subsection, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is defined, once for merger 
of equals, i.e. acquirer and target stakeholders have equal resources 𝑅𝑠1 = 𝑅𝑠2, and 
once for superior mergers where a large firm acquires a small target, so that 𝑅𝑠1 > 𝑅𝑠2. 
2.3.3 Cournot-Nash Equilibrium in Post-Merger Stakeholder Conflicts 
In the previous section, the post-merger wealth functions in multi-stakeholder 
conflicts (𝑛 > 1) and in intra-stakeholder conflicts (𝑛 = 1) were outlined. For the 
latter, the stakeholder post-merger wealth differences between no conflict and conflict 
and the resulting synergy or dis-synergy were specified.  
A post-merger stakeholder conflict between acquirer and target participants can 
be formulated as a strategic decision game where the Cournot-Nash solution concept 
is applicable:  
                     𝐺 = (𝑁, 𝑆, 𝑈) = ({𝑠1, 𝑠2}, [0, 𝑅𝑠1] × [0, 𝑅𝑠2], (?̃?𝑠1 , ?̃?𝑠2)). 
Each party  𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, 2 has to decide how much of its resources should be used 
for combative activity 𝐹𝑠𝑖, given the non-productive effort of its opponent. The 
decisions are made at the same time. Both parties aim to maximize their post-
acquisition wealth which leads to the following optimization problem:  
              𝑠𝑖:𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐹𝑠𝑖∈[0,𝑅𝑠𝑖]
 ?̃?𝑠𝑖 = 𝑞𝑠𝑖?̃?𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠𝑖 =
𝐹𝑠𝑖
𝑚
𝐹𝑠1
𝑚 + 𝐹𝑠2
𝑚 [𝐴 (𝐶𝑠1
1
𝑑 + 𝐶𝑠2
1
𝑑 )
𝑑
] −
𝑇
2𝑁
. 
The derived reaction curves 𝑅𝐶𝑠1 and 𝑅𝐶𝑠2 of stakeholder 𝑠1 ∈ 𝑆1 and 𝑠2 ∈ 𝑆2 
represent each firm’s stakeholder optimal fighting effort, corresponding with the 
opponent’s choice of resources devoted to combative activity:  
 𝑠1:         𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐹𝑠1∈[0,𝑅𝑠1]
 ?̃?𝑠1 = 𝑞𝑠1(𝐹𝑠1 , 𝐹𝑠2) ∗ ?̃?𝑠(𝐶𝑠1 , 𝐶𝑠2), subject to 𝐹𝑠1 + 𝐶𝑠1 = 𝑅𝑠1 . 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
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   ⇒
𝛿?̃?𝑠1
𝛿𝐹𝑠1
= 0. 
  ⇒
𝐹𝑠1𝐶𝑠1
1−𝑑
𝑑
𝐹𝑠2
𝑚 =
𝑚(𝐶𝑠1
1
𝑑 +𝐶𝑠2
1
𝑑 )
𝐹𝑠1
𝑚+𝐹𝑠2
𝑚 ≝ 𝑅𝐶𝑠1 . 
 𝑠2:         𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐹𝑠2∈[0,𝑅𝑠2]
 ?̃?𝑠2 = 𝑞𝑠2(𝐹𝑠1 , 𝐹𝑠2) ∗ ?̃?𝑠(𝐶𝑠1 , 𝐶𝑠2), subject to 𝐹𝑠2 + 𝐶𝑠2 = 𝑅𝑠2 . 
   ⇒
𝛿?̃?𝑠2
𝛿𝐹𝑠2
= 0. 
   ⇒
𝐹𝑠2𝐶𝑠2
1−𝑑
𝑑
𝐹𝑠1
𝑚 =
𝑚(𝐶𝑠1
1
𝑑 +𝐶𝑠2
1
𝑑 )
𝐹𝑠1
𝑚+𝐹𝑠2
𝑚 ≝ 𝑅𝐶𝑠2 . 
The factor 𝐴 (integration capacity) cancels out in the derivations of the respective 
reaction curves. Thus, a sole increase in acquirer integration capacity does not change  
the proportionate allocation of resources between cooperative and non-cooperative 
activity. This is an important finding. Integration capacity seems not to be a decisive 
factor for the decision making process of the stakeholders in conflict. This fact signals 
that instead of integration quantity, integration quality, i.e. the PMI measures that are 
conducted, influence stakeholders’ decision and mitigate intra-stakeholder conflicts.  
Definition 1 (Symmetrical Cournot-Nash solution): In synergistic M&A (1 < 𝑑 ≤ 2), there 
exist only interior solutions for the reaction curve equations 𝑅𝐶𝑠1and 𝑅𝐶𝑠2. In the case of a 
merger of equals where the respective stakeholders 𝑠1 ∈ 𝑆1 and 𝑠2 ∈ 𝑆2 have equal initial 
resource endowments 𝑅𝑠1 = 𝑅𝑠2, the resulting symmetrical Cournot-Nash equilibrium in 
intra-stakeholder conflicts (𝑛 = 1) and for  𝑚 = 1 equals:  
                                 𝐹𝑠1 = 𝐹𝑠2 = 𝐶𝑠1 = 𝐶𝑠2 = (𝑅𝑠1 + 𝑅𝑠2)/4, 
where 𝑞𝑠1 = 𝑞𝑠2 = 0.5 (derivation see 2.7 Appendix A.1 (i)). 
For 𝑚 > 1 the symmetrical Cournot-Nash solution is as follows:  
𝐹𝑠1 = 𝐹𝑠2 =
𝑚(𝑅𝑠1 + 𝑅𝑠2)
2(𝑚 + 1)
, 
where 𝐶𝑠1 =
𝑅𝑠1
(𝑚+1)
= 𝑅𝑠1 − 𝐹𝑠1, 𝐶𝑠2 =
𝑅𝑠2
(𝑚+1)
= 𝑅𝑠2 − 𝐹𝑠2 and 𝑞𝑠1 = 𝑞𝑠2 = 0.5 (derivation 
see 2.7 Appendix A.1 (ii)). 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
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Definition 2 (Stakeholder power relations in M&A):5  
(i) Merger of Equals: Conflictual or productive interaction between equally endowed 
stakeholders 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2, 1 < 𝑑 ≤ 2 so that 𝑅𝑠1 = 𝑅𝑠2  (𝜔𝑠1 = 𝜔𝑠2). 
(ii) Superior Merger: Conflictual or productive interaction between unequally endowed 
stakeholders 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2, 1 < 𝑑 ≤ 2 so that 𝑅𝑠1 > 𝑅𝑠2  (𝜔𝑠1 > 𝜔𝑠2). 
(iii) Extreme Superior Merger: Conflictual or productive interaction between a strong 
endowed stakeholder and a weak endowed stakeholder 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2, 1 < 𝑑 ≤ 2  so that 
𝑅𝑠1 > 𝑅𝑠2  (𝜔𝑠1 > 𝜔𝑠2) where 𝐹𝑠2 → 𝑅𝑠2, i.e. the weak endowed opponent has to put 
almost all of its resources into fighting activity. 
Definition 3 (Stakeholder synergy and dis-synergy):  
(i) 𝜃𝑠
+ = ?̅̃?𝑠 −𝜔𝑠 > 0 equals the expected synergy of stakeholder group 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 of the 
combined firm, where ?̅̃?𝑠 denotes the optimum of post-merger stakeholder wealth that is 
reached in case that no conflict occurs. 
(ii) 𝜃𝑠
− = ?̃?𝑠 −𝜔𝑠 < 0 equals the net dis-synergy of stakeholder group 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 of the combined 
firm (in case of conflict). 
(iii) ∆𝜃𝑠
+ =
?̅̃?𝑠
𝜔𝑠
− 1 > 0 equals the (maximum) relative synergy of stakeholder group 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 of 
the merged firm (in case of no conflict). 
(iv) ∆𝜃𝑠
− =
?̃?𝑠
𝜔𝑠
− 1 ≤ 0 is the relative dis-synergy of stakeholder group 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 of the combined 
firm (in case of conflict). 
As a consequence of post-merger stakeholder conflict between equally endowed 
stakeholders, fifty percent of the available resources 𝑅𝑠𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, 2 are wasted in 
synergy-disruptive combative activity (where 𝑚 = 1). As decisiveness of conflict 𝑚 
increases, the percentage share of non-cooperative behavior expands. For example, if 
𝑚 = 3, the resources devoted to combative action account for seventy five percent of 
                                                     
5 The theory assumes that the size ratio between acquirer and target (measured by market 
capitalization) predetermines the power relationship between acquirer and target stakeholder groups, 
i.e., if Firm 1 is, for example, twice as big as Firm 2 (size ratio of 2), the pre-merger wealth ratios (𝜔𝑠1 𝜔𝑠2)⁄  
or  the ratios of initial resource endowments (𝑅𝑠1 𝑅𝑠2)⁄  between 𝑠1 and 𝑠2 are also 2 for all 𝑠1 ∈ 𝑆1 and 
𝑠2 ∈ 𝑆2. 
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the available resources.  
In the symmetrical Cournot-Nash equilibrium, and independently of 𝑚, each party 
receives the half of the outcome produced through synergistic combination of the 
remaining productive resources 𝐶𝑠1 and 𝐶𝑠2 (refer to 2.7 Appendix A.1 (iii) for the 
derivation of the symmetrical Cournot-Nash solution in case of multi-stakeholder 
conflict, where 𝑛 > 1).  
Figure 1 below illustrates acquirer and target stakeholder post-merger wealth in a 
merger of equals where a symmetrical Cournot-Nash equilibrium exists. 
Figure 1: Acquirer and Target Stakeholder Wealth in Mergers of Equals  
The figure presents an equally sized target stakeholder’s post-merger wealth in conflict ?̃?𝑠2(𝐹𝑠2|𝐹𝑠1
∗ ) and no conflict 
?̅̃?𝑠2 and the respective wealth ratios 
𝑞𝑠1
𝑞𝑠2
, given the acquirer’s non-cooperative effort 𝐹𝑠1
∗  and ?̃?𝑠1(𝐹𝑠2|𝐹𝑠1
∗ ) in the 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The y-axis shows the logarithm of wealth; the x-axis presents the target’s combative 
activity 𝐹𝑠2 ∈ ]0, 100[; 𝑑 = 1.25,𝑚 = 1, 𝐴 = 1, 𝑅𝑠1 = 𝑅𝑠2 = 100 
 
 
The dotted line represents target stakeholders wealth in the post-acquisition period 
(?̃?𝑠2) dependent of their combative activity 𝐹𝑠2, given acquirer’s optimized combative 
activity in equilibrium 𝐹𝑠1
∗ . The decreasing straight line shows acquirer stakeholders 
post-merger wealth (?̃?𝑠1) and the falling broken line displays the ratio 
𝑞𝑠1
𝑞𝑠2
. In the 
symmetrical Cournot-Nash equilibrium the conditions ?̃?𝑠1 = ?̃?𝑠2  and 
𝑞𝑠1
∗
𝑞𝑠2
∗ =
𝑅𝑠1
𝑅𝑠2
= 1 
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hold. As one can see, for both parties a post-merger stakeholder conflict is not 
beneficial. The red area illustrates the target stakeholders wealth losses as a difference 
between resulting wealth under no-conflict ?̅̃?𝑠2 and conflict ?̃?𝑠2. Indeed, in 
equilibrium the losses are minimized but the wealth impairment is still significant. 
Both parties would lose 41% of their initial wealth if conflict was not resolved. Target 
stakeholders would be able to devote even more resources to non-cooperative action 
if they intended to strengthen their power. However, this would further impair both 
acquirer and target stakeholders wealth. For instance (refer to numerical example in 
Table 1), if target stakeholders deviated from the optimum where 𝐹𝑠2
∗ = 𝐹𝑠1
∗ = 50 by 
devoting for example 70 instead, total stakeholder group impairment would be -53%, 
splitting up to -45% for target and -61% for acquirer stakeholders (compared to -41% 
each in equilibrium). Therefore, post-merger stakeholder conflicts in merger of equals 
are a clear lose-lose situation for both parties. Nobody is better-off in a Cournot-Nash 
decision making setting compared to no conflict. This circumstance leads to the 
following theorem: 
Theorem 1 (lose-lose-situation in intra-stakeholder conflicts of merger of equals): In a 
synergistic merger of equals, the stakeholders’ option to compete by conflict is a lose-lose 
solution because both acquirer and target stakeholders suffer on high post-merger synergy and 
wealth impairments. 
Proof. See 2.7 Appendix A.3. 
To analyze the non-symmetrical equilibrium in M&A-transactions where the 
acquirer exceeds the target in size, one has to distinguish between superior mergers 
and extreme superior merges. The former case describes the post-merger conflict 
situation between a strong endowed acquirer stakeholder group and a weak 
endowed target stakeholder group, i.e. 𝑅𝑠1 > 𝑅𝑠2. In the latter case, the size ratio 
between acquirer and target is so high that the weaker endowed target is forced to 
put almost all of its resources into combative activity. It follows that 𝑅𝑠1 > 𝑅𝑠2  where 
𝐹𝑠2 → 𝑅𝑠2 (refer to Definition 2). 
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Definition 4 (Non-symmetrical Cournot-Nash solution): For 𝑅𝑠1 > 𝑅𝑠2 (superior merger, 
extreme superior merger), the non-symmetrical Cournot-Nash solution occurs at the 
intersection of 𝑅𝐶𝑠1 and 𝑅𝐶𝑠2 where each stakeholder’s decision is a best response to the 
opponent’s action (𝑞𝑠1 ≠ 𝑞𝑠2). 
Compared to mergers of equals, superior M&A and, in particular, extreme 
superior acquisitions offer target stakeholders an incentive to consequently fight for 
their interests. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the wealth development and power relations 
in these situations. In superior mergers (Figure 2) while combating, target 
stakeholders improve their power ratio from initially 
𝑅𝑠1
𝑅𝑠2
= 2 to 1.14 =
𝑞𝑠1
∗
𝑞𝑠2
∗  in 
equilibrium.  
Figure 2: Acquirer and Target Stakeholder Wealth in Superior Mergers  
Acquirer size is twice as big as the target. The figure presents a smaller target stakeholder’s post-merger wealth in 
conflict ?̃?𝑠2(𝐹𝑠2|𝐹𝑠1
∗ ) and no conflict ?̅̃?𝑠2 and the respective wealth ratios 
𝑞𝑠1
𝑞𝑠2
, given the larger acquirer’s non-
cooperative effort 𝐹𝑠1
∗  and ?̃?𝑠1(𝐹𝑠2|𝐹𝑠1
∗ ) in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The y-axis shows the logarithm of wealth; 
the x-axis presents the target’s fighting activity 𝐹𝑠2 ∈ ]0, 100[; 𝑑 = 1.25,𝑚 = 1, 𝐴 = 1, 𝑅𝑠1 = 200 > 𝑅𝑠2 = 100 
 
 
It is still the case that conflict leads to synergy and wealth impairments for each 
competitor. Nevertheless, in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the losses are minimized. 
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more than the optimized resources (𝐹𝑠2
∗ = 68) to non-cooperative activities. But in this 
case, target stakeholders would lose additional wealth, i.e. they would not maximize 
their wealth in conflict ?̃?𝑠2. Comparing superior M&A to mergers of equals, one can 
conclude that post-merger conflicts are more detrimental for acquiring firm 
stakeholders than for target stakeholders. In equilibrium the total wealth loss of a 
specific stakeholder group 𝑠 ∈ ?̇? is still -41%. Yet, with -53% the acquirer bears much 
more of the losses than the target with -17% (compared to -41% each in mergers of 
equals). Therefore, unresolved stakeholder conflict is still not beneficial for the total 
merger outcome. However, in conflict, target stakeholders can at least improve their 
power ratio as a compensation for their wealth loss. 
In extreme superior mergers where the target is sufficiently small compared to the 
acquiring firm, so that 𝐹𝑠2 →𝑅𝑠2 holds, the situation in post-merger conflicts is highly 
interesting from the target firm’s perspective. As presented in Figure 3, a conflict 
between stakeholder groups turns out to be beneficial for the target in equilibrium. 
Target stakeholders improve both their power and wealth compared to no conflict. 
The power ratio decreases from 4 to 1.39 (light gray shaded area) and the post-merger 
wealth improves by +26% compared to only +14% (green area). Each marginal 
increase of 𝐹𝑠2 further improves the power ratio in favor of the target (dark grey 
shaded area), yet deviates from the maximum wealth ?̃?𝑠2
∗ . Finally, one can conclude 
that target stakeholders have the paradoxical incentive to fight in extreme superior 
mergers. 
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Figure 3: Acquirer and Target Stakeholder Wealth in Extreme Superior Mergers 
Acquirer size is four times bigger than the target. The figure presents a significantly smaller target stakeholder’s 
post-merger wealth in conflict ?̃?𝑠2(𝐹𝑠2|𝐹𝑠1
∗ ) and no conflict ?̅̃?𝑠2 and the respective wealth ratios 
𝑞𝑠1
𝑞𝑠2
, given the 
acquirer’s non-cooperative effort 𝐹𝑠1
∗   and ?̃?𝑠1(𝐹𝑠2|𝐹𝑠1
∗ ) in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The y-axis shows the 
logarithm of wealth; the x-axis presents the target’s fighting activity 𝐹𝑠2 ∈ ]0, 100[; 𝑑 = 1.25,𝑚 = 1, 𝐴 = 1, 𝑅𝑠1 =
400 > 𝑅𝑠2 = 100, with 𝐹𝑠2 → 𝑅𝑠2 
 
 
Table 1 summarizes the development of post-merger stakeholder wealth under 
conflict and no conflict compared to pre-merger. Panel A presents the outcomes in 
the Cournot-Nash equilibrium for the three cases, merger of equals (𝜔𝑠1 = 𝜔𝑠2 =
100), superior merger (𝜔𝑠1 = 200,𝜔𝑠2 = 100), and extreme superior merger (𝜔𝑠1 =
400,𝜔𝑠2 = 100). As one can see, if no conflict emerges, M&A between equally sized 
companies have the highest synergy potential (+19%). In conflict, acquirer 
stakeholders suffer increasing wealth impairments as the size ratio increases, whereas 
target stakeholders eventually benefit once the ratio becomes extremely large (+26% 
in conflict vs. +14% in no conflict). Panel B shows again the three different cases but 
the results differ in that way that the target deviates from the equilibrium. In each 
constellation – given the fact that the acquirer remains in equilibrium – the target 
stakeholders deteriorate their wealth compared to the outcomes reported in Panel A.  
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Table 1: Numerical Example 
Acquirer and Target Post-Merger Stakeholder Wealth in Cournot-Nash Equilibrium under Conflict 
Compared to No-Conflict and Target Deviation from Equilibrium 
d=1.25; m=1; A=1 
Pre-Merger 
Wealth 
Post-Merger Wealth 
No conflict Conflict 
Panel A: Acquirer and target in equilibrium if conflict 
𝜔𝑠 𝜔𝑠1  𝜔𝑠2  ?̅̃?𝑠 ?̅̃?𝑠1  ?̅̃?𝑠2  ∆𝜃𝑠
+ ∆𝜃𝑠1
+  ∆𝜃𝑠2
+  𝐹𝑠1
∗     
∗  ?̃?𝑠 ?̃?𝑠1  ?̃?𝑠2  ∆𝜃𝑠
− ∆𝜃𝑠1
−  ∆𝜃𝑠2
−  
200 100 100 238 119 119 +19% +19% +19% 50 50 119 59 59 -41% -41% -41% 
300 200 100 353 235 118 +18% +18% +18% 77 68 178 95 83 -41% -53% -17% 
500 400 100 571 457 114 +14% +14% +14% 124 90 301 175 126 -40% -56% +26% 
Panel B: Target deviates from equilibrium if conflict 
𝜔𝑠 𝜔𝑠1  𝜔𝑠2  ?̅̃?𝑠 ?̅̃?𝑠1  ?̅̃?𝑠2  ∆𝜃𝑠
+ ∆𝜃𝑠1
+  ∆𝜃𝑠2
+  𝐹𝑠1
∗      ?̃?𝑠 ?̃?𝑠1  ?̃?𝑠2  ∆𝜃𝑠
− ∆𝜃𝑠1
−  ∆𝜃𝑠2
−  
200 100 100 238 119 119 +19% +19% +19% 50 70 95 39 55 -53% -61% -45% 
300 200 100 353 235 118 +18% +18% +18% 77 80 160 78 81 -47% -61% -19% 
500 400 100 571 457 114 +14% +14% +14% 124 96 288 162 125 -42% -59% -25% 
𝑑 = 1.25;𝑚 = 1;𝐴 = 1 
 
Even more importantly, with increasing disparity, the target does not improve its 
wealth anymore (-25% in conflict vs. +14% in no conflict). Thus, in extreme superior 
M&A, the target stakeholders achieve the maximum increase in wealth only in 
equilibrium. As a result of this finding the following theorem is formulated: 
Theorem 2 (win-lose-situation in intra-stakeholder conflicts of extreme superior mergers): In 
synergistic mergers where a sufficiently strong endowed acquirer purchases a weak target, i.e. 
𝑅𝑠1 > 𝑅𝑠2  where 𝐹𝑠2 → 𝑅𝑠2, the target stakeholders have an incentive to act non-cooperatively 
because of the fact that they can improve their post-merger wealth under conflict (compared to 
no conflict). This holds as long as the following condition is fulfilled:  
             𝐴𝑞𝑠2
∗ ((𝑘𝑅𝑠2 − 𝐹𝑠1
∗ )
1
𝑑 + (
1
𝑘
)
1
𝑑
)
𝑑
− 𝑅𝑠2 >
𝑇
2𝑁
,  for 𝑅𝑠1 = 𝑘𝑅𝑠2   
with a sufficiently large factor 𝑘 ∈ 𝐼𝑅+. 
Proof. See 2.7 Appendix A.4. 
Tables 2 to 4 present numerical examples in more detail for the development of 
post-merger stakeholder wealth compared to pre-merger wealth by varying with the 
parameters 𝑑 and 𝑚. The base scenario with complementarity factor  𝑑 = 1.25 is 
presented in Table 2. In absence of conflict, the synergy potential is highest (for both 
(25) 
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parties +18.9%) once acquirer and target have the same pre-merger wealth (𝜔𝑠1 =
𝜔𝑠2 = 100). Compared to all other power relations where 𝜔𝑠1 > 𝜔𝑠2, a merger of 
equals contains the highest synergy potential if no conflict arises. Yet, in presence of 
struggle, both parties stakeholder would lose -40.5% of their initial wealth (𝜔𝑠1 =
𝜔𝑠2 = 100). However, once disparity between acquirer and target is in place (𝜔𝑠1 >
𝜔𝑠2), the weaker target loses less compared to parity status (for example -16.9% where 
𝜔𝑠1 = 200,𝜔𝑠2 = 100), whereas the acquiring firm’s loss grows. Even more 
importantly, with increasing wealth disparity the target benefits from conflict 
situations, i.e. ?̃?𝑠2 > ?̅̃?𝑠2. In the numerical example in Table 2, the last two lines 
describe this case. Compared to no conflict, the target firm wins additional +12% or 
+53.2%, respectively. 
Table 2: Acquirer and Target Stakeholder Wealth Impairment (I) 
d=1.25; m=1; A=1 
Pre-Merger  Post-Merger Wealth 
𝑠1: Acquirer / 
𝑠2: Target  
Acquirer 
 (no conflict) 
Acquirer 
(conflict) 
Target 
(no conflict) 
Target 
(conflict) 
Conflict vs. 
no conflict 
𝜔𝑠1  𝜔𝑠2  ?̅̃?𝑠1 ∆𝜃𝑠1
+  ?̃?𝑠1 ∆𝜃𝑠1
−  ?̅̃?𝑠2
 ∆𝜃𝑠2
+  ?̃?𝑠2 ∆𝜃𝑠2
− Δ1 Δ2 
100 100 118.9 +18.9% 59.5 -40.5% 118.9 +18.9% 59.5 -40.5% -59.4% -59.4% 
200 100 235.1 +17.6% 94.9 -52.5% 117.6 +17.6% 83.1 -16.9% -70.1% -34.5% 
300 100 347.3 +15.8% 132.8 -55.7% 115.8 +15.8% 105.3 +5.3% -71.5% -10.4% 
400 100 457.0 +14.3% 175.1 -56.2% 114.3 +14.3% 126.3 +26.3% -70.5% +12.0% 
600 100 671.9 +12.0% 278.5 -53.6% 112.0 +12.0% 165.2 +65.2% -65.6% +53.2% 
𝑑 = 1.25;𝑚 = 1;𝐴 = 1 
 
Once complementarity rises from 𝑑 = 1.25 to 𝑑 = 1.5 (results reported in Table 3), 
synergy potential ∆𝜃𝑠𝑖
+ increases, whereas synergy impairment ∆𝜃𝑠𝑖
− decreases for 𝑖 =
1, 2 (compared to the outcome in Table 2). As a result of post-merger stakeholder 
conflict, dissipated synergy advances (Δ𝑖 = ∆𝜃𝑠𝑖
− − ∆𝜃𝑠𝑖
+). It still holds that there is no 
incentive to fight against the merger in case of 𝜔𝑠1 = 𝜔𝑠2. In case of increasing wealth 
disparity (𝜔𝑠1 > 𝜔𝑠2) a target’s incentive to combat diminishes as the overall 
dissipated synergy increases (e.g., +4.6% vs. +12.0% as reported in Table 2, for 𝜔𝑠1 =
400,𝜔𝑠2 = 100). 
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Table 3: Acquirer and Target Stakeholder Wealth Impairment (II) 
d=1.5; m=1; A=1 
Pre-Merger  Post-Merger Wealth 
𝑠1: Acquirer / 
𝑠2: Target  
Acquirer 
 (no conflict) 
Acquirer 
(conflict) 
Target 
(no conflict) 
Target 
(conflict) 
Conflict vs. 
no conflict 
𝜔𝑠1  𝜔𝑠2  ?̅̃?𝑠1 ∆𝜃𝑠1
+  ?̃?𝑠1 ∆𝜃𝑠1
−  ?̅̃?𝑠2
 ∆𝜃𝑠2
+  ?̃?𝑠2 ∆𝜃𝑠2
− Δ1 Δ2 
100 100 141.4 +41.4% 70.7 -29.3% 141.4 +41.4% 70.7 -29.3% -70.7% -70.7% 
200 100 277.5 +38.7% 116.0 -42.0% 138.7 +38.7% 94.4 -5.6% -80.7% -44.4% 
300 100 405.4 +35.1% 162.4 -45.9% 135.1 +35.1% 115.9 +15.9% -81.0% -19.3% 
400 100 528.3 +32.1% 212.3 -46.9% 132.1 +32.1% 136.7 +36.7% -79.1% +4.6% 
600 100 764.8 +27.5% 319.2 -46.8% 127.5 +27.5% 172.2 +72.2% -74.3% +44.8% 
𝑑 = 1.5;𝑚 = 1; 𝐴 = 1 
 
Table 4 reports results once decisiveness of conflict 𝑚 grows. For 𝑚 = 1.5 synergy 
impairment and thus post-merger wealth destruction is reinforced by conflict, 
compared to the situation shown in Table 2. As a consequence, overall dissipated 
synergy Δ𝑖 increases for both acquirer and target. The incentive of a weaker endowed 
target to fight against the M&A transaction further diminishes (in extreme superior 
mergers). If the conflict is of high decisiveness, only relatively small targets benefit 
from opposing the transaction. Here, for example, where 𝜔𝑠1 = 600 and 𝜔𝑠2 = 100. 
Table 4: Acquirer and Target Stakeholder Wealth Impairment (III) 
d=1.25; m=1.5; A=1 
Pre-Merger  Post-Merger Wealth 
𝑠1: Acquirer / 
𝑠2: Target  
Acquirer 
 (no conflict) 
Acquirer 
(conflict) 
Target 
(no conflict) 
Target 
(conflict) 
Conflict vs. 
no conflict 
𝜔𝑠1  𝜔𝑠2  ?̅̃?𝑠1 ∆𝜃𝑠1
+  ?̃?𝑠1 ∆𝜃𝑠1
−  ?̅̃?𝑠2
 ∆𝜃𝑠2
+  ?̃?𝑠2 ∆𝜃𝑠2
− Δ1 Δ2 
100 100 118.9 +18.9% 47.6 -52.4% 118.9 +18.9% 47.6 -52.4% -71.4% -71.4% 
200 100 235.1 +17.6% 77.4 -61.3% 117.6 +17.6% 67.3 -32.7% -78.9% -50.2% 
300 100 347.3 +15.8% 118.2 -60.6% 115.8 +15.8% 80.9 -19.1% -76.4% -34.9% 
400 100 457.0 +14.3% 156.9 -60.8% 114.3 +14.3% 107.6 +7.6% -75.0% -6.7% 
600 100 671.9 +12.0% 270.7 -54.9% 112.0 +12.0% 148.7 +48.7% -66.9% +36.7% 
𝑑 = 1.25;𝑚 = 1.5;𝐴 = 1 
 
  
39 
 
Assuming synergistic mergers (1 < 𝑑 ≤ 2), several implications are concluded 
from the preceding numerical examples, finally leading to Theorem 3. 
Acquirer 
1. The acquisition of a relatively large target or a target of same size (merger of 
equals) contains the highest synergy potential (1 < 𝑑 ≤ 2,𝑚 ≥ 1), i.e. deal size 
has a positive impact on acquirer performance. 
2. With increasing wealth disparity, acquirer stakeholders’ synergy potential ∆𝜃𝑠1
+  
decreases. 
3. The risk of dis-synergy caused by synergy impairment ∆𝜃𝑠1
−  increases up to a 
certain critical disparity threshold  𝑥1 =
𝜔𝑠2
𝜔𝑠1
, dependent of decisiveness of conflict 
𝑚 and complementarity 𝑑. 
4. Increasing complementarity 𝑑 improves long-term acquirer performance due to 
higher synergy potential. 
5. Higher decisiveness of conflict 𝑚 further impairs synergy in case of post-merger 
stakeholder conflict, thus, deteriorates financial and operating performance. 
Target 
1. In a merger of equals, where 𝜔𝑠1 = 𝜔𝑠2 , there does not exist any incentive to 
oppose the merger because ∆𝜃𝑠2
− < ∆𝜃𝑠2
+  for all 1 < 𝑑 ≤ 2 and 𝑚 ≥ 1. 
2. In superior or extreme superior mergers where 𝜔𝑠1 > 𝜔𝑠2  , there exists a critical 
disparity threshold 𝑥2 =
𝜔𝑠2
𝜔𝑠1
 (dependent of complementarity 𝑑 and decisiveness 
of conflict 𝑚), where the target benefits from fighting against the M&A 
transaction, i.e. ∆𝜃𝑠2
− > ∆𝜃𝑠2
+ . 
Theorem 3 (Acquirers’ best choice in M&A): From an acquiring firm’s perspective, the 
acquisition of an equally-sized target (merger of equals), i.e. primary stakeholders 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖, 𝑖 =
1, 2 with equal resource endowments (𝑅𝑠1 = 𝑅𝑠2), has the highest expected relative acquirer 
stakeholder synergy ∆𝜃𝑠1
+  compared to superior and extreme superior M&A (with 𝑅𝑠1 > 𝑅𝑠2) 
if no conflict arises. At the same time, if post-merger a conflict of minor decisiveness arises 
(𝑚 = 1), a merger of equals has the lowest potential of an acquirer’s post-merger synergy 
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impairment (relative dis-synergy ∆𝜃𝑠1
− ). Yet, the latter does not hold once decisiveness of 
conflict increases (𝑚 > 1). 
Proof: See 2.7 Appendix A.5. 
2.4 PMI as a Mitigating Mechanism in Conflict 
As a central conclusion from the previous section – assuming the application of a 
Cournot-Nash solution concept – one can summarize that a post-merger stakeholder 
conflict tremendously impairs perceived merger synergies. This happens 
independently of the magnitude of provided integration resources by the acquiring 
firm’s management. This finding reinforces the perception of the value-increasing 
effect of a high-quality PMI in M&A. 
In this section, the concept of a stakeholder-oriented PMI as a mitigating mechanism 
in M&A is defined and integrated into the model. High-quality PMI measures aiming 
to align stakeholder interests help to avoid post-merger conflicts. This in turn 
encourages the synergy realization process during the integration phase in mergers. 
As a consequence, M&A-transactions with a stakeholder-oriented PMI end up being 
successful. A stakeholder-oriented post-merger integration is characterized by the 
management’s effort and skill, firstly, to identify relevant stakeholders of the firm and 
their interests (pre- and post-merger). Secondly, it is essential to align and integrate 
those interests through definition and conduction of respective PMI measures with 
focus on (i) stakeholder information, (ii) stakeholder support, (iii) stakeholder risks, 
and (iv) continuing management attention on primary stakeholder interests during 
the entire integration process.  
Let 𝑓𝑠𝑖 ∈ ]𝑓𝑠𝑖
∗, 1[ be the stakeholder-oriented PMI effort (PMI quality) for the respective 
stakeholder group 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 of firm 𝑖 = 1, 2, with 
               𝑓𝑠𝑖
∗ =
𝜃𝑠𝑖
+
𝜃𝑠𝑖
− =
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖
𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖
< 0, 𝑖 = 1, 2. 
The respective direct PMI costs 𝛾𝑠𝑖 ≥ 0 are defined as:  
(26) 
41 
 
    𝛾𝑠𝑖 = {
𝛾𝑠𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑓𝑠𝑖 → 𝑓𝑠𝑖
∗
→ 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑓𝑠𝑖 → 1 
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜 𝑃𝑀𝐼 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑.
 
Further let 𝑓𝑠
∗ = 𝑓𝑠1
∗ + 𝑓𝑠2
∗ =
𝜃𝑠
+
𝜃𝑠
− =
(𝜃𝑠1
+ +𝜃𝑠2
+ )
(𝜃𝑠1
− +𝜃𝑠2
− )
=
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆
𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 
< 0 be 
the PMI quality for the stakeholder group 𝑠 ∈ ?̇? of the merged firm, with 𝛾𝑠 = 𝛾𝑠1 +
𝛾𝑠2. Thus, the resulting post-merger stakeholder wealth function in presence of 
conflict and PMI equals:  
                ?̿̃?𝑠: = 𝑓𝑠?̃?𝑠 − 𝛾𝑠 = 𝑓𝑠1?̃?𝑠1 − 𝛾𝑠1 + 𝑓𝑠2?̃?𝑠2 − 𝛾𝑠2 
          = 𝑓𝑠1 [𝑞𝑠1 (𝐴(𝐶𝑠1
1
𝑑 + 𝐶𝑠2
1
𝑑 )𝑑) −
𝑇
2𝑁
] − 𝛾𝑠1 + 𝑓𝑠2 [𝑞𝑠2 (𝐴(𝐶𝑠1
1
𝑑 + 𝐶𝑠2
1
𝑑 )
𝑑
) −
𝑇
2𝑁
] − 𝛾𝑠2 . 
It follows the general aggregated post-merger stakeholder wealth function  
?̿̃?𝑠(𝜂, 𝑓𝑠) = {
𝜔𝑠 + 𝜃𝑠
+, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜂 = 0, 𝐶𝑠𝑖 = 𝑅𝑠𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, 2, 𝜃𝑠
+ > 0, 𝛾𝑠 = 0 
𝜔𝑠 + 𝑓𝑠𝜃𝑠
− − 𝛾𝑠, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜂 = 1, 𝑓𝑠 ∈]𝑓𝑠
∗, 1[, 𝐶𝑠𝑖 = 𝑅𝑠𝑖 − 𝐹𝑠𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, 2, 𝜃𝑠
− < 0, 0 < 𝛾𝑠 ≤ 𝛾𝑠
𝑚𝑎𝑥
  
with lim
𝑓𝑠→𝑓𝑠
∗
𝑓𝑠𝜃𝑠
− = 𝜃𝑠
+ , (𝛾𝑠 = 𝛾𝑠
𝑚𝑎𝑥) and lim
𝑓𝑠→1
𝑓𝑠𝜃𝑠
− = 𝜃𝑠
− , (𝛾𝑠 → 0), so that 𝑓𝑠𝜃𝑠
− ∈
]𝜃𝑠
−, 𝜃𝑠
+[, and the stakeholder group 𝑠 ∈ ?̇? (realized) net synergy function: 
𝜃𝑠(𝜂, 𝑓𝑠) = {
𝜃𝑠(0, 𝑓𝑠
∗) = 𝜃𝑠
+ − 0
𝜃𝑠(1, 𝑓𝑠 → 𝑓𝑠
∗) → 𝜃𝑠
+
𝜃𝑠(1, 𝑓𝑠 → 1) → 𝜃𝑠
− − 0
− 𝛾𝑠
𝑚𝑎𝑥 
where 𝜃𝑠𝑖 = 𝑓𝑠𝑖𝜃𝑠𝑖
− − 𝛾
𝑠𝑖
 equals the (realized) net synergy/ dis-synergy of stakeholder 
𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 of firm 𝑖 = 1, 2 and 𝜃 = ∑ 𝜃𝑠
𝑁
𝑠  the combined firm’s merger net synergy/ dis-
synergy.  
The respective synergy impairment function for the stakeholder group 𝑠 ∈ ?̇? is as 
follows:  
?̌?𝑠(𝜂, 𝑓𝑠) = {
?̌?𝑠(0, 𝑓𝑠
∗) = 𝜃𝑠
+ − 𝜃𝑠
+ = 0
?̌?𝑠(1, 𝑓𝑠 → 𝑓𝑠
∗) → −𝛾𝑠
𝑚𝑎𝑥
?̌?𝑠(1, 𝑓𝑠 → 1) → 𝜃𝑠
+ − 𝜃𝑠
−
 
with ?̌? = 𝜃+ − 𝜃 is the merger synergy impairment. In conflict with PMI, the 
condition 𝜃− < 𝜃 < 𝜃+ holds, i.e. the realized synergy or dis-synergy lies between the 
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
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dis-synergy potential of unsolved stakeholder conflict and the merger’s expected 
synergy potential.  
Through a high stakeholder orientation in PMI (𝑓𝑠 → 𝑓𝑠
∗, 𝛾𝑠 = 𝛾𝑠
𝑚𝑎𝑥) across all 
stakeholder groups 𝑠 ∈ ?̇?, the anticipated merger net synergy 𝜃+ can be almost fully 
realized (𝜃+) because stakeholder conflict will be resolved and the impairment of 
stakeholder wealth prevented. If PMI quality is low (𝑓𝑠 → 1, 𝛾𝑠 → 0) across all 
stakeholder groups 𝑠 ∈ ?̇?, the realized synergy impairment ?̌? will exceed expected net 
synergy 𝜃+ so that a dis-synergy occurs (𝜃−). Table 5 summarizes the possible cases 
and respective synergy, merging cost, direct PMI cost and realized synergy: 
Table 5: Summary of Potential Synergy Outcomes 
The table reports the stakeholder synergy (dis-synergy), fixed cost of merging, direct PMI cost, and realized synergy 
dependent of the four cases 1) no M&A, 2) M&A w/o post-merger stakeholder conflict, 3) M&A with unresolved 
conflict, and 4) M&A with conflict and PMI 
 
Stakeholder 
Synergy 𝛉𝐬𝐢 
Fixed cost of 
Merging 𝐜   
Direct PMI  
Cost 𝛄𝐬𝐢 
Realized 
Synergy ?̂?𝐬𝐢 
1) No M&A 0 0 0 0 
2) M&A without conflict (𝜂 = 0) 𝜃𝑠𝑖
+ > 0 
𝑇
2𝑁
> 0 0 𝜃𝑠𝑖 = 𝜃𝑠𝑖
+ > 0 
3) M&A with unresolved conflict 
(𝜂 = 1) 
𝜃𝑠𝑖
− < 0 
𝑇
2𝑁
> 0 0 𝜃𝑠𝑖 = 𝜃𝑠𝑖
− < 0 
4) M&A with conflict and PMI 
4.1) Low PMI quality (𝑓𝑠𝑖 → 1) 𝜃𝑠𝑖
− < 0 
𝑇
2𝑁
> 0 𝛾𝑠𝑖 → 0 𝜃𝑠𝑖 → 𝜃𝑠𝑖
− < 0 
4.2) Avg. PMI quality (𝑓𝑠𝑖 = 𝑓𝑠𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛) 0 ≤ 𝜃𝑠𝑖
− < 𝜃𝑠𝑖
+ 
𝑇
2𝑁
> 0 𝛾𝑠𝑖 > 0 𝜃𝑠𝑖 → 𝜃𝑠𝑖
− ≥ 0 
4.3) High PMI quality (𝑓𝑠𝑖 → 𝑓𝑠𝑖
∗) 𝜃𝑠𝑖
− → 𝜃𝑠𝑖
+ > 0 
𝑇
2𝑁
> 0 𝛾𝑠𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜃𝑠𝑖 → 𝜃𝑠𝑖
+ > 0 
 
Definition 5 (Upper and lower bound synergy conditions): The maximum stakeholder 
synergy that can be achieved if there is no stakeholder conflict equals: 
𝜃𝑠
+:   ?̃?𝑠
𝑚𝑎𝑥 > 𝜔𝑠; upper bound condition for synergy (𝜂 = 0). 
 The maximum dis-synergy in post-merger stakeholder conflicts equals: 
𝜃𝑠
−:  ?̃?𝑠
𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 𝜔𝑠; lower bound condition for dis-synergy (𝜂 = 1). 
In case of low PMI quality with subsequent (realized) dis-synergy, following condition holds: 
𝑓𝑠𝜃𝑠
− = 𝜃𝑠
−:  ?̃?𝑠
𝑚𝑖𝑛 < ?̃?𝑠 < 𝜔𝑠  < ?̃?𝑠
𝑚𝑎𝑥. 
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High PMI quality solves post-merger stakeholder conflicts, so that a net synergy is realized: 
𝑓𝑠
∗𝜃𝑠
− = 𝜃𝑠
+: ?̃?𝑠
𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 𝜔𝑠 < ?̃?𝑠 < ?̃?𝑠
𝑚𝑎𝑥. 
Proposition 1 (Necessary condition for profitable PMI): Provided that the condition ?̃?𝑠 > 0 
in case of stakeholder conflict (𝜂 = 1) holds, i.e. combined stakeholder merger output minus 
cost of merging is larger than zero, a stakeholder-oriented PMI at a direct cost of 𝛾𝑠 ≥ 0 is 
worth conducting if and only if resulting stakeholder net merger synergy (𝜃𝑠) exceeds synergy 
impairment (?̌?𝑠 = 𝜃𝑠
+ − 𝑓𝑠𝜃𝑠
−) plus management effort’s related direct PMI cost (𝛾𝑠):  
                     𝜃𝑠 > ?̌?𝑠 + 𝛾𝑠 
⇔𝑓𝑠𝜃𝑠
− > (𝜃𝑠
+ − 𝑓𝑠𝜃𝑠
−) + 𝛾𝑠 ⇔𝛾𝑠 < 2𝜃𝑠 − 𝜃𝑠
+. 
According to Proposition 1 it therefore only makes sense to invest additional 
money into stakeholder-oriented PMI measures as long as dis-synergies caused by 
stakeholder conflict are resolved, i.e. the condition 𝜃𝑠 − ?̌?𝑠 − 𝛾𝑠 ≥ 0 > 𝜃𝑠
− holds at least 
to limit the damages of merger synergy impairment (it is better to achieve at least 
positive or a little bit of the expected merger synergy 𝜃𝑠 − ?̌?𝑠 − 𝛾𝑠 < 𝜃𝑠
+ instead of 
realizing dis-synergies 𝜃𝑠 − ?̌?𝑠 − 𝛾𝑠 < 0). Condition above simplifies to 𝛾𝑠
𝑚𝑎𝑥 < 𝜃𝑠
+ 
for 𝑓𝑠 → 𝑓𝑠
∗. For the case where 𝑓𝑠 → 1 with 𝛾𝑠 → 0 the condition does not hold because 
a poor PMI does not resolve synergy impairments, thus still leading to dis-synergy 
(𝜃𝑠 − ?̌?𝑠 − 𝛾𝑠 → 𝜃𝑠
−). Finally, the following theorem regarding minimum PMI quality 
is derived: 
Theorem 4 (Minimum quality of PMI): The minimum stakeholder orientation or quality in 
PMI to prevent dis-synergy and to create at least positive synergy instead equals:  
 𝑓𝑠
𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤
1
2
𝑓𝑠
∗ +
𝛾𝑠
2𝜃𝑠
− 
where 𝛾𝑠 ≥ 0 and 𝜃𝑠
− < 0. 
Proof: See 2.7 Appendix A.6. 
  
(31) 
(32) 
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2.5 Illustration of Intra-Stakeholder Conflict and PMI 
For an illustration of the theoretical framework developed in this paper, a situation 
where Company A (acquirer) merges with Company T (target) is analyzed in this 
section. The motive of the transaction is an expected synergy due to combination of 
complementary resources (𝑑 > 1) that improves the sharing of skills and knowledge, 
facilitates organizational learning and increases the probability of creation of 
uniquely valuable efficiencies. 
For example, A and T have complementary sales channels, yet T has its core 
competencies in customized online marketing and A in (direct) sales in general. 
Therefore, a combination of these strengths is expected to exploit the merged firm’s 
sales and marketing activities to its full extent. The management pursues a significant 
revenue synergy of 𝜃+. Due to the fact that the interests of major stakeholders of both 
companies might be negatively influenced by the merger and its subsequent 
organizational changes, management conducted a comprehensive stakeholder 
analysis which led to the perception that the stakeholder groups employees and 
customers were critical of achieving anticipated merger synergies. Therefore, 
management defined specific PMI measures focusing on those two primary 
stakeholders during the entire post-merger integration phase. 
Throughout this example, the focus lies on the stakeholder group employees. It is 
assumed that part of the sales force of the new firm (consisting of A and T sales 
employees) fears a negative impact of the merger on its commission-based salary due 
to the prospects of increased online sales in future. Moreover, sales staff are worried 
about their job security in general if direct sales channels start to grow and are 
prioritized. As a logical consequence, an environment of uncertainty emerges among 
the sales staff resulting in cautious acting and merger-refusing behavior. If 
management is unaware of this development, a conflict situation will arise 
immediately. The potential risk of dis-synergy is 𝜃−. 
Let 𝐴 = 1, 𝑑 = 2, 𝑇 = 100,𝑁 = 10, and let further be A and T equally-sized 
companies measured by market capitalization (merger of equals). Employees have 
equal pre-merger resource endowments 𝑅𝐸𝑚𝑝𝐴 = 𝑅𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑇 = 100. It follows the 
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calculation of the expected employees’ synergy 𝜃𝐸𝑚𝑝
+  in absence of conflict, and the 
potential employees’ synergy impairment 𝜃𝐸𝑚𝑝
−  in case of conflict. The expected 
employees’ merger synergy if no conflict arises (𝜂 = 0) equals: 
 𝐶𝐸𝑚𝑝𝐴 = 𝐶𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑇 = 𝑅𝐸𝑚𝑝𝐴 = 𝑅𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑇 = 100 
   𝜃𝐸𝑚𝑝
+ = [𝐴(𝑅𝐸𝑚𝑝𝐴
1
𝑑 + 𝑅𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑇
1
𝑑 )𝑑] − 𝑐𝐸𝑚𝑝 −𝜔𝐸𝑚𝑝 
 ⇔ 𝜃𝐸𝑚𝑝
+ = (√100 + √100)2 − 100/10 − 200 = 400 − 10 − 200 = 190. 
This will be the employees’ merger synergy if there is one hundred percent 
cooperative and productive behavior during the whole merger and integration 
process. The climate of the merger is characterized by a friendly and trustworthy 
environment that helps the merging partners to overcome a multitude of obstacles 
during the PMI. Employees feel confident and put all of their resources into 
synergistic activity to reach a higher post-merger wealth compared to pre-merger. 
Synergy creation mainly results from combination of unique knowledge. For the 
reason that no conflict among A and T employees emerges, there is no need for a 
stakeholder specific PMI management effort that comes with a direct PMI cost. 
The potential risk of merger dis-synergy under stakeholder conflict (𝜂 = 1) with 
decisiveness of conflict factor 𝑚 = 1 equals: 
 𝐹𝐸𝑚𝑝𝐴 = 𝐹𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑇 = 𝐶𝐸𝑚𝑝𝐴 = 𝐶𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑇 =
𝑅𝐸𝑚𝑝𝐴+𝑅𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑇
4
=
200
4
= 50 
 𝜃𝐸𝑚𝑝
− = [𝐴(𝐶𝐸𝑚𝑝𝐴
1
𝑑 + 𝐶𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑇
1
𝑑 )𝑑] − 𝑐𝐸𝑚𝑝 − 𝜔𝐸𝑚𝑝 
⇔𝜃𝐸𝑚𝑝
− = (√50 + √50)2 − 10 − 200 = 200 − 10 − 200 = −10. 
This will be the potential stakeholder dis-synergy if resistance against the merger and 
conflict within the stakeholder group employees arises. This can easily happen if, for 
example, employees of both firms have the feeling of not being well-informed about 
what is going on post-merger because management misses out on actively 
communicating about the next steps and objectives of the transaction. Furthermore, 
merging partners’ sales staff might question the “win-win” aspect of the deal and feel 
threatened by the other firm’s opposing stakeholders (employees). As a consequence, 
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already present uncertainty increases and people start to protect their interests by 
acting unproductively and indifferently, even going as far as to leave the company. 
The latter has a significant negative impact if key employees resign taking away 
competitive know-how. Anticipated synergies like the expected revenue synergy in 
this case due to a combination of marketing skills and core competencies erode. Even 
worse, the entire management’s foundation of the merger is challenged. If 
management loses out on counteracting with stakeholder-oriented PMI measures, the 
negative spiral will accelerate and ultimately lead to dis-synergy.  
In summary, the situation is characterized by resentment and fear among staff, 
decreased morale and productivity, increased internal conflict, dysfunctional 
communication, jeopardized business continuity, confusion and lack of clear 
objectives, loss of confidence, and a high level of uncertainty and anxiety.  
The employees’ synergy to be realized depends on the PMI quality and ranges 
between the following values: 
 𝜃𝐸𝑚𝑝 = 𝑓𝐸𝑚𝑝𝜃𝐸𝑚𝑝
− ∈ ]𝜃𝐸𝑚𝑝
− = −10; 𝜃𝐸𝑚𝑝
+ = 190[ with 𝑓𝐸𝑚𝑝 ∈ ]𝑓𝐸𝑚𝑝
∗ =
𝜃𝐸𝑚𝑝
+
𝜃𝐸𝑚𝑝
− ;  1[. 
The respective PMI stakeholder orientation to resolve employee conflict is derived 
by calculation of  𝛾𝐸𝑚𝑝 = 𝛾𝐸𝑚𝑝
𝑚𝑎𝑥 for 𝑓𝐸𝑚𝑝 → 𝑓𝐸𝑚𝑝
∗  with 𝑓𝐸𝑚𝑝
∗ =
𝜃𝐸𝑚𝑝
+
𝜃𝐸𝑚𝑝
− =
190
−10
= −19 and 
𝛾𝐸𝑚𝑝 → 0 for 𝑓𝐸𝑚𝑝 → 1 and 𝑓𝐸𝑚𝑝 = 0 if there is no PMI management effort at all. The 
minimum PMI quality 𝑓𝐸𝑚𝑝
𝑚𝑖𝑛 under the condition that 𝛾𝐸𝑚𝑝 ≥ 0 holds, to realize at least 
positive synergy, is determined according to Proposition 1 and Theorem 4: 
𝜃𝐸𝑚𝑝 − ?̌?𝐸𝑚𝑝 − 𝛾𝐸𝑚𝑝 > 0⇔ 𝑓𝐸𝑚𝑝𝜃𝐸𝑚𝑝
− − (𝜃𝐸𝑚𝑝
+ − 𝑓𝐸𝑚𝑝𝜃𝐸𝑚𝑝
− ) − 𝛾𝐸𝑚𝑝 > 0 
 ⇔2𝑓𝐸𝑚𝑝𝜃𝐸𝑚𝑝
− > 𝜃𝐸𝑚𝑝
+ + 𝛾𝐸𝑚𝑝 
⇔𝑓𝐸𝑚𝑝 <
𝜃𝐸𝑚𝑝
+
2𝜃𝐸𝑚𝑝
− +
𝛾𝐸𝑚𝑝
2𝜃𝐸𝑚𝑝
− ⇔𝑓𝐸𝑚𝑝
𝑚𝑖𝑛 <
1
2
𝑓𝐸𝑚𝑝
∗ +
𝛾𝐸𝑚𝑝
2𝜃𝐸𝑚𝑝
−  
⇔𝑓𝐸𝑚𝑝
𝑚𝑖𝑛 <
1
2
(−19) −
𝛾𝐸𝑚𝑝
200
⇔ 𝑓𝐸𝑚𝑝
𝑚𝑖𝑛 < −9.5 −
𝛾𝐸𝑚𝑝
200
 
If, for instance, management of the newly formed company conducts a well-
planned PMI characterized of strict stakeholder focus, i.e. in this case with focus on 
the stakeholder group employees, the situation under stakeholder conflict described 
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above can be resolved and anticipated merger synergy through combination of 
synergistic resources can still be realized.  
Effective employee specific PMI measures would be, for example, the 
development of a cultural assessment where the two groups (A and T sales people) 
can identify their differences and similarities and develop a common understanding 
of business objectives, strategy, values and ethics, as well as leadership. Other 
measures could include the introduction of forums at all levels for sharing 
institutional history, vocabulary, formal and informal networks, management and 
work styles, or the identification of stakeholder expectations and problems, plus the 
design of a realistic process for addressing them. A key element would be active and 
continuous communication about the rationale for management decisions coming 
along with the merger and the integration progress to avoid rumors and distrust 
among sales staff, along with strong leadership and supervisory of the newly formed 
sales organization. Final implications of the outlined illustration example are the 
following findings: 
1. If management does not recognize the risk of a stakeholder conflict among sales 
employees, the stakeholder merger dis-synergy will be 𝜃𝐸𝑚𝑝
− = −10. 
2. Thus, coming from the expecting merger synergy of 𝜃𝐸𝑚𝑝
+ = 190 for the 
stakeholder group employees, the synergy impairment would reach the 
maximum amount of ?̌?𝐸𝑚𝑝 = (𝜃𝐸𝑚𝑝
+ − 𝑓𝐸𝑚𝑝𝜃𝐸𝑚𝑝
− ) = (190 − (−10) = 200 unless a 
PMI is conducted. 
3. If management manages to implement a PMI of high quality, i.e. 𝑓𝐸𝑚𝑝 → 𝑓𝐸𝑚𝑝
∗ =
−19, the realized remaining stakeholder synergy after direct PMI cost will be 
?̿?𝐸𝑚𝑝 = 190 − 𝛾𝐸𝑚𝑝
𝑚𝑎𝑥. Thus, almost resolving conflict and synergy impairment 
completely (?̌?𝐸𝑚𝑝 → −𝛾𝐸𝑚𝑝
𝑚𝑎𝑥). 
4. If management does not manage to conduct a stakeholder-oriented PMI of high 
quality, it would need at least a PMI quality of 𝑓𝐸𝑚𝑝
𝑚𝑖𝑛 < −9.5 −
𝛾𝐸𝑚𝑝
200
 to realize 
positive remaining stakeholder merger synergy ?̿?𝐸𝑚𝑝 ≥ 0. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
A lot of M&A transactions are executed because management of the merging firms 
expects high synergies which are supposed to lead to an increased post-merger value 
of the combined entity. When announcing the intended deal, managers often 
enthusiastically promise beneficial and long-term operating efficiencies to their 
shareholders. Yet, as soon as the merger or acquisition is completed, acquiring firms 
start stumbling during the integration period. In many cases, the considered 
synergies are not captured or even worse the post-merger outcome becomes negative. 
The bottom line is that M&A transactions finally fail and destroy shareholder value.  
In this paper, a post-merger stakeholder conflict hypothesis is established that 
outlines the poor post-acquisition performance of M&A, in particular of the acquiring 
firm. It theorizes post-merger conflict and power struggle between members of 
primary stakeholder groups, e.g. employees, customers, debt-holders, suppliers, etc. 
which lead to an impairment of anticipated merger synergies. Conflicts thereby 
emerge because essential stakeholder interests are violated through negative effects 
that M&A can cause. The established theoretical framework is based on a Cournot-
Nash solution concept which argues that stakeholders compete through conflictual 
behavior that ends up in an optimized stakeholder wealth equilibrium.  
This paper further shows that a high-quality post-merger integration that focuses 
on stakeholder interests serves as a mitigating mechanism to prevent value-
decreasing effects. It eventually concludes that PMI quality matters and not the 
capacity (in terms of manpower) devoted by the management to handle the 
integration process. Furthermore, the paper explains that a merger of equals contains 
the highest synergy potential and likewise the lowest risk of post-merger stakeholder 
conflict because target stakeholders have no incentive to oppose the merger. 
However, if conflict is unavoidable, the total synergy loss in a symmetrical Cournot-
Nash equilibrium is at least fifty percent and increases once post-merger stakeholder 
conflict becomes more decisive. 
 In the more common case of non-symmetrical, i.e. superior mergers, where a large 
acquirer purchases a small target, the result of post-merger stakeholder conflict 
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differs. The analysis points out that weaker endowed target stakeholders improve 
either their power or both their power and wealth while combating. This happens to 
the disadvantage of the acquiring firm’s stakeholders. They lose tremendously in 
terms of wealth once stakeholder conflict arises and remains unsolved. Therefore, 
stakeholder-oriented PMI measures become significantly important to align merging 
partners’ stakeholder interests and in addition, to keep target stakeholders from 
fighting.  
The minimum PMI quality which is necessary to prevent dis-synergy and to create 
at least positive synergy in post-merger conflict situations is also derived in this 
paper. The implication of the presented theory supports the prevailing opinion that 
the integration period is the most critical phase in corporate mergers and acquisitions. 
Moreover, a well-conducted PMI that addresses primary stakeholder interests has a 
positive impact on acquirers’ post-acquisition profitability.  
The theory constructed in this paper relies on several definitions and simplified 
assumptions. However, these assumptions provide the basis for the formalization 
and investigation of the underlying research question and for the application of a 
game-theory approach to derive the negative effects of intra-stakeholder conflicts on 
long-term M&A outcome. 
In a next step the developed theoretical framework of post-merger stakeholder 
conflicts has to be empirically tested to find evidence which, firstly, justifies the 
existence of stakeholder conflict and power struggle during the integration phase in 
M&A (Section 3), and secondly, verifies the mitigating and value-increasing effect of 
high-quality PMI (Section 4). 
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2.7 Appendix 
A1: Derivation of the symmetrical Cournot-Nash equilibrium in case of 
intra-stakeholder and multi-stakeholder conflict 
 
Symmetrical Cournot-Nash Equilibrium: 𝑅𝑠1 = 𝑅𝑠2 for all 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 
(i) Intra-stakeholder conflict, where 𝑛 = 1 and 𝑚 = 1, 1 < 𝑑 ≤ 2: 
𝑅𝐶𝑠1 : 
𝐹𝑠1 ∗ 𝐶𝑠1
1−𝑑
𝑑
𝐹𝑠2
𝑚 =
𝑚(𝐶𝑠1
1
𝑑 + 𝐶𝑠2
1
𝑑 )
𝐹𝑠1
𝑚 + 𝐹𝑠2
𝑚  
𝑅𝐶𝑠2 : 
𝐹𝑠2 ∗ 𝐶𝑠2
1−𝑑
𝑑
𝐹𝑠1
𝑚 =
𝑚(𝐶𝑠1
1
𝑑 + 𝐶𝑠2
1
𝑑 )
𝐹𝑠1
𝑚 + 𝐹𝑠2
𝑚  
The intersection between 𝑅𝐶𝑠1 and 𝑅𝐶𝑠2 solves equations above, so that in equilibrium 
the following condition holds: 𝐹𝑠1
∗ = 𝐹𝑠2
∗ . 
Set 𝑚 = 1 and 𝐹𝑠1 = 𝐹𝑠2: 
⇒
𝐹𝑠2 ∗ 𝐶𝑠2
1−𝑑
𝑑
𝐹𝑠2
=
𝐶𝑠1
1
𝑑 + 𝐶𝑠2
1
𝑑
𝐹𝑠2 + 𝐹𝑠2
 
⇔𝐶𝑠2
1−𝑑
𝑑 =
𝐶𝑠2
1
𝑑
𝐹𝑠2
 
⇒𝐹𝑠2 = 𝐹𝑠1 =
𝐶𝑠2
1
𝑑
𝐶𝑠2
1−𝑑
𝑑
= 𝐶𝑠2 = 𝐶𝑠1 
⇒𝑅𝑠1 = 𝐶𝑠1 + 𝐹𝑠1 ⇔𝑅𝑠1 = 2𝐶𝑠1 
Because of 𝑅𝑠1 = 𝑅𝑠2it follows: 
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     𝐹𝑠1 = 𝐹𝑠2 = 𝐶𝑠1   = 𝐶𝑠2  =
𝑅𝑠1+𝑅𝑠2  
4
    
(ii) Intra-stakeholder conflict, where 𝑛 = 1 and 𝑚 > 1, 1 < 𝑑 ≤ 2: 
⇒
𝐹𝑠1 ∗ 𝐶𝑠1
1−𝑑
𝑑
𝐹𝑠2
𝑚 =
𝑚(𝐶𝑠1
1
𝑑 + 𝐶𝑠2
1
𝑑 )
𝐹𝑠1
𝑚 + 𝐹𝑠2
𝑚  
Set 𝐹𝑠1 = 𝐹𝑠2: 
⇒
𝐹𝑠1 ∗ 𝐶𝑠1
1−𝑑
𝑑
𝐹𝑠1
𝑚 =
𝑚2𝐶𝑠1
1
𝑑
2𝐹𝑠1
𝑚  
⇔𝐹𝑠1 =
𝑚𝐶𝑠1
1
𝑑
𝐶𝑠1
1−𝑑
𝑑
= 𝑚𝐶𝑠1 
⇒𝑅𝑠1 = 𝑚𝐶𝑠1 + 𝐶𝑠1 = (𝑚 + 1)𝐶𝑠1 ⇔𝐶𝑠1 =
𝑅𝑠1
(𝑚 + 1)
 
⇒𝐹𝑠1 =
𝑅𝑠1
(𝑚 + 1)
. 
Because of 𝐹𝑠1 = 𝐹𝑠2 and 𝑅𝑠1 = 𝑅𝑠2 it follows: 
𝐹𝑠1 = 𝐹𝑠2  = 𝑚 ∗
𝑅𝑠1
(𝑚 + 1)
=
𝑚(𝑅𝑠1 + 𝑅𝑠2)
2(𝑚 + 1)
 
 
(iii) Multi-stakeholder conflict, where 𝑛 > 1 and 𝑚 ≥ 1, 1 < 𝑑 ≤ 2: 
𝛿𝜔𝑠𝑖
𝜂=1
𝛿𝐹𝑠𝑖
= 0 
⇒𝑅𝐶𝑠𝑖 : 
𝐹𝑠𝑖𝐶𝑠𝑖
1−𝑑
𝑑
(∑ ∑ 𝐹𝑠𝑖
𝑚𝑛
𝑠∈?̇?𝐹
2
𝑖=1 ) − 𝐹𝑠𝑖
𝑚
=
𝑚∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑠𝑖
1
𝑑𝑛
𝑠∈?̇?𝐹
2
𝑖=1
∑ ∑ 𝐹𝑠𝑖
𝑚𝑛
𝑠∈?̇?𝐹
2
𝑖=1
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The intersection between 2𝑛 reaction curves 𝑅𝐶𝑠𝑖 solves the 2𝑛 equations so that 
𝐹𝑠1 = 𝐹𝑠2 = ⋯ = 𝐹𝑛1 = 𝐹𝑛2 
⇒𝐹𝑠𝑖 =
𝑚∑ ∑ 𝑅𝑠𝑖
𝑛
𝑠=1
2
𝑖=1
2𝑛(𝑚 + 1)
 
 
A2: Derivation of the non-symmetrical Cournot-Nash equilibrium in case of 
intra-stakeholder conflict 
 
Non-symmetrical Cournot-Nash Equilibrium: 𝑅𝑠1 > 𝑅𝑠1 for all 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖. 
In this case a solution is only determinable through numerical iteration. At first, given 
a reasonable start value for 𝐹𝑠1 and 𝐹𝑠2the reaction curve equation 𝑅𝐶𝑠1is solved where 
𝑅𝐶𝑠1 = 0. The derived optimal fighting activity 𝐹𝑠1
∗  hence, again serves as a starting 
point for the solution of equation 𝑅𝐶𝑠2 = 0. As a result 𝐹𝑠2
∗  is derived. 
 
A3: Proof of Theorem 1 
 
Let 𝑅𝑠1 = 𝑅𝑠2 , 1 < 𝑑 ≤ 2, 𝐴 ≤ 1,𝑁 > 0, 𝑇 > 0 and 𝑚 ≥ 1. For 𝑛 = 1 (intra-stakeholder 
conflict) it follows: 
𝐹𝑠1 = 𝐹𝑠2 =
𝑚(𝑅𝑠1+𝑅𝑠2)
2(𝑚+1)
 and 𝐶𝑠1 =
𝑅𝑠1
𝑚+1
, 𝐶𝑠2 =
𝑅𝑠2
𝑚+1
. 
It is to show that: ?̃?𝑠𝑖 < 𝜔𝑠𝑖  for all 𝑖 = 1,2. 
⇒𝐴 ∗ ((
𝑅𝑠1
𝑚+ 1
)
1
𝑑
+ (
𝑅𝑠2
𝑚 + 1
)
1
𝑑
)
𝑑
∗
𝐹𝑠𝑖
𝑚
𝐹𝑠1
𝑚 + 𝐹𝑠2
𝑚 −
𝑇
2𝑁
< 𝜔𝑠𝑖  
For the reason that 𝑅𝑠1 = 𝑅𝑠2 , 𝜔𝑠𝑖 = 𝑅𝑠𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1,2 and 𝐹𝑠1 = 𝐹𝑠2 for all 𝑚 ≥ 1 it follows 
that 
𝐹𝑠𝑖
𝑚
𝐹𝑠1
𝑚+𝐹𝑠2
𝑚 =
1
2
. 
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⇒
𝐴
2
 ∗ ((
𝑅𝑠𝑖
𝑚+ 1
)
1
𝑑
+ (
𝑅𝑠𝑖
𝑚 + 1
)
1
𝑑
)
𝑑
−
𝑇
2𝑁
< 𝑅𝑠𝑖 
⇔ 
𝐴
2
 ∗ (2(
𝑅𝑠𝑖
𝑚 + 1
)
1
𝑑
)
𝑑
−
𝑇
2𝑁
< 𝑅𝑠𝑖 
⇔ 
𝐴
2
 ∗ (2𝑑 ∗
𝑅𝑠𝑖
𝑚 + 1
) −
𝑇
2𝑁
< 𝑅𝑠𝑖 
⇔
𝐴
2
2𝑑 ∗ (
𝑅𝑠𝑖
𝑚 + 1
) −
𝑇
2𝑁
< 𝑅𝑠𝑖 
⇔𝑅𝑠𝑖𝐴2
𝑑−2𝑅𝑠𝑖(𝑚 + 1) <
𝑇(𝑚 + 1)
𝑁
 
⇔𝑅𝑠𝑖(𝐴2
𝑑 − 2𝑚 − 2) <
𝑇(𝑚 + 1)
𝑁
 
 
The left term of the equation is always smaller or equal to zero because it holds that 
𝑚 ≥ 1,𝐴 ≤ 1 and 2𝑑 ∈ ]1,4] for all 1 < 𝑑 ≤ 2. The right term of the equation is always 
positive for 𝑁 > 0 and 𝑇 > 0. Therefore, the equation derived above is fulfilled for all 
𝑖 = 1,2 so that ?̃?𝑠𝑖 < 𝜔𝑠𝑖∎ 
 
A4: Proof of Theorem 2 
 
For 𝑅𝑠1 > 𝑅𝑠2 so that 𝐹𝑠2
∗ →𝑅𝑠2 it is to show that 
(i) ?̃?𝑠2 > 𝜔𝑠2 and at the same time, 
(ii) 
𝑞𝑠1
∗
𝑞𝑠2
∗ <
𝑅𝑠1
𝑅𝑠2
 in equilibrium. 
If condition (i) is fulfilled, condition (ii) is also fulfilled. Let 𝑅𝑠1 = 𝑘𝑅𝑠2 where 𝑘 →∞ 
and 𝑞𝑠𝑖 =
𝐹𝑠𝑖
𝑚
𝐹𝑠1
𝑚+𝐹𝑠2
𝑚. 
If 𝑅𝑠1 > 𝑅𝑠2 ⇒𝐹𝑠1
∗ > 𝐹𝑠2
∗ ⇒ 𝑞𝑠1
∗ > 𝑞𝑠2
∗ . 
54 
 
With 𝐹𝑠2
∗ →𝑅𝑠2 it follows that 𝐶𝑠2 = 𝑅𝑠2 − 𝐹𝑠2
∗ →
1
𝑘
. 
⇒𝐴 ∗ ((𝐶𝑠1)
1
𝑑 + (
1
𝑘
)
1
𝑑
)
𝑑
∗ 𝑞𝑠2
∗ −
𝑇
2𝑁
> 𝑅𝑠2 
𝑅𝑠1 = 𝑘 ∗ 𝑅𝑠2 ⇒ 𝐶𝑠1 = 𝑘 ∗ 𝑅𝑠2 − 𝐹𝑠1
∗  
⇒𝐴 ∗ ((𝑘𝑅𝑠2 − 𝐹𝑠1
∗ )
1
𝑑 + (
1
𝑘
)
1
𝑑
)
𝑑
∗ 𝑞𝑠2
∗ −
𝑇
2𝑁
> 𝑅𝑠2 
Condition (ii) holds in the extreme case where 𝑘 →∞: 
𝑞𝑠2
∗ =
𝐹𝑠2
∗ 𝑚
𝐹𝑠1
∗ 𝑚+𝐹𝑠2
∗ 𝑚 and it holds that 𝐹𝑠1
∗ > 𝐹𝑠2
∗  where 𝐹𝑠2
∗ →𝑅𝑠2. It follows: 
 
𝑞𝑠2
∗ =
𝑅𝑠2
𝑚
𝐹𝑠1
∗ 𝑚 + 𝑅𝑠2
𝑚 < 𝑞𝑠1
∗ = (1 − 𝑞𝑠2
∗ ) 
⇒
𝑞𝑠1
∗
𝑞𝑠2
∗ <
𝑅𝑠1
𝑅𝑠2
= 𝑘, 𝑘 →∞∎ 
 
A5: Proof of Theorem 3 
 
Let ∆𝜃𝑠1 =
?̃?𝑠1
𝜔𝑠1
− 1 and 1 < 𝑑 ≤ 2, 𝐴 ≤ 1. 
It is to show that for 𝜂 = 0 (no conflict) and 𝜂 = 1 (conflict) the following condition is 
fulfilled: 
∆𝜃𝑠1(𝑅𝑠1 = 𝑅𝑠2) > ∆𝜃𝑠1(𝑅𝑠1 > 𝑅𝑠2), 𝑠1 ∈ 𝑆1. 
Let 𝜔𝑠1
𝐸 = 𝜔𝑠1
𝑈 = 𝑅𝑠1where index 𝐸 stands for equal size and index 𝑈 for unequal size. 
For 𝑅𝑠1 = 𝑅𝑠2 it follows: 
⇒ ?̃?𝑠1
𝐸 = 𝐴(𝑅𝑠1
1
𝑑 + 𝑅𝑠2
1
𝑑 )𝑑 ∗ 𝑞𝑠1
𝐸 −
𝑇
2𝑁
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⇔ ?̃?𝑠1
𝐸 = 𝐴(2𝑅𝑠1
1
𝑑 )
𝑑
∗ 𝑞𝑠1
𝐸 −
𝑇
2𝑁
. 
For 𝑅𝑠1 > 𝑅𝑠2 and  𝑅𝑠1 = 𝑘𝑅𝑠2 ⇔𝑅𝑠2 =
𝑅𝑠1
𝑘
, 𝑘 ∈ ]1,∞[: 
?̃?𝑠1
𝑈 = 𝐴(𝑅𝑠1
1
𝑑 + 𝑅𝑠2
1
𝑑 )𝑑 ∗ 𝑞𝑠1
𝑈 −
𝑇
2𝑁
 
⇔ ?̃?𝑠1
𝑈 = 𝐴(𝑅𝑠1
1
𝑑 + (
𝑅𝑠1
𝑘
)
1
𝑑
)
𝑑
∗ 𝑞𝑠1
𝑈 −
𝑇
2𝑁
 
It is to show that 
?̃?𝑠1
𝐸
𝜔𝑠1
𝐸 >
?̃?𝑠1
𝑈
𝜔𝑠1
𝑈  for both 𝜂 = 0 and 𝜂 = 1. 
(i) 𝜂 = 0: 
𝐴(2𝑅𝑠1
1
𝑑 )
𝑑
∗ 𝑞𝑠1
𝐸 −
𝑇
2𝑁
𝜔𝑠1
𝐸 >
𝐴(𝑅𝑠1
1
𝑑 + (
𝑅𝑠1
𝑘
)
1
𝑑
)
𝑑
∗ 𝑞𝑠1
𝑈 −
𝑇
2𝑁
𝜔𝑠1
𝑈  
⇔𝐴(2𝑅𝑠1
1
𝑑 )
𝑑
∗ 𝑞𝑠1
𝐸 −
𝑇
2𝑁
> 𝐴(𝑅𝑠1
1
𝑑 + (
𝑅𝑠1
𝑘
)
1
𝑑
)
𝑑
∗ 𝑞𝑠1
𝑈 −
𝑇
2𝑁
. 
With 𝑞𝑠1
𝐸 =
1
2
 and 𝑞𝑠1
𝑈 =
𝑅𝑠1
𝑅𝑠1+
𝑅𝑠1
𝑘
 it follows: 
𝐴
2
2𝑑𝑅𝑠1 −
𝑇
2𝑁
> 𝐴 ∗
𝑅𝑠1
𝑅𝑠1 +
𝑅𝑠1
𝑘
∗ (𝑅𝑠1
1
𝑑 + (
𝑅𝑠1
𝑘
)
1
𝑑
)
𝑑
−
𝑇
2𝑁
 
⇔
2𝑑𝑅𝑠1
2
>
𝑅𝑠1
𝑅𝑠1 +
𝑅𝑠1
𝑘
∗ (𝑅𝑠1
1
𝑑 + (
𝑅𝑠1
𝑘
)
1
𝑑
)
𝑑
 
⇔
1
2
(2𝑑𝑅𝑠1 +
2𝑑𝑅𝑠1
𝑘
) > (𝑅𝑠1
1
𝑑 + (
𝑅𝑠1
𝑘
)
1
𝑑
)
𝑑
. 
This equation holds for all 𝑅𝑠1 > 0, 1 < 𝑑 ≤ 2, 𝑘 ∈ ]1,∞[. For example set 𝑑 = 2 and 
𝑘 = 2: 
56 
 
2𝑅𝑠1 >
𝑅𝑠1
𝑅𝑠1 +
𝑅𝑠1
2
(𝑅𝑠1
1
2 + (
𝑅𝑠1
2
)
1
2
)
2
 
⇔3𝑅𝑠1 >
3
2
𝑅𝑠1 +
2𝑅𝑠1
√2
 
⇔𝑅𝑠1 > 𝑅𝑠1 (
1
2
+
2
3√2
) 
⇔1 >
1
2
+
2
3√2
, 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒! 
(ii) 𝜂 = 1: For the derivation of ?̃?𝑠1
𝐸 (𝑅𝑠1 = 𝑅𝑠2) it holds: 𝐹𝑠1 = 𝐹𝑠1 =
𝑚(𝑅𝑠1+𝑅𝑠2)
2(𝑚+1)
 and 𝐶𝑠1 =
𝐶𝑠2 =
𝑅𝑠1
𝑚+1
. With 𝑚 ≥ 1 and 𝑞𝑠1
𝐸 =
1
2
 it follows: 
⇒?̃?𝑠1
𝐸 =
𝐴
2
∗ (2 (
𝑅𝑠1
𝑚 + 1
)
1
𝑑
)
𝑑
−
𝑇
2𝑁
. 
For ?̃?𝑠1
𝑈 (𝑅𝑠1 > 𝑅𝑠2), where 𝑅𝑠1 = 𝑘𝑅𝑠2 ⇔𝑅𝑠2 =
𝑅𝑠1
𝑘
, 𝑘 ∈ ]1,∞[ and 𝑞𝑠1
𝑈 =
𝐹𝑠1
𝑚
𝐹𝑠1
𝑚+𝐹𝑠2
𝑚 it 
follows: 
?̃?𝑠1
𝑈 = 𝐴∗
𝐹𝑠1
𝑚
𝐹𝑠1
𝑚 + 𝐹𝑠2
𝑚 (𝐶𝑠1
1
𝑑 + 𝐶𝑠2
1
𝑑 )
𝑑
−
𝑇
2𝑁
 
⇔ ?̃?𝑠1
𝑈 = 𝐴∗
𝐹𝑠1
𝑚
𝐹𝑠1
𝑚 + 𝐹𝑠2
𝑚 ((𝑅𝑠1 − 𝐹𝑠1)
1
𝑑 + (𝑅𝑠2 − 𝐹𝑠2)
1
𝑑)
𝑑
−
𝑇
2𝑁
. 
It is to show that ?̃?𝑠1
𝐸 > ?̃?𝑠1
𝑈  for 𝜂 = 1, i.e.: 
2𝑑
2
(
𝑅𝑠1
𝑚 + 1
) >
𝐹𝑠1
𝑚
𝐹𝑠1
𝑚 + 𝐹𝑠2
𝑚 ((𝑅𝑠1 − 𝐹𝑠1)
1
𝑑 + (𝑅𝑠2 − 𝐹𝑠2)
1
𝑑)
𝑑
 
In equilibrium of conflict between two unequally endowed stakeholders it holds that 
𝐹𝑠1
∗ > 𝐹𝑠2
∗ . Consequently, it holds: 𝑞𝑠2
∗ < 0.5 < 𝑞𝑠1
∗ < 1. 
The equation derived above only holds for the case where decisiveness of conflict is 
low, i.e. 𝑚 = 1.  
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For example let 𝑅𝑠1 = 200,𝑅𝑠2 = 100 and set 𝑑 = 1.25 and 𝑚 = 1: 
In equilibrium where 𝐹𝑠1
∗ = 77 and 𝐹𝑠2
∗ = 68 if follows: 
21.25
2
(
200
1 + 1
) >
77
77 + 68
((200 − 77)
1
1.25 + (100 − 68)
1
1.25)
1.25
 
⇔118.92 > 94.03 (𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒!) 
 
But for example if 𝑚 = 1.5 it follows: 
21.25
2
(
200
1.5 + 1
) >
921.5
921.5 + 801.5
((200 − 92)
1
1.25 + (100 − 80)
1
1.25)
1.25
 
⇔79.28 > 82.34 (𝑤𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔!)∎ 
 
A6: Proof of Theorem 4 
 
Let 𝜃𝑠 = 𝑓𝑠𝜃𝑠
− ≥ 0, ?̌?𝑠 ≥ 0 and 𝛾𝑠 ≥ 0. Following condition has to hold: 
 
𝜃𝑠 − ?̌?𝑠 − 𝛾𝑠 > 0⇔ 𝑓𝑠𝜃𝑠
− − (𝜃𝑠
+ − 𝑓𝑠𝜃𝑠
−) − 𝛾𝑠 > 0⇔ 2𝑓𝑠𝜃𝑠
− > 𝜃𝑠
+ + 𝛾𝑠 
⇔𝑓𝑠 <
𝜃𝑠
+
2𝜃𝑠
− +
𝛾𝑠
2𝜃𝑠
−⇔𝑓𝑠
𝑚𝑖𝑛 <
1
2
𝑓𝑠
∗ +
𝛾𝑠
2𝜃𝑠
−. 
Due to the prerequisite that 𝛾𝑠 ≥ 0 it follows the condition: 𝑓𝑠
∗ < 𝑓𝑠
𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤
1
2
𝑓𝑠
∗ to realize 
a positive residual ?̿?𝑠 > 0 of stakeholder merger synergy, with ?̿?𝑠 = 𝜃𝑠 − ?̌?𝑠 − 𝛾𝑠∎ 
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3  
Synergy Deterioration through Stakeholder Conflict in 
M&A and its Effect on Long-Term Acquirer 
Performance 
 
Abstract  
This paper analyzes 1,035 effective US mergers and acquisitions in the period 
2005-2014. It finds a significant negative long-run financial and operating 
performance measured by buy-and-hold abnormal returns and abnormal 
operating cash flow returns. On average, US acquirers achieve a -8.2% stock 
price underperformance and a decline in pre-tax operating cash flow returns 
of -3.1% in the subsequent 36 months. The paper confirms that cash-financed 
transactions and the takeover of private targets positively impact M&A 
profitability. Controlling for certain firm and deal characteristics, further 
determinants are identified and tested which firstly, negatively influence 
synergy realization in general, and secondly, encourage post-merger 
stakeholder conflicts that reinforce synergy impairment, or even lead to dis-
synergy. Based on robust results of multivariate regression analyses on 
acquirer performance, this paper concludes that the main post-merger value-
influencing factors are integration capacity, complementarity of economic 
environment, and decisiveness of stakeholder conflict. This ultimately 
justifies the theoretical foundation of the existence of post-merger stakeholder 
conflicts and the need for a well-managed PMI as a mitigating mechanism to 
improve M&A performance.  
Keywords: Mergers, acquisitions, post-merger integration, buy-and-hold 
abnormal return, operating performance, stakeholder conflict, cultural 
distance, geographic distance, cross-border M&A 
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3.1 Introduction 
This paper makes two essential contributions to the existing finance literature on 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Firstly, it re-examines the financial and operating 
performance of US acquirers by using long-term performance measures and a more 
accurate benchmarking methodology of non-merging firms portfolios matched by 
size and book-to-market ratio to eliminate commonly known biases. Secondly, this 
paper emphasizes the post-merger integration (PMI) as the most synergistic and 
value creative phase of the M&A process with focus on a firm’s primary stakeholders 
and their interests. It identifies and empirically tests factors that might encourage 
post-merger stakeholder conflicts with a significant influence on M&A performance. 
Corporate M&A are an important strategic means of investment to create external 
growth opportunities for company shareholders. Despite consistently strong M&A 
activity, failure rates still remain at a high level. There are countless examples of 
transactions that did not achieve initially anticipated merger objectives, like 
synergies, market growth, or technology access (Dessein et al., 2006). For instance, 
more than fifty percent of investigated US acquisitions destroy value for acquiring 
firms’ shareholders, whereas target owners significantly benefit (Agrawal et al., 1992). 
Conceptualization and subsequent execution of M&A transactions seem to expose 
promising value-effects from a solely business case point of view. Nevertheless, the 
following integration period seems to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, 
acquirer management has to deliver and realize synergies to justify its merger motive 
and to satisfy its shareholders. On the other hand, there are further essential 
stakeholders whose interests need to be carefully aligned to the newly formed entity 
and its strategy. Thus, conflict during the integration period is sure to follow if 
management fails to integrate for all primary stakeholders, and not only for 
shareholders at the expense of employees, customers, suppliers, and debt-holders. At 
least it is the stakeholders and not the shareholders that are directly confronted by 
organizational changes, restructuring processes, and integration challenges caused 
by the M&A transaction. An unpreventable intervention in stakeholders’ intimate 
environment arises. As a result it seems to be obvious that those developments lead 
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to potential post-acquisition problems and conflicts.  
Besides the well-founded agency conflict in publicly listed firms, due to separation 
of ownership and control, there exists little evidence in M&A research that deals with 
conflicts among merging firms’ primary stakeholders during the PMI. This study 
aims to bridge the gap between finance research on M&A – that prioritizes 
shareholder interests and shareholder value maximization (Jensen and Ruback, 1983) 
– and strategic management literature with increasing scholarly attention paid to the 
stakeholder theory of the firm and its impact on corporate performance (Parmer et 
al., 2010; Choi and Wang, 2009) and acquisition outcome (Bettinazzi and Zollo, 2017). 
This heterogeneous approach in examining M&A performance might be one 
reason why research results in this field show high variance. Both finance and 
management scholars often easily agree on the conclusion that post-merger problems 
are responsible for acquiring firms’ negative M&A performance. Therefore, they 
argue that PMI plays a decisive role in M&A. But to date, neither a theoretical 
framework nor an empirical analysis confirms this conclusion. In addition, an 
orientation towards stakeholders during the integration process is still missing. 
A central objective of the present study – given the assumption that managers 
seriously seek synergies in their acquisition bids – is the identification of determinants 
that can cause value-decreasing, i.e. non-cooperative instead of synergistic 
stakeholder actions during the integration process of strategic M&A. The theoretical 
foundation of the “post-merger stakeholder conflict hypothesis” which is based on 
reapplication of Hirshleifer’s paradox of power (Hirshleifer, 1991) serves as a starting 
point. Within this framework, certain parameters are described that influence 
aggregated post-merger stakeholder wealth. This paper tests these parameters 
empirically by applying appropriate proxies of so-called “stakeholder conflict 
factors” (SCF) in PMI. Ultimately, implications of the empirical findings amplify the 
hypothesis that the acquirer management should focus on primary stakeholder 
interests in its integration efforts to protect and realize identified merger synergies. 
This in turn can also enhance long-term M&A performance compared to acquirers 
that fail to integrate for stakeholders. Therefore, PMI serves as a value-enhancing 
factor to mitigate the negative impact of stakeholder conflict on long-term M&A 
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performance.  
Primary stakeholders considered in this paper are employees, customers, 
financiers (debt- and shareholders), suppliers, and management itself (Clarkson, 
1995; Freeman, 2010). They are important for a firm’s existence and have either direct 
or indirect impact on its future cash flows and hence, on future synergy flows.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the theoretical 
motivation and research hypotheses to be tested. Section 3.3 describes the data and 
methodology. Section 3.4 presents empirical results of the analyses. Section 3.5 
summarizes and concludes the article. 
3.2 Stakeholder Conflict Factors in PMI 
There exist two trends in the literature concerning the analysis of M&A performance. 
On the one hand, finance scholars typically focus on short-term examination of M&A 
announcement effects, usually within a three to ten-day event window. They ignore 
returns in the post-merger period by arguing that capital markets are efficient and 
incorporate all important information accurately and promptly in the stock price. On 
the other hand, previous studies analyze long-term stock price performance or 
operating profitability, assuming that the market does not perfectly adjust to a merger 
event in the post-acquisition period. Results of those studies therefore imply that 
post-merger abnormal returns are inconsistent with market efficiency.  
Literature to date on long-run M&A performance documents a consistent 
underperformance of US acquirers in the past five decades. Table 6 lists selected 
studies covering an overall investigation period from 1955-2010, exclusively focusing 
on US acquirers, applying different methods to calculate long-term abnormal returns, 
and using event windows that range from 24-60 months. All of them report a negative 
outcome for the bidder firm of -6.5% to -16.8%.  
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Table 6: Research Studies on US Acquirers’ M&A Performance 
The table reports different articles with analyses and findings on US acquirers’ underperformance in M&A covering 
the overall period from 1955-2010 
Study Period Sample Size Methodology Returns Event period  
Agrawal et al. (1992) 1955-1987 765 CAR -10.3%** 60 months 
Loughran & Vijh (1997) 1970-1989 947 BHAR -6.5% 60 months 
Rau & Vermaelen (1998) 1980-1991 2,823 CAR -4.0%*** 36 months 
Megginson et al. (2004) 1977-1996 204 BHAR -9.9%** 24 months 
Cui (2018) 1980-2010 7,668 BHAR -16.8%*** 36 months 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
For the reason that the major focus is on the analysis of value-effects of stakeholder 
conflict factors in the post-merger integration period, the present article also applies 
long-term methodology to capture and re-examine the value effects for US acquirers. 
Apart from the existing economic theories, i.e. value-maximizing theories, and 
agency-based hypotheses (which in general predict non-value-maximizing M&A 
performance), the underlying empirical work primarily is grounded upon the 
theoretical thoughts of the stakeholder conflict theory in M&A which is developed 
from reapplication of Hirshleifer’s paradox of power (Hirshleifer, 1991).  Among 
others, the theory approaches the following questions in M&A: Why does stakeholder 
conflict arise post-merger? How does the conflict affect synergy realization? What 
role do differences in stakeholder power play (in terms of initial resource 
endowments or wealth)? Within this framework, intra-stakeholder conflicts between 
acquirer and target members of a primary stakeholder group – for example, 
employees – are the major source of synergy impairments. Stakeholders start to 
oppose the transaction post-merger by acting non-productively. The merged firm’s 
post-merger stakeholder wealth function according to the post-merger stakeholder 
conflict hypothesis is defined as: 
?̃?𝑠 = 𝑞𝑠1 [𝐴(𝐶𝑠1
1
𝑑 + 𝐶𝑠2
1
𝑑 )𝑑] − 𝑐𝑠1 + 𝑞𝑠2 [𝐴(𝐶𝑠1
1
𝑑 + 𝐶𝑠2
1
𝑑 )𝑑] − 𝑐𝑠2,  (33) 
with the conflict functions 𝑞𝑠𝑖  and resource endowments 𝑅𝑠𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2:  
𝑞𝑠1 =
𝐹𝑠1
𝑚
𝐹𝑠1
𝑚+𝐹𝑠2
𝑚, 𝑞𝑠2 = (1 − 𝑞𝑠1) and 𝑅𝑠𝑖 = 𝐶𝑠𝑖 + 𝐹𝑠𝑖 ,  (34) 
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where 𝐶𝑠1, 𝐶𝑠2 are the productive and 𝐹𝑠1, 𝐹𝑠2 the non-productive resources of the 
acquiring firm’s stakeholder 𝑠1 and the target firm’s stakeholder 𝑠2. Factor 𝐴 ≤ 1 
measures the utilization of integration capacity, 𝑑 ∈ ]1,2] is a complementarity index, 
𝑚 an index for decisiveness of stakeholder conflict, and 𝑐𝑠1, 𝑐𝑠2 are the fixed cost of 
merging, equally shared by target and acquirer stakeholders. 
On the one hand, the model emphasizes the power relations (𝑅𝑠1vs. 𝑅𝑠2) between 
acquiring and target firms’ stakeholder groups which become important in conflict 
situations. Dependent of the deal size of an acquisition (that serves as a proxy for the 
ratio between acquirer and target stakeholders’ resource endowments 𝑅𝑠𝑖), there are 
different alternatives for productive (𝐶𝑠𝑖) or non-productive (𝐹𝑠𝑖) actions. 
Furthermore, the model integrates the three general parameters 𝐴, 𝑑,𝑚 which affect 
each stakeholder’s private wealth function, and similarly, the aggregated post-merger 
stakeholder wealth function of the transaction: (i) acquiring firm’s integration 
capacity, (ii) merger complementarity, and (iii) decisiveness of stakeholder conflict. 
Whereas the first two parameters (𝐴 and 𝑑) generally impact the degree of synergy 
realization, the third one (𝑚) substantially determines the overall extent of synergy 
impairment in case of stakeholder conflict.  
Merger complementarity consists of three dimensions of congruence between 
acquirer and target firm: firstly, complementarity of businesses, products and 
markets (organizational dimension); secondly, complementarity of economic sphere, 
legal systems, economic laws and regulations (economic dimension); thirdly, 
complementarity of culture, values, language, and business practices (sociocultural 
dimension). High complementarities in all of these dimensions foster synergistic 
combination of stakeholder resources, eventually resulting in higher post-merger 
stakeholder wealth (King et al., 2004). Yet, in the minority of M&A transactions, post-
merger integration and reorganization activities go along without any difficulties. 
Typically, familiar organizational structures, business processes and functions erode, 
routine work flows get stuck, corporate leadership and values change, uncertainty 
arises, and so on. All these transformative developments can negatively influence 
stakeholder interests and thereby make a higher level of orientation toward important 
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stakeholder groups indispensable at this stage of a M&A process. Otherwise, merger 
synergy is impaired and in case the conflict escalates (i.e. decisiveness of conflict is 
high), M&A profitability diminishes and becomes negative. 
Whether decisiveness of stakeholder conflict is high or low mainly depends on two 
aspects. The first is the importance of the merger, respectively the underlying merger 
synergies, for an acquirer’s growth story. If the acquiring firm suffers on low internal 
growth opportunities, a synergy-impairing post-merger stakeholder conflict will 
become more decisive compared to value acquirers which are less dependent on 
synergy realization (due to other growth sources). The second aspect is the direct 
confrontation between merging firms’ stakeholders, which of course will fuel conflict 
potential if they expect their interests to be impaired. This happens when both firms 
are consolidated and, for example, employees of both parties have to work together 
under the same roof. 
To identify appropriate stakeholder conflict factors, it is insufficient to merely 
apply deal and acquirer characteristics commonly used in finance research that 
mainly account for the transaction phase in acquisitions (e.g. method of payment, 
target’s public status, or acquirer size). Nevertheless, those variables are employed in 
this empirical study as controls to achieve reliable and robust multivariate regression 
results (refer to Section 3.4.3).  
An explanatory variable to test for merger performance impact has to fulfill certain 
requirements to be set as a stakeholder conflict factor (SCF) in PMI. Firstly, its 
performance-influencing characteristic primarily takes effect in the post-merger 
period, i.e. from the day of merger completion until three years afterwards (event 
window of interest). Secondly, the factor has to be covered by and tested on a reliable 
proxy for the underlying model parameters 𝐴, 𝑑,𝑚, and the ratio of 𝑅𝑠2 to 𝑅𝑠1 of the 
outlined aggregated stakeholder wealth function above. In particular, 
complementarity issues between the merging firms need to be fully covered because 
deviations in the defined dimensions contain a high stakeholder conflict potential, 
above all in large and complex M&A transactions. If resources for a well-managed 
integration process are low or not existent, stakeholder conflict will arise or even be 
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reinforced. To control for the decisiveness of conflicts, geographic proximity (distance 
in miles between bidder and target home country) and an acquirer’s growth prospects 
are used as proxies in this paper.  
Finally, the following SCF which fulfill the requirements mentioned above are 
empirically studied in this article: deal size, acquirer pre-deal M&A activity, business 
relatedness, cross-border M&A, cultural distance, geographic distance, and acquirer 
growth prospects. 
Deal size 
Deal size, i.e. the relative size of the target compared to the acquiring firm, is used to 
account for the differences in pre-merger wealth between target stakeholders and 
acquirer stakeholders. According to the theoretical framework, relative size matters 
in post-merger stakeholder conflicts because in (extreme) superior M&A where a 
relatively small target is acquired, the party perceived as weaker (in terms of wealth) 
has the paradox incentive to oppose the merger and fight for its interests. As long as 
decisiveness of conflict is at a low level, the opponent then increases its post-merger 
wealth compared to not combating. Therefore, in case of a merger of equals where 
the companies’ sizes are more or less equal (deal size = 1), the acquirer will be better 
off in case of conflict (due to the missing incentive for the target to combat).  
Nevertheless, mixed interpretations exist in the literature regarding deal size and 
its impact on M&A performance. On the one hand, researchers claim that large 
acquisitions destroy more value than small ones because of higher complexity in post-
merger integration and consequently higher uncertainty in realizing expected 
synergies (Shrivastava, 1986; Hayward, 2002). For example, Alexandridis et al. (2011) 
find in their analysis that the acquisition of large compared to small targets 
significantly reduces both long-term share price and operating performance. On the 
other hand, existing literature documents a positive impact of deal size on M&A 
profitability because of larger and more significant synergies (economies of scale and 
economies of scope). This paper agrees to the latter interpretation of deal size. 
Therefore, and due to the objective of testing the justification of the post-merger 
stakeholder conflict theory, the following hypothesis is formulated:  
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Hypothesis 1: Post-merger acquirer performance increases with the acquisition of relatively 
large targets because of decreasing probability of arising post-merger stakeholder conflict (due 
to reduced target stakeholders’ incentive to fight for their interests).  
 Deal frequency 
Pre-deal M&A activity is used as a proxy for (i) an acquirer’s integration capacity. 
Deal frequency determines integration capacity (and productivity) because if the 
acquirer has executed several large transactions in the recent past, resources for a 
well-managed integration are limited. As a consequence, synergy realization in 
general, and more specifically, the alignment of conflicting stakeholder interests 
becomes difficult. For instance, Conn et al. (2005) analyze a sample of UK acquirers 
from 1984-1998. Applying different short-term and long-run performance measures, 
the authors find a robust pattern of declining performance for multiple acquirers 
whose acquisitions all took place shortly after previous deals. They therefore 
conclude a significantly negative relationship between bid order and M&A 
performance. They do not find any support of M&A learning effects from previous 
acquisitions. 
Hypothesis 2: If acquirers’ integration capacity is low, stakeholder conflict is more likely to 
arise or in case of already existent conflict, more likely to reinforce. This impairs acquirers’ 
long-term M&A profitability. 
Relatedness 
Relatedness is applied as a proxy for (ii) merger complementarity with a) a focus on 
business congruence (in terms of industry, products, markets, business objective). 
Complementarity of business has two main positive effects during the post-merger 
phase. Firstly, horizontal or focused M&A are supposed to generate higher synergy 
potential compared to non-related, i.e. diversified transactions. Secondly, stakeholder 
interests are easier to align compared to diversified transactions because they are 
supposed to be more congruent, too. It is therefore hypothesized: 
Hypothesis 3a: Acquirer M&A performance increases with the acquisition of related targets 
in terms of business congruency because of reduced probability of stakeholder conflict. 
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Cross-border M&A 
To test the justification of (ii) merger complementarity with b) a focus on economic 
environment (in terms of economic sphere, legal systems, policy, employment law 
and regulations) the cross-border flag is used as a proxy. The argument behind it is 
that cross-country transactions compared to domestic M&A bear higher risk of post-
merger stakeholder conflict if economic complementarity is low. For instance, when 
an acquirer purchases a target in a country where labor rights are not respected or the 
political situation is unstable.  
Hypothesis 3b: Cross-border M&A encourage post-merger stakeholder conflict due to less 
economic complementarity. Thus, acquirer acquisition performance declines. 
Cultural distance 
Cultural distance is applied as a proxy for (ii) merger complementarity with c) a focus 
on sociocultural factors (in terms of culture, language, and business practices). 
Cultural differences such as language barriers are a big challenge in post-merger 
integration activities. They can cause tremendous problems if top management fails 
to pay attention on those allegedly weak factors. One considers the simple situation 
where, for instance, a US firm acquirers a Chinese company and shortly after deal 
closure the acquirer declares unequivocally American English to be the business 
language. It seems to be obvious that most of the Chinese employees will experience 
a strong impairment of their interests. Therefore, it is argued that the probability of 
stakeholder conflict increases with higher cultural distance. 
Hypothesis 3c: If cultural distance between bidder and target is high, risk of post-merger 
stakeholder conflict is high, too. As a consequence, synergy impairs and M&A profitability of 
the acquirer decreases.   
Geographic distance 
A further parameter to be empirically tested in this paper is (iii) decisiveness of 
conflict with a) a focus on geographic proximity. Arising post-merger stakeholder 
conflict might be mitigated through a high geographic distance between an acquirer’s 
and a target’s home country. It is supposed that a physical separation and missing 
direct stakeholder confrontation, as well as the possible perception of still being a 
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stand-alone entity, reduce post-merger problems between stakeholders.  
Hypothesis 4a: High geographic distance has a mitigating effect on stakeholder conflict and 
therefore a positive impact on acquirers’ long-run M&A performance.   
Book-to-market ratio 
The book-to-market ratio serves as a proxy for (iii) decisiveness of conflict with b) a 
focus on an acquirer’s growth perspective. Weak internal growth opportunities 
encourage companies to conduct M&A to create at least external growth. Therefore 
one can argue that decisiveness of conflict increases with an acquirer’s lower internal 
growth prospects (decreasing book-to-market ratio) because the synergy motive of an 
executed deal becomes more important, as well as the realization of synergies during 
the post-acquisition integration period. Otherwise, in case of failure, there would be 
a wasted opportunity for external growth. 
Hypothesis 4b: Acquirers’ growth prospects drive decisiveness of stakeholder conflict. As a 
consequence, a weak internal growth outlook (low book-to-market ratio) makes emerging 
conflict more decisive and in turn acquirers’ M&A transaction less profitable. 
3.3 Data Sample and Methodology 
3.3.1 Data and Sources 
This paper analyzes a sample of mergers and acquisitions by US publicly listed firms, 
completed between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2014. The sample is drawn 
from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) online US Mergers and Acquisitions 
Database. The sample is limited to strategic M&A, i.e. to mergers defined as a 
combination of business that takes place or the takeover of one hundred percent of 
the stock of a public or private target, and to acquisitions of majority interest (acquirer 
has a stake of less than fifty percent before the acquisition and seeks to acquire fifty 
percent or more, but less than one hundred percent of the target firm’s equity). There 
are 1,035 M&A transactions identified that meet the following sampling criteria: 
1. The acquirer is a US company listed either on the NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX. 
2. The target is not a subsidiary and can either be private or public. 
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3. The primary rationale for a M&A transaction is either synergy or operating 
efficiency. 
4. Neither the bidder nor the target operate in the Finance, Insurance, or Real Estate 
industry (Standard Industrial Classification Codes (SIC) 60-67).6 
5. The deal value is equal to or greater than one hundred million US dollars.7 
6. Monthly acquirer price and return data are available in the Thomson Reuters 
DataStream database for a 36-month period after deal completion. 
7. Accounting data is available in the Thomson Reuters DataStream database from 
three years prior until three years following the effective year of the transaction. 
 
Table 7 presents summary statistics of the final M&A sample on an annual basis. Most 
deals were closed in 2007 with 150 transactions. The year before, 2006 shows the 
highest aggregate deal value (305 billion USD), whereas in 2009 the highest average 
USD value is paid (3.36 billion USD). The mean sample deal value is 1.98 billion USD. 
171 transactions (17%) take place cross-border (between an entity in the US and one 
based in a foreign country), and 572 (55%) are purely cash-financed. The majority of 
667 M&A (65%) are public transactions, i.e. M&A between a publicly listed acquirer 
and target.  
                                                     
6 Firms that belong to these industries are subject to special accounting and regulatory requirements, 
making them difficult to compare with other companies. 
7 This size constraint is set for the reason that the analysis focuses on M&A of material size. In addition, 
it reduces the probability of confounding events in case of multiple acquirers that complete several small 
M&A transactions within the studied event window of 12 to 36 months. 
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Table 7: Summary Statistics by Year 
The table reports the number of M&A deals, the aggregated and average deal values in million USD, and further 
deal characteristics on an annual basis from 2005-2014 
Year Total Nr. 
of M&A 
Total 
Value 
Avg. 
Value 
Domestic 
M&A 
Cross-border 
M&A 
Cash 
Deals 
Equity 
Deals 
Private 
Targets 
Public 
Targets 
2005 115 260,011 2,261 102 13 62 53 36 79 
2006 114 305,282 2,678 96 18 61 53 40 74 
2007 150 216,014 1,440 126 24 90 60 44 106 
2008 99 151,910 1,534 79 20 42 57 32 67 
2009 59 198,338 3,362 52 7 27 32 21 38 
2010 100 163,169 1,632 85 15 54 46 24 76 
2011 92 121,967 1,326 76 16 57 35 48 44 
2012 99 237,657 2,401 80 19 59 40 39 60 
2013 105 132,910 1,266 85 20 63 42 40 65 
2014 102 265,254 2,601 83 19 57 45 44 58 
Total 1,035 2,052,511 1,983 864 171 572 463 368 667 
 
3.3.2 Deal and Acquirer Controls 
The underlying empirical analysis controls for specific deal and acquirer 
characteristics. The variables method of payment (pay) and target’s public status (priv) 
are used as transaction-specific controls. These factors have been researched and 
proofed in literature as M&A performance driving factors. 
If a deal is one hundred percent cash-financed, the binary variable pay equals 1, 
otherwise 0 if it is financed by stock or a mixture of stock and cash. The control 
variable priv takes a 1 if the target is private, otherwise it takes a 0 if it is publicly 
traded. Information for both variables are available in the SDC database. As a firm 
control, the variable acquirer size (ln_mv_acqu) is applied which is determined as the 
natural logarithm of the acquirer’s market value three months prior the effective 
month of the M&A transaction. Market values are gathered from Thomson Reuters 
DataStream. Additional controls are industry dummies according to SIC of the 
acquiring firms (sic_b, sic_c, sic_xy, etc.), and year dummies (y_2005 to y_2014) that 
indicate the year where the respective M&A transactions take place.  
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3.3.3 Post-Merger Stakeholder Conflict Factors 
An acquirer’s pre-merger M&A activity is measured by the variable deal frequency 
(deal_frequ) which is defined as the number of M&A transactions with a minimum 
deal value of one million USD, executed within the previous five years of the 
considered acquisition. This deal value constraint is adopted to exclude very small 
deals that are expected to have no material effect on acquirers’ integration effort and 
capacity. For each transaction, acquirers’ pre deal history is documented in SDC. Deal 
size (deal_size) equals deal value (excl. net debt of target) divided by the acquirer’s 
market value (information available in Thomson Reuters DataStream). Whether a 
transaction is domestic or cross-border is defined by the binary variable cb which 
equals 1 in case of cross-border M&A, otherwise 0. A further variable applied in the 
empirical study is cultural distance (cd). It is determined according to the formula 
developed by Kogut and Singh (1988) as the sum of the deviations of each country 
from the US along each of the four cultural distance dimensions defined by Hofstede 
(1980, 1985): power distance, individualism, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance.8 
Moreover, geographic distance (geo) in miles between acquirer and target is 
calculated for each transaction by firstly collecting latitude and longitude coordinates 
of the locations (as reported in SDC), and secondly using the great circle distance 
formula (Ragozzino, 2009). The book-to-market ratio (bm) is computed as the ratio of 
the acquirer’s book value and its market capitalization as of December of the prior 
year of the transaction’s effective year. The ratio gives an indication about an 
acquirer’s growth perspective. A low ratio implies an overvalued acquirer with low 
future growth potential (so-called “glamour acquirer”), whereas a high book-to-
market ratio identifies an undervalued acquirer with high future growth prospects 
(so-called “value acquirer”).  Finally, the binary variable relate_2sic refers to the 2-digit 
SIC code overlap of the primary industries between bidder and target to measure the 
relatedness of the businesses. The variable equals 1, if the first two digits are identical    
                                                     
8 Hofstede (1980) collects survey data on work-related values from about 120,000 IBM employees in 40 
different countries. He identifies these four statistically independent cultural distance dimensions that 
explain the inter-country variation in his survey. For a detailed description of each dimension refer to 
Hofstede’s analyses (Hofstede 1980, 1985).  
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(focused or horizontal M&A), otherwise it is 0 (diversified or conglomerate M&A).  
3.3.4 Methodology 
This paper applies a more reliable long-term return measurement procedure to 
capture value-deteriorating effects which mainly take effect during the post-merger 
integration period. Therefore, information on the post-acquisition phase will be 
included in the dependent return variable, and the documented disadvantages of 
short-term M&A event study analyses (which focus only on a few days around the 
announcement date, usually -1/+1 to -10/+10 days) are avoided. On the one-hand, 
12-, 24-, and 36-month buy-and-hold abnormal stock price returns (BHARs) of each 
sample acquirer firm are computed through comparison of the compounded bidder 
holding return to a reference portfolio matched by firm size (market capitalization) 
and book-to-market ratio (following the approach of Barber and Lyon, 1997; Barber 
et al., 1999). Reference portfolios consist of NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX-listed firms 
not operating in the Finance, Insurance, or Real Estate industry (SIC Codes 60-67) that 
were not identified as acquirers during the whole period 2005-2014 of the initial SDC 
M&A sample and the preceding and following three years.  
In June of each year from 2005-2014, all reference firms are ranked on market 
capitalization into ten size deciles. In each size decile, reference firms are further 
sorted into five quintiles based on its book-to-market ratios in December of the 
previous calendar year. As a result of this procedure, fifty equally-weighted 
portfolios are created in each year, i.e. a total of five hundred portfolios in the ten year 
period from 2005 to 2014. Finally, each event firm is matched to one reference 
portfolio according to size and book-to-market ratio at the end of the latest June prior 
the deal completion date. 
The buy-and-hold abnormal return is calculated as the difference between the 
acquirer’s buy-and-hold return and the long-run buy-and-hold return of its matched 
reference portfolio: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑇 = ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡) − 1 − 𝑅𝑝𝑇
𝑇
𝑡=0 ,  (35) 
where 𝑡 = 0 is the month following the month of deal closing and 𝑇 the overall 
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holding period in months. 𝑅𝑖𝑡 in the formula above is the return of event firm 𝑖 in 
month 𝑡, and 𝑅𝑝𝑇 the return of the reference portfolio 𝑝, calculated as 
𝑅𝑝𝑇 = ∑
[∏ (1+𝑅𝑗𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=0 ]−1
𝑛
𝑛
𝑗=1 ,  (36) 
where 𝑅𝑗𝑡 is the return of reference firm 𝑗 in month 𝑡, and 𝑛 equals the number of 
reference firms included in portfolio 𝑝. The empirical analysis mainly focuses on 36-
month post-merger stock price performance, but for robustness reasons 24 and 12-
month BHARs are also computed.  
Due to the fact that BHARs are compounded and not cumulative, a common 
documented disadvantage of this approach is the positively skewed distribution of 
the returns which can lead to a misspecification of test statistics. This skewness-bias 
is controlled for by applying a bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistics when 
testing for statistical significance as described by Barber et al. (1999). 
The second return measure applied in this paper is the abnormal operating cash 
flow return (AOCFR). Event firms’ AOCFRs are computed by the following 
procedure (Megginson, 2004; Healy et al., 1992). Firstly, acquirers’ and reference 
firms’ pre-tax operating cash flow returns (OCFR), as the ratio of earnings before 
interest and taxes (EBIT) to market value of assets, are computed in each of the three 
years before and the three years following the effective year of the transaction.9 
Market value of assets is defined as market value of equity (number of shares 
outstanding multiplied with share price) plus book value of net debt, where net debt 
equals total debt minus cash and cash equivalents plus minority interests plus 
preferred stock. Secondly, for each reference portfolio the mean OCFR in year 𝑡 ∈
{−3,−2,−1, 1, 2, 3} is calculated. Thirdly, AOCFR of event firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 is computed 
by deducting the matched portfolio mean OCFR in year 𝑡 from the event firm’s OCFR 
in year 𝑡. Finally, acquirers’ mean post-merger AOCFR are compared to the mean 
pre-merger AOCFR. 
                                                     
9 According to Healy et al. (1992) the year of the merger t=0 is excluded from the return calculation 
because in year 0 the merging entities are consolidated for financial reporting purposes only from 
effective date (the day where the M&A was officially closed) to end of the financial year. In addition, 
year 0 is affected by one-time merger costs making a comparison with other years difficult. 
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3.4 Empirical Analysis and Results 
Firstly, this empirical study re-examines the post-merger underperformance of US 
acquirers within an event window of up to 36 months, applying appropriate statistical 
tests to avoid commonly known biases associated with the usage of long-term return 
estimators such as BHAR and AOCFR. Then, the investigation proceeds with a 
univariate analysis of certain stakeholder conflict factors to test for significant 
differences in acquirers’ long-term financial and operating performance. Moreover, 
the multivariate regression technique is applied which includes controls to determine 
if any of the selected SCFs has a dominant impact on long-term abnormal returns. 
The following basic regression model is used:  
𝐴𝑅 = 𝛽0 + 𝑆𝐶𝐹1 ∗ 𝛽1+. . . +𝑆𝐶𝐹𝑛  ∗ 𝛽𝑛 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑛+1 ∗ 𝛽𝑛+1+. . . +𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑚 ∗ 𝛽𝑚,  (37) 
where 𝐴𝑅 is the dependent abnormal return variable that either equals BHAR or 
AOCFR, 𝑆𝐶𝐹𝑘 are the independent stakeholder conflict factors, with 𝑘 ∈ [1, 𝑛] and 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙 with 𝑙 ∈ [𝑛 + 1,𝑚] are further control variables incorporated in the model 
and well known as correlating with M&A performance (for example, method of 
payment or target’s public status).  
3.4.1 Evidence on Acquirers’ Long-Term M&A Underperformance 
In this section, the negative long-term financial and operating performance of US 
acquiring firms is re-examined. Table 8 reports the results of the empirical tests of 
acquirers’ M&A profitability. Panel A shows the average 12-, 24-, and 36-month buy-
and-hold returns for the sample firms, for the size/book-to-market reference 
portfolios, and the resulting return differences.  
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Table 8: Long-Term Acquirer Post-Merger Performance 
The table reports the differences in long-term financial and operating performance between US acquirers and a 
benchmark portfolio in 1,035 completed mergers and acquisitions from 2005 to 2014 
Panel A: Financial 
Performance 
 
Acquirers 
 
Reference Portfolio 
 
Difference 
36-month BHR 0.180*** (7.94) 0.262*** (24.10) -0.082*** (-3.89) 
24-month BHR 0.106*** (6.24) 0.179*** (17.73) -0.073*** (-4.60) 
12-month BHR 0.041*** (3.39) 0.105*** (17.03) -0.064*** (-5.54) 
Panel B: Operating 
Performance 
 
Acquirers 
 
Reference Portfolio 
 
Difference 
3-year OCFR -0.041*** (-9.55) -0.010*** (-5.20) -0.031*** (-6.94) 
Bootstrapped Skewness-adj. t-statistics (Panel A) and student t-statistics (Panel B) in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
In Panel B the results for the average three year operating performance is 
documented. For each acquirer, a reference portfolio is matched that consists of non-
merging firms based on firm size and book-to-market ratio (as described in Chapter 
3.3). Consistent with the evidence in former M&A performance studies, acquirers’ 
abnormal returns relative to the constructed benchmark portfolios are negative and 
significantly different from zero: -8.2% in 36-month BHAR, -7.3% in 24-month BHAR, 
-6.4% in 12-month BHAR, and -3.1% in three-year AOCFR.  
For robustness reasons a so-called control firm approach is applied, where each 
sample acquirer is paired with a single matching firm according to market 
capitalization (ranging between seventy percent and one hundred thirty percent of 
the sample firm’s market value) and the closest book-to-market ratio. In addition, to 
reduce the influence of potential outliers, the sample BHARs and AOCFRs are 
winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels. Furthermore, to account for cross-sectional 
dependency, multiple transactions by the same acquirer are eliminated, where event 
windows overlap with preceding or following deals. The results for acquiring firms 
are robust and remain highly negative across all investment horizons (not reported 
here). 
3.4.2 Univariate Analysis of Acquirers’ Long-Term M&A Performance 
This section examines the simple relationship between selected post-merger 
stakeholder conflict factors and buy-and-hold abnormal returns, as well as abnormal 
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operating cash flow returns by testing each single SCF for statistical significance 
within a univariate setting.  
Firstly, simple linear regressions for each SCF are applied. The results are reported 
in Table 9. Geographic distance (geo) and book-to-market ratio (bm) show significant 
statistical impact on BHAR, all other factors are insignificant. The effect of the variable 
geo is positive, although very small, indicating that higher geographic distance results 
in a lower decisiveness of conflict (if post-merger stakeholder conflict arises), thus 
positively influencing bidder firms’ financial performance. This is in line with 
Hypothesis 4a (refer to hypotheses development in Section 3.2) and the assumption 
regarding the model parameter m (decisiveness of conflict) of the post-merger 
stakeholder conflict hypothesis. The variable bm shows a negative coefficient which 
means that a rising growth prospect (i.e. low decisiveness of conflict) reduces acquirer 
stock returns. This is contradictory to Hypothesis 4b, to the outlined general impact of 
model parameter m, and to the regression outcome of the variable geo above.  
Table 9: Simple Linear Regression Results for SCF 
The table reports simple linear regression results for each stakeholder conflict factor on acquirer financial and 
operating performance as dependent variables 
Stakeholder conflict factor 
 BHAR  AOCFR 
 Coef.  t-statistic   Coef.  t-statistic  
deal_size  -0.072  -1.20   0.012  0.93  
deal_frequ  0.003  0.65   -0.001  -1.84 * 
relate_2sic  0.013  0.31   -0.023  -2.56 ** 
cb  0.050  0.89   -0.034  -3.31 *** 
cd  0.006  1.12   -0.002  -2.15 ** 
geo  0.000  2.75 ***  -0.000  -1.17  
bm  -0.131  -2.00 **  -0.013  -0.67  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
AOCFR is highly negatively impacted by deal frequency (deal_frequ), business 
relatedness (relate_2sic), cross-border M&A (cb) and cultural distance (cd). Based on 
these simple linear regression results Hypothesis 2, 3b and 3c are confirmed, whereas 
Hypothesis 3a is rejected. 
The explanatory power of the simple linear regression analysis is limited judging 
by the mixed results and the different coefficients depending on whether BHAR or 
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AOCFR is applied. Therefore, the outcome has to be treated with caution and the 
empirical analysis to be extended in the following sections.  
Secondly, for each SCF, the data sample is divided into two subgroups using the 
respective factor’s median as a cut-off point. Then each SCF is tested whether its 
difference in abnormal returns is statistically significant or not. The following 
variables are analyzed: acquirer M&A activity (deal_frequ), acquirer growth 
perspective (bm), deal size (deal_size), cross-border M&A (cb), geographic distance 
(geo), cultural distance (cd), and business relatedness (relate_2sic).  
Table 10 to Table 15 report the results of the different subsample investigations. 
Whereas frequent acquirers show a highly significant operating underperformance 
of -3.7% (at the 1% significance level) compared to less frequent bidders, there seems 
to be no noteworthy difference in BHARs. In contrast to operating performance, 
acquirers with high M&A activity (low integration capacity) show a less negative 
performance across all investment horizons, but statistically insignificant (Table 10). 
As a consequence of this outcome, Hypothesis 2 can be confirmed for acquirers’ 
operating profitability, however not for bidder stock price performance. Limited 
integration capacity due to parallel integration processes of previous acquisitions 
encourages post-merger stakeholder conflict, and thus, has a highly negative impact 
on acquirers’ long-term operating cash flow returns. 
Table 10: Frequent vs. Infrequent Acquirers in M&A – Univariate Analysis 
The sample consists of 1,035 completed US mergers and acquisitions in the period 2005-2014 
Performance 
Measures  
Frequent 
Acquirers 
(N=552) 
 Infrequent 
Acquirers 
(N=483) 
 Test of Difference 
(Frequent – Infrequent)   
Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  t-statistic  
36-month BHAR -0.065  -0.102  0.037  0.87  
24-month BHAR -0.059  -0.090  0.031  0.94  
12-month BHAR -0.050  -0.080  0.030  1.24  
3-year AOCFR -0.046  -0.009  -0.037  -3.83 *** 
(Cut-off point: Median of pre-deal M&A activity measured by variable deal_frequ: 1) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01          
 
Growth or value acquirers (undervalued, i.e. high book-to-market ratio) perform 
better compared to mature ones (overvalued, i.e. low book-to-market ratio) indicating 
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that decisiveness of post-merger stakeholder conflict is higher and therefore more 
detrimental to synergies for acquirers with low internal growth prospects. This holds 
for both BHAR and AOCFR. Nevertheless, there does not exist a sole significant 
statistical dependency between acquirer growth perspective and long-term financial 
and operating performance (Table 11). As a consequence, based on these findings of 
the univariate subsample test, Hypothesis 4b can neither be rejected nor confirmed. 
Table 11: Mature vs. Growth Acquirers in M&A – Univariate Analysis 
The sample consists of 1,035 completed US mergers and acquisitions in the period 2005-2014 
Performance 
Measures  
Mature 
Acquirers 
(N=533) 
 Growth Acquirers 
(N=502) 
 Test of Difference 
(Mature – Growth)   
Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  t-statistic  
36-month BHAR -0.094  -0.069  -0.026  -0.62  
24-month BHAR -0.092  -0.054  -0.038  -1.17  
12-month BHAR -0.081  -0.045  -0.036  -1.52  
3-year AOCFR -0.034  -0.028  -0.006  -0.72  
(Cut-off point: Median of book-to-market ratio measured by variable bm: 0.36) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01          
 
The analysis of large versus small M&A transactions reveal mixed outcomes (as 
reported in Table 12). The takeover of a relatively large target leads to significantly 
worse negative BHARs across all investment horizons. For example, in the 36-month 
investment period, the acquisition of a relatively large target compared to the 
takeover of a small target yields a significant -13.5% difference in stock price returns. 
A possible explanation could be the critical investors’ expectation of higher 
complexity to integrate larger firms and increased uncertainty of realizing anticipated 
merger synergies. However, if applying the operating performance measure, the 
acquisition of a relatively large target results in a higher cash flow return, yet not 
statistically significant. Referring to the stakeholder conflict theory and the derived 
Hypothesis 1, which claims that the takeover of a relatively large target bears less risk 
of conflict during the PMI – associated with higher long-term performance – the 
results of the subsample analysis reveal exactly the opposite for acquirers’ financial 
profitability. Consequently, in a univariate setting Hypothesis 1 has to be rejected.  
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Table 12: Large vs. Small M&A-Transactions – Univariate Analysis 
The sample consists of 1,035 completed US-mergers and acquisitions in the period 2005-2014 
Performance 
Measures  
Large Target 
(N=531) 
 Small Target 
(N=504) 
 Test of Difference 
(Large – Small)   
Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  t-statistic  
36-month BHAR -0.149  -0.015  -0.135  -3.27 *** 
24-month BHAR -0.131  -0.014  -0.118  -3.63 *** 
12-month BHAR -0.101  -0.025  -0.076  -3.21 *** 
3-year AOCFR -0.024  -0.037  0.014  1.52  
(Cut-off point: Median of deal value to market value of acquirer measured by variable deal_size: 0.14) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01          
 
Cross-border compared to domestic M&A have a significantly worse impact on 
acquirers’ average three year operating profitability of -3.4%. Interestingly, financial 
performance is higher in cross-border transactions but insignificant as reported in the 
following table. A reasonable explanation might be an increased potential of 
stakeholder conflict due to divergent legal systems, economic laws and policies, 
making it more difficult to capture future synergy cash flows. Therefore, Hypothesis 
3b can be confirmed once the operating performance measure is used.   
Table 13: Cross-Border vs. Domestic M&A-Transactions – Univariate Analysis 
The sample consists of 1,035 completed US-mergers and acquisitions in the period 2005-2014 
Performance 
Measures  
Cross-border 
M&A 
(N=165) 
 Domestic M&A 
(N=818) 
 Test of Difference 
(Cross-border – Domestic)   
Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  t-statistic  
36-month BHAR -0.040  -0.090  0.050  0.89  
24-month BHAR -0.031  -0.082  0.052  1.19  
12-month BHAR -0.040  -0.069  0.028  0.84  
3-year AOCFR -0.059  -0.025  -0.034  -3.31 *** 
(Cut-off point: Cross-border flag measured by dummy variable cb) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01          
 
Finally, this paper tests the isolated influence of geographic distance as a proxy for 
decisiveness of stakeholder conflict, and cultural distance as an explanatory variable 
for sociocultural complementarity, on financial and operating performance. The 
former factor only signals for 36-month BHAR that the acquisition of high compared 
to low distant targets leads to a significant positive return difference of +8.2%. The 
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mitigating effect of geographic proximity thus can be partially confirmed for 36-
month BHAR (Hypothesis 4a). Nevertheless, the result is mixed because, on the one 
hand, it is not significant for 24 and 12-month BHARs, neither for AOCFR. On the 
other hand, the coefficient of the return difference is negative for the three-year 
operating performance (-1.4%) which indicates that from an operating profitability 
viewpoint, the acquisition of high distant targets results in lower returns (Table 14). 
Table 14: Geographic Distance in M&A-Transactions – Univariate Analysis 
The sample consists of 1,035 completed US-mergers and acquisitions in the period 2005-2014 
Performance 
Measures  
High 
Distance 
(N=518) 
 Low Distance 
(N=517) 
 Test of Difference 
(High – Low)   
Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  t-statistic  
36-month BHAR -0.041  -0.123  0.082  1.98 ** 
24-month BHAR -0.066  -0.081  0.015  0.45  
12-month BHAR -0.049  -0.078  0.029  1.22  
3-year AOCFR -0.038  -0.024  -0.014  -1.58  
(Cut-off point: Median of geographic distance measured by variable geo: 105) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01          
 
The latter determinant split into high cultural distance and low cultural distance 
shows a significant negative difference in AOCFR of -1.9%, whereas the differences 
in financial performance are positive and not significant across all event windows  
(Table 15). Therefore, Hypothesis 3c can be confirmed in the case of applying AOCFR. 
Table 15: Cultural Distance in M&A-Transactions – Univariate Analysis 
The sample consists of 1,035 completed US-mergers and acquisitions in the period 2005-2014 
Performance 
Measures  
High 
Distance 
(N=115) 
 Low Distance 
(N=920) 
 Test of Difference 
(High – Low)   
Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  t-statistic  
36-month BHAR -0.055  -0.085  0.030  0.53  
24-month BHAR -0.017  -0.081  0.064  1.35  
12-month BHAR -0.047  -0.066  0.019  0.51  
3-year AOCFR -0.047  -0.029  -0.019  -1.71 * 
(Cut-off point: Mean of culture distance measured by variable cd: 1.07) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01          
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The analysis of return differences between related M&A and non-related, i.e. 
diversified or conglomerate transactions reveals a significant negative relationship 
between business relatedness and acquirers’ abnormal operating cash flow returns. 
The acquisition of related targets compared to non-related ones results in a three-year 
AOCFR-difference of -2.3% (not reported here). As a result of this finding, Hypothesis 
3a is rejected. 
Overall, the univariate analyses do not comprehensively shed light upon the 
underlying research question, whether or not certain stakeholder conflict factors do 
cause synergy impairments post-merger that impact long-term value creation of 
acquiring firms. The outcomes of the analyzed subsamples are mixed and do not offer 
clear interpretation. Possible reasons are the limited explanatory power due to the 
isolated consideration of each SCF, missing control variables, or miss-specified 
methodology in measuring long-term bidder performance (financial vs. operating 
returns). It makes it difficult to correctly make a conclusion on the derived 
hypotheses.  
 Therefore, the following Subsection 3.4.3 extends the empirical analysis by 
applying multivariate regression methodology and controlling for effects which have 
been proved in M&A literature to explain returns to acquiring firms. 
3.4.3 Multivariate Analysis of Acquirers’ Long-Term M&A Performance  
Based on the basic regression model outlined above, the long-term financial 
performance and operating profitability of acquiring firms are analyzed in a 
multivariate setting. The following seven SCFs are tested on its joint impact on both 
BHARs and AOCFRs: deal size (deal_size), deal frequency (deal_frequ), acquirer 
growth prospects (bm), cultural distance (cd), cross-border deals (cb), geographic 
distance (geo) and relatedness of businesses (relate_2sic). 
In all regression models, the three controls – method of payment (pay), target 
public status (priv), and acquirer size (ln_mv_acqu) – are included. In addition, this 
paper controls for industry and year effects by adding dummy variables to the 
regressions. Table 16 reports results from the multivariate regressions (Models 1-3) 
where the dependent variable is either 36-, 24- or 12-month BHAR (BHAR_36, 
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BHAR_24, and BHAR_12).  Since the examination of long-term post-merger acquirer 
performance is of main interest in this study, the conclusions are primarily based on 
the 36-month BHAR regression results combined with the regression findings on the 
three-year post-acquisition operating performance (reported in Table 17). The other 
investment horizons presented here serve as robustness checks.  
Table 16: Regression Results (I) 
Regression of 36-/ 24-/ 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) on stakeholder conflict variables and 
deal and acquirer controls 
Model 
Dep. variable 
1 
BHAR_36 
 2 
BHAR_24 
 3 
BHAR_12 
 
       
deal_size 0.027  -0.039 -0.061 * 
 (0.43)          (-0.85) (-1.95) 
deal_frequ -0.011 *** -0.009 *** -0.008 *** 
 (-2.38) (-2.85) (-3.06) 
cd -0.010 0.003 0.001 
 (-1.05) (0.52) (0.20) 
cb -0.143 * -0.044 -0.012 
 (-1.71) (-0.63) (-0.22) 
geo 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 
 (2.48) (1.12) (0.52) 
bm -0.030 -0.007  0.054 
 (-0.41)  (-0.12) (1.21) 
ln_mv_acqu 0.044 *** 0.038 *** 0.032 *** 
 (2.82)  (3.06) (3.87) 
priv 0.089 * 0.059 0.011 
 (1.73)  (1.52) (0.42) 
pay 0.117 ** 0.039 0.008 
 (2.31)  (1.03) (0.28) 
relate_2sic 0.040 0.004 0.013 
 (0.93)  (0.11) (0.52) 
constant -0.566 *** -0.312 ** -0.251 ** 
 (-3.07)  (-2.07)  (-2.51) 
Industry dummies yes  yes  yes  
Year dummies no  no  no  
N 982  1016  1034  
R² 0.051  0.040  0.047  
Adjusted R² 0.035  0.025  0.032  
Overall p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  
t statistics in parentheses      
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01    
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The explanatory variables deal_frequ, cb, and geo show a statistically significant 
impact on both acquiring firms’ financial and operating M&A performance. 
Acquirers’ pre-merger M&A activity is negatively correlated to profitability, 
suggesting that serial acquirers or firms that executed many deals of material size in 
the recent past have only limited resources available for integration of the present 
transaction. This pattern is confirmed by previous research, for example in Conn et 
al. (2004), Kengelbach and Klemmer (2012), or Fuller et al. (2002). As often mistakenly 
hypothesized, there seems to be no M&A learning effect that exists, thus implicating 
that transaction quantity does not automatically improve quality in terms of M&A 
performance. 
The regression outcomes further reveal a significant negative impact of the binary 
variable cross-border M&A which serves as a proxy for economic complementarity 
(in terms of economic sphere, legal systems, regulations and laws, etc.). It is assumed 
that the integration period in those deals is characterized by higher potential of 
stakeholder conflict compared to domestic M&A due to lacking complementarity. For 
instance, Black et al. (2003) also find a negative association between cross-border 
M&A and five-year BHARs for US acquirers of -22.9% in the period 1985-1995. Conn 
et al. (2005) report evidence for UK acquirers from 1984 to 1998. They report negative 
three-year post-acquisition returns of -13.4% for completed cross-border deals. For 
public cross-border targets, the returns are even more negative and amount to -32.3%. 
The authors suggest that cultural differences are primarily responsible for the 
negative impact on acquirers’ long-run returns making integration and acculturation 
a complex and time-consuming undertaking. However, this paper controls for 
cultural distance in the underlying analysis but does not find any significant impact 
neither on long-run financial performance nor on abnormal operating cash flow 
returns. At least the coefficient is negative, i.e. an increasing gap in culture reduces 
36-month returns.  
The factor geographic distance has a significant positive value-effect for acquirers. 
This might be due to less decisiveness of emerging stakeholder conflict caused by the 
distant physical separation of bidder and target corporate environments and the 
continuing perception of still being a stand-alone entity. This in turn reduces 
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ambiguity and anxiety among affected stakeholder groups about their primary 
interests and claims. 
Table 17: Regression Results (II) 
Regression of (4) abnormal operating cash flow returns (AOCFR) on stakeholder conflict variables and deal and 
acquirer controls vs. (5) incl. year dummies and vs. (6) deal size by total assets 
Model 
Dep. variable 
4 
AOCFR 
 5 
AOCFR 
 6 
AOCFR 
 
       
deal_size 0.019 0.017  
 (0.43)          (1.32)  
deal_size_ta   -0.002  
   (-0.21)  
deal_frequ -0.001 ** -0.001 ** -0.002 ** 
 (-2.04) (-1.98) (-3.06) 
cd -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.51) (-0.25) (-0.27) 
cb -0.043 *** -0.045 *** -0.055 *** 
 (-2.76) (-2.88) (-3.00) 
geo 0.000 * 0.000 0.000 * 
 (1.72) (1.55) (1.70) 
bm -0.028 -0.026 -0.023 
 (-1.58)  (-1.42) (-1.07) 
priv 0.009 0.006 0.019 
 (0.92)  (0.61) (1.16) 
pay 0.011 0.010 0.002 
 (1.12)  (1.01) (0.13) 
relate_2sic -0.018 ** -0.019 ** -0.033 *** 
 (-2.03)  (-2.16) (-3.37) 
constant 0.027 0.031 0.034 
 (1.16)  (1.08)  (1.27) 
Industry dummies yes  yes  yes  
Year dummies no  yes  no  
N 806  806  597  
R² 0.061  0.070  0.079  
Adjusted R² 0.043  0.041  0.055  
Overall p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  
t statistics in parentheses      
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01    
 
So far, these findings on the stakeholder conflict factors M&A activity, cross-
border flag, and geographic proximity are in line with the respective Hypotheses 2, 3b, 
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and 4a. Both financial and operating performance measures signal the hypothesized 
direction. Therefore, these hypotheses are confirmed. 
The three control variables priv, pay, and ln_mv_acqu are statistically significant in 
the BHAR regressions (insignificant on AOCFR), all of them with a positive 
coefficient. There exists a lot of evidence in M&A literature claiming that cash-
financed deals (e.g., Faccio and Masulis, 2005; King et al., 2004; Loughran and Vijh, 
1997; Megginson et al., 2004; Andrade et al., 2001) and the acquisition of private 
targets (Fuller et al., 2002; Chang, 1998; Conn et al., 2005) yield significant higher long-
run returns for bidder firms. Therefore the inclusion as control variables in regression 
analyses on performance is standard to the literature. 
Moeller et al. (2004) analyze announcement returns for acquirers and find a robust 
negative size-effect, i.e. large acquirers do earn lower stock price returns compared to 
small ones. They conclude that larger acquirers destroy shareholder value due to 
managerial entrenchment as hypothesized by Shleifer and Vishny (1989). Yet, the 
used acquirer size control in this paper shows a highly positive effect on holding 
returns. Due to the fact that the focus is on strategic M&A and true synergy rationales 
by acquirer management are assumed, possible explanations for the positive size-
effect could be larger organizational resources, more investment experience, and also 
better corporate governance mechanisms of large compared to small firms. For 
example, Alexandridis et al. (2011) do also find a positive and significant association 
between acquirer size and abnormal returns in their analysis of completed US 
mergers during 1990-2007.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 3a, although not significant, the SCF 
deal size (deal_size) and business relatedness (relate_2sic) contribute positively to 
acquirers’ financial performance. However in the AOCFR regressions the variable 
business relatedness is highly negative (on a 5%-significance level), indicating that 
diversified instead of focused M&A improve operating performance of bidder firms. 
This is the only contradictory finding between the BHAR and AOCFR regressions. In 
addition, the negative correlation to AOCFR also differs from the results of 
Megginson et al. (2004). They report corporate focus as a strong value-influencing 
factor in M&A long-term performance. Yet, Agrawal et al. (1992) find a less negative 
86 
 
acquirer performance for non-related mergers compared to focused transactions. 
Nevertheless, all other variables in the regression models show the same signs. 
Cultural distance (cd) and acquirer growth prospects (bm) are negatively correlated 
and statistically insignificant. Hypotheses 3c and 4b are therefore rejected. It seems 
reasonable that cultural differences might cause problems during the integration 
period, hence impacting value creation in mergers. Yet, limited research outcome in 
context of M&A exists to date. One study by Barkema and Vermeulen (1997) focuses 
on international joint ventures. The authors find that certain culture differences have 
a strong negative impact on joint ventures. However, M&A research on acquirer 
growth either measured by book-to-market ratio or Tobin’s Q is extensive. Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998) document a significant negative relationship between US acquirer 
performance in mergers and its low book-to-market ratio (so-called “glamour” 
acquirers which are overvalued and low-growth firms) in the period 1980-1991. They 
argue that this is due to the market’s overextrapolation of bidders’ past performance. 
Contrary to this finding Megginson et al. (2004) and Lang et al. (1989) report a 
negative correlation between acquirer growth and post-acquisition performance 
which is – apart from the insignificance – in line with the findings here. 
Several robustness checks are applied in this paper to verify the statistical inference 
of the reported multivariate results. Firstly, to control for outliers, the BHARs and 
AOCFRs are winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% level (Model 8 in Table 18). Secondly,  
a matching firm approach is used instead of a reference portfolio procedure (Model 9 
in Table 18) to control for an imperfect expected return proxy (bad model bias). There, 
each event firm is matched to a single reference firm according to its size and book-
to-market ratio. Thirdly, to control for cross-sectional dependencies in the tested data 
sample, multiple acquisitions by the same firm within any 36-month period are 
excluded, i.e. after the first transaction, additional M&A until after the 36-month 
event window are eliminated from the initial data sample (Tables 2 and 3 in 3.6 
Appendix A.1). The initial regression results remain stable and robust.  
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Table 18: Regression Results (III) 
Robustness check: regression of (7) 36-month BHAR on stakeholder conflict variables and deal and acquirer controls 
vs. (8) 2.5%-winsorized BHARs and vs. (9) matching firm approach 
Model 
Dep. variable 
7 
BHAR_36 
 8 
wBHAR_36 
 9 
mBHAR_36 
 
       
deal_size 0.027 0.025           0.052    
 (0.43)          (0.44)           (0.86) 
deal_frequ -0.011 *** -0.010 ** -0.020 *** 
 (-2.38) (-2.44) (-3.00) 
cd -0.010 -0.006 -0.008 
 (-1.05) (-0.83) (-0.84) 
cb -0.143 * -0.132 * -0.139 
 (-1.71) (-1.82) (-1.33) 
geo 0.000 ** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
 (2.48) (2.92) (3.05) 
bm -0.030 -0.030 -0.047 
 (-0.41)  (-0.42) (-0.47) 
ln_mv_acqu 0.044 *** 0.045 *** 0.025 
 (2.82)  (3.25) (1.31) 
priv 0.089 * 0.077 * 0.097 
 (1.73)  (1.75) (1.58) 
pay 0.117 ** 0.106 ** 0.120 ** 
 (2.31)  (2.40) (2.02) 
relate_2sic 0.040 0.040 0.007 
 (0.93)  (1.06) (0.13) 
constant -0.566 *** -0.547 *** -0.298 
 (-3.07)  (-3.24)  (-1.32) 
Industry dummies yes  yes  yes  
Year dummies no  no  no  
N 982  982  982  
R² 0.051  0.054  0.046  
Adjusted R² 0.035  0.039  0.030  
Overall p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  
t statistics in parentheses      
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01    
 
In addition, due to the importance of the parameter deal size – according to the 
stakeholder conflict theory – different size measures are incorporated into the 
regression analyses (see Table 19 for BHAR and Table 17 for AOCFR, models 4 and 
6). On the one hand, deal size is measured by the firms’ sales ratio (Model 11), on the 
other hand, deal size is defined as the ratio of total assets of target and bidder (Model 
12). Apart from all other determinants, the sign of the variable deal size changes, 
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probably indicating miss-specification of the applied proxy. In a last robustness 
check, the analysis controls for year-fixed effects by including year dummies while 
regressing 36-month BHAR (see Table 1 in 3.6 Appendix A.1). Again, the initial 
regression results of Model 1 remain robust. 
Table 19: Regression Results (IV) 
Robustness check: regression of (10) 36-month BHAR on stakeholder conflict variables and deal and acquirer 
controls vs. deal size by sales (11) and deal size by total assets (12) 
Model 
Dep. variable 
10 
BHAR_36 
 11 
BHAR_36 
 12 
BHAR_36 
 
       
deal_size 0.027   
 (0.43)            
deal_size_sales  -0.001   
  (-0.03)  
deal_size_ta   -0.003 
   (-0.10) 
deal_frequ -0.011 *** -0.012 *** -0.012 ** 
 (-2.38) (-2.59) (-2.29) 
cd -0.010 -0.006 -0.004 
 (-1.05) (-0.56) (-0.38) 
cb -0.143 * -0.194 ** -0.209 ** 
 (-1.71) (-1.82) (-2.45) 
geo 0.000 ** 0.000 ** 0.000 ** 
 (2.48) (2.17) (2.18) 
bm -0.030 -0.062 -0.072 
 (-0.41)  (-0.82) (-0.96) 
ln_mv_acqu 0.044 *** 0.031 * 0.031 * 
 (2.82)  (1.88) (1.89) 
priv 0.089 * 0.064 0.067 
 (1.73)  (0.85) (0.78) 
pay 0.117 ** 0.120 ** 0.115 ** 
 (2.31)  (2.18) (2.04) 
relate_2sic 0.040 0.045 0.029 
 (0.93)  (0.95) (0.60) 
constant -0.566 *** -0.539 ** -0.531 ** 
 (-3.07)  (-2.48)  (-2.23) 
Industry dummies yes  yes  yes  
Year dummies no  no  no  
N 982  738  725  
R² 0.051  0.044  0.049  
Adjusted R² 0.035  0.023  0.028  
Overall p-value 0.000  0.002  0.000  
t statistics in parentheses      
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01    
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Finally, the results of the empirical analyses pointed out in Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 
are summarized in the following Table 20. 
Table 20: Summary Hypotheses Confirmation 
The table reports the rejection (=no) or confirmation (=yes) of the developed research hypotheses tested by seven 
stakeholder conflict factors (SCF) 
Perform. Measure BHAR AOCFR 
Hypo- 
thesis 
SCF Simple 
regression 
Subgroup 
analysis 
Multivariate 
regression 
Simple 
regression 
Subgroup 
analysis 
Multivariate 
regression 
1 deal_size No No No No No No 
2 deal_frequ No No Yes*** Yes* Yes*** Yes** 
3a relate_2sic No No No No No No 
3b cb No No Yes* Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
3c cd No No No Yes** Yes* No 
4a geo Yes*** Yes** Yes** No No Yes* 
4b bm No No No No No No 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
By comparing the findings of the univariate tests with those of the multivariate 
regressions, one can see that results of the latter methodology are consistent across 
the applied long-term abnormal return measures: 36-month BHAR and three-year 
AOCFR. In addition, the multivariate regression results are robust upon the 
application of different robustness tests, such as cross-sectional dependency, different 
benchmarks in estimating BHARs, year-fixed effects, or sample outliers. For both 
BHAR and AOCFR, the Hypotheses 2, 3b, and 4a can be confirmed. The result of the 
multivariate regression of the SCF geographic distance (geo) on BHAR is also 
confirmed by simple linear regression and subgroup analysis. In case of AOCFR, the 
significant effects of the SCFs acquirer integration capacity (deal_frequ) and economic 
complementarity (cb) on operating performance are also found within the simple 
linear regressions and subgroup analyses. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of long-term M&A performance of US 
acquirers. In a first step, it re-examines bidders’ underperformance and confirms the 
existing evidence that US acquirers still fail to create value in corporate mergers and 
acquisitions. Both financial and operating performance measures (buy-and-hold and 
abnormal operating cash flow returns) are applied and significant negative outcomes 
are found compared to a size and book-to-market reference portfolio of nonevent US 
firms. 
 Based on the theoretical framework of post-merger stakeholder conflict, several 
hypotheses for selected stakeholder conflict factors are derived to explain how and to 
what extent they influence long-term acquirer performance during the post-merger 
integration phase. This paper runs univariate and multivariate empirical tests on 
these SCFs and reveals statistically significant results for acquirers’ integration 
capacity, complementarity of economic environment, and decisiveness of stakeholder 
conflict. Therefore, this paper concludes that acquirers that have executed several 
M&A transactions in the recent past have only limited integration capacity. This in 
turn causes stakeholder conflict during the post-merger integration period because 
their interests are not aligned through a well-managed and productive PMI. In 
addition, stakeholder claims are violated when merging firms’ economic sphere, legal 
systems, regulations and laws differ, which is primarily the case in cross-country 
compared to domestic M&A. Thus, missing complementary resources within the 
organizational and sociocultural dimensions seem to be secondary in post-merger 
processes. At least, no significant impact of the applied predictor variables 
relatedness and cultural distance on long-term acquirer returns was found. 
 Furthermore, geographic proximity has a mitigating effect on stakeholder 
conflicts within the merged entity, i.e. the greater the distance between acquirer and 
target, the less decisive emerging stakeholder conflicts are. The direct confrontation 
between primary stakeholder groups of the merging firms therefore outweighs 
acquirers’ growth perspectives.  
Overall, one can affirm the following central conclusion: If an acquirer executes a 
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cross-border M&A transaction in a nearby country and then fails to put enough 
capacity into post-merger integration, stakeholder conflict with subsequent synergy 
impairments will arise, and by implication lead to a value destruction on a massive 
scale.  
There seems to be a slight positive relationship between increasing deal size or 
target size on acquirer performance. Yet, a significant negative impact of smaller 
targets on long-run acquirer returns is not found. As a consequence, the existence of 
the paradox incentive for weaker endowed stakeholders to fight for their interests by 
opposing a merger cannot be confirmed to its full extent. Nevertheless, one can 
conclude that it appears that the acquisition of a larger target is associated with larger 
synergy potential outweighing an investor’s expectation of higher integration 
complexity and uncertainty about synergy realization. 
 Further steps would include empirical research on the importance of a 
stakeholder-oriented PMI to test the mitigating mechanism of integration in M&A as 
described in the post-merger stakeholder conflict hypothesis. This would amplify the 
orientation towards all primary stakeholders of a firm while conducting a merger or 
acquisition, ultimately indicating that the mere focus on shareholder interests and 
shareholder value maximization is already outdated and does not create value for 
acquiring firms.  
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3.6 Appendix 
A1: Robustness tests 
 
Table 1 
Robustness check: regression of (13) 36-month BHAR on stakeholder conflict variables and deal and acquirer 
controls vs. (14) regression incl. year dummies 
Model 
Dep. variable 
13 
BHAR_36 
 14 
BHAR_36 
 
     
deal_size 0.027 0.008 
 (0.43)          (0.12) 
deal_frequ -0.011 *** -0.010 ** 
 (-2.38) (-2.14) 
cd -0.010 -0.009 
 (-1.05) (-0.94) 
cb -0.143 * -0.148 * 
 (-1.71) (-1.77) 
geo 0.000 ** 0.000 ** 
 (2.48) (2.21) 
bm -0.030 -0.007 
 (-0.41)  (-0.09) 
ln_mv_acqu 0.044 *** 0.045 *** 
 (2.82)  (2.90) 
priv 0.089 * 0.069 
 (1.73)  (1.36) 
pay 0.117 ** 0.101 ** 
 (2.31)  (2.05) 
relate_2sic 0.040 0.040 
 (0.93)  (0.97) 
constant -0.566 *** -0.623 *** 
 (-3.07)  (-2.76)  
Industry dummies yes  yes  
Year dummies no  yes  
N 982  982  
R² 0.051  0.092  
Adjusted R² 0.035  0.068  
Overall p-value 0.000  0.000  
t statistics in parentheses    
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table 2 
Robustness check: cross-sectional dependency. Regression of 36-/ 24-/ 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHAR) on stakeholder conflict variables and deal and acquirer controls 
Model 
Dep. variable 
15 
BHAR_36 
 16 
BHAR_24 
 17 
BHAR_12 
 
       
deal_size 0.034  -0.033 -0.056 * 
 (0.54)          (-0.70) (-1.73) 
deal_frequ -0.015 ** -0.010 * -0.009 * 
 (-2.35) (-1.75) (-1.85) 
cd -0.016 0.003 0.001 
 (-1.60) (0.43) (0.10) 
cb -0.109 -0.046 -0.013 
 (-1.14) (-0.56) (-0.20) 
geo 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 
 (2.15) (1.08) (0.69) 
bm -0.080 -0.023 0.034 
 (-1.06)  (-0.36) (0.70) 
ln_mv_acqu 0.055 *** 0.047 *** 0.034 *** 
 (3.08)  (3.27) (3.91) 
priv 0.109 * 0.074 * 0.008 
 (1.87)  (1.65) (0.27) 
pay 0.093 0.031 -0.003 
 (1.63)  (0.72) (-0.09) 
relate_2sic 0.027 -0.005 0.019 
 (0.55)  (-0.13) (0.66) 
constant -0.723 *** -0.373 ** -0.266 ** 
 (-3.16)  (-2.18)  (-2.34) 
Industry dummies yes  yes  yes  
Year dummies no  no  no  
N 803  836  853  
R² 0.047  0.042  0.050  
Adjusted R² 0.027  0.023  0.031  
Overall p-value 0.002  0.003  0.000  
t statistics in parentheses      
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01    
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Table 3 
Robustness check: cross-sectional dependency. Regression of (18) abnormal operating cash flow returns (AOCFR) 
on stakeholder conflict variables and deal and acquirer controls vs. (19) incl. year dummies and vs. (20) deal size by 
total assets 
Model 
Dep. variable 
18 
AOCFR 
 19 
AOCFR 
 20 
AOCFR 
 
       
deal_size 0.015 0.013  
 (1.11)          (0.94)  
deal_size_ta   -0.005  
   (-0.56)  
deal_frequ -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 ** 
 (-1.53) (-1.40) (-1.51) 
cd -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.16) (0.07) (-0.19) 
cb -0.055 *** -0.055 *** -0.066 *** 
 (-3.15) (-3.19) (-3.26) 
geo 0.000 ** 0.000 * 0.000 * 
 (2.06) (1.85) (1.91) 
bm -0.020 -0.015 -0.018 
 (-1.07)  (-0.74) (-0.79) 
priv 0.009 0.008 0.012 
 (0.84)  (0.75) (0.67) 
pay 0.011 0.011 0.002 
 (0.97)  (0.97) (0.12) 
relate_2sic -0.015 -0.017 * -0.035 *** 
 (-2.03)  (-1.67) (-2.98) 
constant 0.080 0.052 0.038 
 (1.58)  (1.00)  (1.21) 
Industry dummies yes  yes  yes  
Year dummies no  yes  no  
N 648  648  477  
R² 0.064  0.074  0.086  
Adjusted R² 0.041  0.038  0.056  
Overall p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  
t statistics in parentheses      
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01    
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A2: Variable definitions 
 
Table 4 
Variable definition 
Variable Description 
I     M&A Financial Performance Variables 
BHAR_36 
36-month buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) derived with reference portfolio 
approach 
BHAR_24 24-month BHAR derived with reference portfolio approach 
BHAR_12 12-month BHAR derived with reference portfolio approach 
mBHAR_36 36-month BHAR derived with matching control firm approach 
mBHAR_24 24-month BHAR derived with matching control firm approach 
mBHAR_12 12-month BHAR derived with matching control firm approach 
wBHAR_36 
36-month BHAR derived with reference portfolio approach – winsorized 2.5%/ 
97.5% levels 
wBHAR_24 
24-month BHAR derived with reference portfolio approach – winsorized 2.5%/ 
97.5% levels 
wBHAR_12 
12-month BHAR derived with reference portfolio approach – winsorized 2.5%/ 
97.5% levels 
wmBHAR_36 
36-month BHAR derived with matching control firm approach – winsorized 2.5%/ 
97.5% levels 
wmBHAR_24 
24-month BHAR derived with matching control firm approach – winsorized 2.5%/ 
97.5% levels 
wmBHAR_12 
12-month BHAR  derived with matching control firm approach – winsorized 2.5%/ 
97.5% levels 
II    M&A Operating Performance Variables 
AOCFR 
Three year average abnormal operating cash flow return (AOCFR) compared to pre-
merger 
wAOCFR Three year average AOCFR compared to pre-merger – winsorized 2.5%/ 97.5% levels 
III   Stakeholder Conflict Variables 
deal_size 
Relative deal size defined as ratio between deal value and acquirer’s market value at 
effective year 
deal_size_sales 
Relative deal size defined as ratio between target’s LTM sales and acquirer’s LTM 
sales at effective year 
deal_size_ta 
Relative deal size defined as ratio between target’s total assets and acquirer’s total 
assets at effective year 
deal_frequ 
Acquirer’s deal frequency: defined as number of transactions with minimum deal 
value of 100 million USD  - executed within the previous 5 years 
cd 
Culture distance between acquirer’s and target’s nation: measured by Kogut and 
Singh formula and with 5 culture distance dimensions of Hofstede 
cb 
Binary variable that equals 1 if the transaction takes place cross-border, otherwise 0 
if US domestic 
geo 
Geographic distance in miles between acquirer’s headquarter and target’s 
headquarter 
IV   Firm and Deal Characteristic Controls 
bm 
Acquirer firm’s book-to-market ratio (high ratio = undervalued acquirer, low ratio = 
overvalued acquirer) 
ln_mv_acqu Natural logarithm of the acquirer’s market value 
priv 
Binary variable that equals 1 if target firm is a private firm, otherwise 0 if it is publicly 
listed 
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pay Binary variable that equals 1 if the acquirer pays with cash, otherwise 0 
relate_2sic 
Binary variable that equals 1 if acquirer’s and target's first 2-digit SIC codes are 
identic, otherwise 0 
V    Industry and Year Controls 
sic_b 
Binary variable that equals 1, if acquirer operates in the SIC division B: mining, 
otherwise 0 
sic_c 
Binary variable that equals 1, if acquirer operates in the SIC division C: construction, 
otherwise 0 
sic_d 
Binary variable that equals 1, if acquirer operates in the SIC division D: 
manufacturing, otherwise 0 
sic_e 
Binary variable that equals 1, if acquirer operates in the SIC division E: transportation, 
communications, electric, gas, and sanitary services, otherwise 0 
sic_f 
Binary variable that equals 1, if acquirer operates in the SIC division F: wholesale 
trade, otherwise 0 
sic_g 
Binary variable that equals 1, if acquirer operates in the SIC division G: retail trade, 
otherwise 0 
sic_i 
Binary variable that equals 1, if acquirer operates in the SIC division I: services, 
otherwise 0 
y_2005,…,  
y_2014 
Binary variable that equals 1, if M&A effective date in 2005, 2006, …, 2014, otherwise 
0 
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4  
Post-Merger Stakeholder Conflict and the Impact of 
Integration Quality on Acquirer M&A Profitability 
 
Abstract  
This paper empirically examines the post-merger stakeholder conflict 
hypothesis in M&A by applying a sample of 425 effective US transactions 
from 2005-2014. The theory claims that potential violations of primary 
stakeholder interests cause non-cooperative stakeholder actions and an 
impairment of merger synergy. A stakeholder-oriented post-merger 
integration (PMI) may serve as a value enhancing mechanism to mitigate the 
negative impact on long-term merger outcomes. The theory is tested by 
showing that a high-quality PMI with focus on the four dimensions of 
management attention, stakeholder information, integration support, and risk 
awareness (all measured by textual analysis of annual reports and publicly 
available information), on average results in a 22% higher acquirer stock 
return and an increase in operating performance of 4% over a three-year 
period compared to a portfolio of reference firms matched by size and book-
to-market ratio. This paper also finds, as a result of high-quality integration, 
that improved employee productivity and customer demand positively 
influence long-run M&A performance. Finally, it is shown that acquirer 
synergy expectation, pre-deal M&A activity, growth prospects, as well as deal 
size drive PMI quality.  
Keywords: Mergers, acquisitions, post-merger integration, PMI quality, 
operating performance, buy-and-hold abnormal returns, stakeholder conflict, 
synergy impairment 
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4.1 Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) play a predominant and popular role among 
corporate managers seeking external growth opportunities. Apart from a strategic 
and organizational fit between two merging companies, the acquisition process and 
here, in particular, the post-merger integration (PMI) are important to make a M&A 
transaction successful. A lack of appropriate integration has been the downfall of 
many mergers in the past. One third of all mergers simply fail due to poor PMI 
(Shrivastava, 1986). The Daimler-Chrysler merger in 1998 or the combination of AOL 
and Time Warner in 2000 are spectacular examples of value destruction on a massive 
scale, mainly caused by integration incompetence.  
Of course, it is not only the lack of integration which causes a merger to fail. All 
parts in the M&A process are important for value creation. Haspeslagh and Jemison 
(1991) claim that the key to successful M&A is the understanding and management 
of the entire acquisition process with a strict distinction of pre-acquisition decision-
making and post-acquisition integration processes. The conception and transaction of 
a merger do not bring the expected benefits and synergies. It is clearly the post-merger 
integration activities and measures of the management that determine the 
achievement of the perceived M&A objectives and hence, determine success and 
failure. Easily said, it is the integration and how it is managed which matters in M&A. 
 According to Risberg’s (2003) opinion, “If one wants to understand what happens 
to the organization during the post-acquisition process, one needs to understand how 
the individuals experience the process”, a major point of criticism in previous finance 
research on M&A is seen in the mere orientation towards company shareholders. 
There are still other important stakeholders like employees, customers, suppliers, 
debt-holders, and management itself, all who also have tremendous impact on a 
firm’s future cash flows. 
A merger of material size can have a major impact on the organization and its 
renewal. It seems to be grossly negligent to believe that this transformative 
development does not fail to leave its mark on primary stakeholders. A lot of sources 
of conflict can emerge, making it important to counteract these through an 
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appropriate and well-managed PMI process. Strategic management literature has 
recently started to counter the prioritization of shareholder interests through the 
application of stakeholder theory, arguing that benefits of managing for stakeholders 
are stronger commitment, higher firm legitimacy, more value creation, and more trust 
in firm-stakeholder relationships (Freeman, 2010; Parmar et al., 2010). 
Therefore, this paper empirically tests the post-merger stakeholder conflict 
hypothesis with a focus on the mitigating effect of a stakeholder-oriented PMI on 
long-term acquirer M&A performance. The analysis aims to answer the question all 
too frequently raised by theorists and practitioners of whether or not the quality of 
PMI improves post-acquisition profitability. In the present article, quality of PMI is 
understood as the degree of stakeholder orientation during the integration 
(managerial and sociocultural aspects) and not as the evaluation of functional, 
procedural, legal, or physical integration tasks. Thus, this analysis arguably covers 
one of the most difficult and least examined integration challenges. 
To measure the quality of PMI, i.e. the stakeholder orientation in PMI, four indexes 
are first constructed within this paper with a focus on the following dimensions: 
stakeholder information, integration support, risk awareness, and management 
attention. Secondly, data is hand-collected via textual analysis from annual reports, 
Lexis Nexis database, and S&P daily news by focusing on the mentioned stakeholder 
integration aspects.  
The hypothesis to be tested claims that primary stakeholder interests are 
negatively impacted post-merger, which in turn causes value-deteriorating conflicts 
and the impairment of synergies. Therefore, PMI measures that directly focus on the 
alignment of stakeholder interests and a firm’s relationship to its most important 
stakeholder groups can either avoid or resolve emerging conflict and stop costly 
synergy destruction. Moreover, the hypothesis emphasizes that the quality of 
integration matters and not the sole provision or increase of integration capacity (in 
terms of quantity), true to the motto “not just doing the right things but also doing 
things right”.  
The empirical study does also incorporate the variables employee productivity 
and customer demand to further investigate the impact of stakeholder commitment 
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(as indirect PMI quality measure) on M&A performance. In addition, determinants 
that might drive PMI quality are analyzed. Of major interest are the variables deal 
size, acquirer M&A activity, organizational, economical and sociocultural 
complementarity between merging firms, target public status, and acquirer growth 
perspective and synergy expectation. 
Empirical research to date mainly focuses on the general investigation of M&A 
performance and the impact of deal characteristics like method of payment, hostile 
vs. friendly takeovers, target public status, et cetera. The evidence on acquiring firms’ 
long-term financial performance seems to be clear. Acquirers achieve significant 
negative abnormal returns in mergers and acquisitions (Agrawal et al., 1992; 
Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; Megginson et al., 2004; Cui, 2018). 
Studies that focus on short-term announcement returns for both target and acquirer 
firms find significant positive returns for the target shareholders (Dodd and Ruback, 
1977; Bradley et al., 1983; Servaes, 1996; Andrade et al., 2001), but zero or negative 
returns for bidder shareholders (Firth, 1980; Draper and Paudyal, 2006).  
The study of Kengelbach and Klemmer (2012) is one of only a few that tries to 
analyze post-merger problems in association with M&A performance, though with 
limited validity. The authors investigate a global M&A sample of 20,975 transactions 
from 1989 to 2010. Based on the indigestion hypothesis10 (Conn et al., 2004), they 
hypothesize a positive relationship between the time since the last completed merger 
and the short-term abnormal returns of the present transaction. They argue that a 
shorter time span between two consecutive M&A transactions leads to PMI problems 
due to shorter integration periods. They measure integration time and regress it on 
short-term abnormal return metrics but find no significant impact. The authors 
therefore further investigate the existence of a negative interaction effect of deal size 
and integration time on short-run stock price performance. Finally, significant 
                                                     
10 The indigestion hypothesis claims that a high M&A activity causes post-merger integration problems 
because the acquiring firm cannot manage several integration processes simultaneously. On the one 
hand, the acquirer is not able to use learning effects and transfer them to following M&A transactions. 
On the other hand, too many acquisitions within a short time span can lead to a loss of control and to 
organizational chaos.  
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negative abnormal returns that result for the acquirer support the existence of the 
indigestion hypothesis. Yet, the analysis design and outcome are limited to derive 
guidance for successful post-merger integration. On the one hand, the sole 
consideration of integration time does not comprehensively cover post-acquisition 
problems. On the other hand, the analysis limits its focus to short-term shareholder 
returns, assuming that the market is efficient, and acknowledges negative post-
acquisition developments to its full extent.  
In contrast, the analysis of Bettinazzi and Zollo (2017) investigates stakeholder 
orientation and its impact on acquisition performance. They analyze 1,884 US 
acquisitions in the period 2002-2010 and find a positive association between 
stakeholder focus and acquisition outcomes. In particular, there appears to be a 
positive moderation effect of business relatedness and degree of integration on 
financial profitability. Yet, the authors point out the advantages and disadvantages 
of stakeholder orientation during the entire M&A process, but their empirical study 
is also limited to parameters that do not comprehensively incorporate post-merger 
stakeholder problems. As a consequence, the authors prompt the investigation of the 
value-impact of PMI in conjunction with the acquirer’s ability to integrate primary 
stakeholder interests, for instance, with regard to integration planning and 
implementation. This is exactly the motivation of the underlying empirical study in 
this paper. It aims to provide evidence for the positive impact of high-quality PMI 
(stakeholder-oriented PMI measures) on long-term acquirer financial and operating 
performance.  
In summary, this article contributes to the existing literature in several ways. 
Firstly, it empirically tests the post-merger stakeholder conflict hypothesis and the 
mitigating factor of high-quality PMI measures. Secondly, this paper proves that 
stakeholder commitment is important for post-acquisition value creation. Thirdly, 
variables are determined that significantly impact PMI quality. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the data, the PMI 
quality index construction, and the methodology applied. Section 4.3 documents 
descriptive and empirical results of the research analysis. Section 4.4 concludes the 
article. 
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4.2 Data Sample, PMI Index Construction and Methodology 
4.2.1 Data and Sources 
To make the hand data collection tasks manageable the number of M&A transactions 
analyzed in this paper is limited to 425 M&A transactions executed by US publicly 
listed acquirers (NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ) from 2005-2014. Deal data is collected from 
the Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum M&A database. The sample is limited to strategic 
and synergistic M&A, i.e. to mergers defined as a combination of business that takes 
place or the takeover of one hundred percent of the stock of a public or private target, 
and to acquisitions of majority interest (acquirer has a stake of less than fifty percent 
before the acquisition and seeks to acquire fifty percent or more, but less than one 
hundred percent of the target firm’s equity). The sampling procedure is conducted 
according to the following criteria: 
1. Neither the bidder nor the target operate in the Finance, Insurance, or Real Estate 
industry (SIC Codes 60-67).11 
2. The deal value is equal to or greater than one hundred million US dollars.12 
3. Monthly acquirer price and return data is available in the Thomson Reuters 
DataStream database for the period of 36 months after deal completion. 
4. Accounting data is available in the Thomson Reuters DataStream database from 
three years prior the merger until three years following the effective date of the 
transaction. 
5. Annual reports or 10-K SEC filings are available for the effective year and the 
following three years. 
Table 21 presents summary statistics of the M&A sample on an annual basis. Most 
deals were closed in 2007 with 62 transactions. The year before, 2006 shows the 
                                                     
11 Firms that belong to these industries are subject to special accounting and regulatory requirements, 
making them difficult to compare with other companies. 
12 This size constraint is set for the reason that the analysis focuses on M&A of material size. In addition, 
it reduces the probability of confounding events in case of multiple acquirers that complete several small 
M&A transactions within the studied event window of 12 to 36 months. 
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highest aggregate deal value (260 billion USD), whereas in 2009 the highest average 
USD value was paid (6.13 billion USD). The mean sample deal value is 3.05 billion 
USD. 51 mergers (12%) take place cross-border (between an entity in the US and one 
in a foreign country), and 218 deals are purely financed with cash (51%). The majority 
of 73% are public transactions, i.e. M&A where both acquirer and target are stock-
exchange-listed companies (309 M&A). 
Table 21: Summary Statistics by Year 
The table reports the number of M&A deals, the aggregated and average deal values in million USD, and further 
deal characteristics on an annual basis from 2005-2014 
Year Total Nr. 
of M&A 
Total 
Value 
Avg. 
Value 
Domestic 
M&A 
Cross-border 
M&A 
Cash 
Deals 
Equity 
Deals 
Private 
Targets 
Public 
Targets 
2005 51 184,697 3,622 46 5 21 30 12 39 
2006 49 260,187 5,310 44 5 19 30 9 40 
2007 62 139,802 2,255 56 6 35 27 9 53 
2008 16 92,310 5,769 15 1 6 10 0 16 
2009 23 140,990 6,130 21 2 9 14 6 17 
2010 41 117,056 2,855 40 1 18 23 8 33 
2011 47 92,097 1,960 39 8 27 20 21 26 
2012 43 147,252 3,424 38 5 22 21 14 29 
2013 50 57,428 1,149 41 9 33 17 21 29 
2014 43 63,664 1,481 34 9 28 15 16 27 
Total 425 1,295,483 3,048 374 51 218 207 116 309 
 
4.2.2 Variable Definition 
Deal and acquirer controls 
On the one hand, the empirical analysis controls for the following deal characteristics: 
method of payment, target public status, deal size, cross-border transaction, cultural 
and geographic distance between acquiring firm and target, as well as business 
relatedness. If the acquirer pays one hundred percent in cash, the binary variable pay 
equals 1, otherwise, if it finances the deal with stock or a mixture of stock and cash, 
the variable equals 0. The variable priv takes a 1 if the target is private, otherwise, if it 
is publicly traded, it equals 0. Information for both method of payment and target 
public status are available in the SDC database. Deal size (deal_size) equals deal value 
(excl. net debt of target) divided by acquirer market value (information available in 
Thomson Reuters DataStream). Whether a transaction is domestic or cross-border is 
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defined by the binary variable cb which equals 1 in case of cross-border M&A, 
otherwise 0. A further variable applied in the empirical study is cultural distance (cd). 
It is determined according to the formula developed by Kogut and Singh (1988) as the 
sum of the deviations of each country from the US along each of the four cultural 
distance dimensions defined by Hofstede (1980, 1985): power distance, 
individualism, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance.13 Moreover, geographic 
distance (geo) in miles between acquirer and target is calculated for each transaction 
by firstly, collecting latitude and longitude coordinates of the locations (as reported 
in SDC), and secondly, using the great circle distance formula (Ragozzino, 2009). 
Finally, the binary variable relate_2sic refers to the 2-digit SIC code overlap of primary 
industry between bidder and target to measure the relatedness of the businesses. The 
variable equals 1, if the first two digits are identical (focused or horizontal M&A), 
otherwise it equals 0 (diversified or conglomerate M&A). 
On the other hand, the variables acquirer size, acquirer pre-deal M&A activity, 
acquirer growth perspective and acquirer synergy expectation are used as firm 
controls. The variable acquirer size (ln_mv_acqu) is determined as the natural 
logarithm of the acquirer’s market value three months prior the effective month of 
the M&A transaction. Market values are gathered from Thomson Reuters 
DataStream. An acquirer’s pre-merger M&A activity is measured by the variable deal 
frequency (deal_frequ) which is defined as the number of M&A transactions, with a 
minimum deal value of one hundred million USD, executed within the previous five 
years of the considered acquisition. The deal value constraint is adopted to exclude 
very small deals that are expected to have no material effect on acquirer integration 
capacity. For each transaction, acquirers’ pre-deal history is documented in SDC. An 
acquirer’s synergy expectation (goodw_to_dv) is defined as the ratio between reported 
transaction goodwill according to IFRS and the deal value. Goodwill equals the 
residual value which is not allocated to any tangible or intangible asset within the 
                                                     
13 Hofstede (1980) collects survey data on work-related values from about 120,000 IBM employees in 
40 different countries. He identifies these four statistically independent cultural distance dimensions that 
explain the inter-country variation in his survey. For a detailed description of each dimension refer to 
Hofstede’s analyses (Hofstede 1980, 1985). 
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purchase price allocation process. Therefore, it is argued that goodwill reflects the 
management’s synergy expectation as present value of the future synergy cash flows 
of the M&A transaction. The transaction goodwill is collected from the annual 
reports/10-K SEC filings in the year of deal completion. Finally, the book-to-market 
ratio of the acquiring firm (bm) is calculated as the ratio of its book value and its 
market capitalization as of December of the prior year of the effective year. The ratio 
gives an indication about acquirer growth prospects. A low ratio implies an 
overvalued bidder with low future growth potential (so-called “glamour acquirer”), 
whereas a high book-to-market ratio identifies an undervalued acquirer with high 
future growth prospects (so-called “value acquirer”). As further controls, the 
empirical investigation incorporates industry dummies according to the Standard 
Industrial Classification Code (SIC) of the acquiring firm (sic_b, sic_c, sic_xy, etc.). 
Stakeholder commitment variables 
This paper further studies the indirect impact of PMI quality on long-term M&A 
performance through incorporation of stakeholder commitment variables. On the 
basis of defined proxies, these variables evaluate how the commitment of a specific 
stakeholder group has changed post-merger compared to pre-merger, thus giving an 
indirect assessment of PMI quality. This paper claims that if post-merger important 
interests of a stakeholder group are violated and are not aligned through high-quality 
PMI measures, the respective commitment to the firm of this specific stakeholder will 
decrease. Vice versa, the commitment to the firm will be stable or even improve if 
acquirer management implements a stakeholder-oriented PMI.  
Here, the focus lies on two primary stakeholders of a firm, the customer and the 
employee. The changes in sales growth (demand) and sales per employee 
(productivity) post-merger to pre-merger are used as proxies for customer and 
employee commitment, respectively. The former indicator equals the ratio of the 
combined firm’s post-merger three-year average growth in net sales (excluding the 
year of deal completion) minus the acquirer net sales growth one year prior to the 
effective year of the M&A transaction. Sales growth equals net sales at the end of the 
financial year divided by net sales at the beginning of the financial year. The latter 
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variable is calculated by an acquirer’s post-merger average employee productivity 
(sales per employee, which is net sales divided by the number of employees) in the 
following three years after the event year minus the acquirer employee productivity 
one year prior the merger completion. 
PMI quality factors 
This paper defines ten PMI quality variables to measure the direct impact of PMI 
quality on long-term acquirer performance. They are allocated to four PMI sub-
indexes. PMI Sub-index 1 “management attention” comprises the binary variables 
pmi_mgmt and pmi_conf to determine management focus and confidence, 
respectively. PMI Sub-index 2 “stakeholder information” consists of the determinants 
pmi_plan, pmi_object and pmi_transp. All of them take either a 1 if applicable, otherwise 
0. PMI Sub-index 3 “integration support and governance” is composed of the 0/1-
variables pmi_consult, pmi_incent and pmi_gov, whereas Sub-index 4 “risk awareness” 
comprises pmi_risk and pmi_stakeh. The sub-indexes and its construction as well as its 
respective PMI quality variables are described in the following Section 4.2.3. 
4.2.3 PMI Quality Index Construction and Measurement 
To empirically prove that PMI has a significant impact on acquirer long-run financial 
and operating performance, a PMI quality index that consists of four sub-indexes is 
constructed and applied. The following subsection describes the data sources and 
data collection process of relevant PMI information and the construction of each PMI 
sub-index. 
In the context of the underlying analysis of stakeholder orientation in the post-
merger integration process, it is important to receive applicable and reliable data. Due 
to the fact that each company should have an interest in keeping its primary 
stakeholders informed about important and material firm events, there has to be a 
maximum degree of transparency and communication. Important documents to 
inform all relevant stakeholders are a company’s annual report and 10-K filing of the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). These publicly available 
documents serve as a standardized and reliable source of all important financial and 
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economic data and events within a firm’s reporting year. These sources are used to 
hand-collect integration data of M&A transactions. In addition, the information 
search is referred to the Lexis Nexis database that provides corporate data and full 
text press articles (e.g. S&P Daily News) as well as company ad-hoc announcements. 
To collect suitable PMI data, the following textual analysis approach is applied. 
Firstly, for each M&A transaction, the annual reports or 10-K SEC filings of the 
effective year and the subsequent three reporting years are downloaded electronically 
from the respective acquiring firm’s investor relations website or the SEC’s EDGAR 
(Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval) database (www.sec.gov), 
respectively. Secondly, each document is searched for the following keywords: 
“merger”, “acquisition”, “integration”, “integrating”, “integrate”, “restructure”, 
“restructuring”, “synergy”, “synergies”, “consultant”, “consulting”, “advisor”, 
“goodwill”, “purchase price”, and “stakeholder”. Thirdly, applicable information 
and data are matched to the respective PMI quality sub-indexes according to the 
defined criteria of each index.  
In general, a PMI sub-index comprises two or three criteria. Each criterion 𝑐𝑖, 𝑖 =
1,… ,𝑁 is scored, either with 1 if applicable or 0 if not applicable. The sum of all 
reviewed aspects results in a total sub-index score: 
 𝐼?̅?𝑚 = ∑ 𝑐𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 ,   (38) 
where 𝑁 equals the number of criteria and 𝑚 ∈ {1,2,3,4} equals the set of PMI sub-
indexes. 
 The main objectives of the index scoring are, a standardized mapping of relevant 
PMI quality characteristics, and a reasonable numerical evaluation of the different 
PMI sub-indexes and its respective dimensions. Overall, the PMI quality index 
consists of ten criteria subdivided into four sub-indexes: (i) management attention 
(two criteria), (ii) stakeholder information (three criteria), (iii) integration support and 
governance (three criteria), and (iv) risk awareness (two criteria). As a result of this 
procedure, the overall PMI quality index score is as follows: 
𝐼?̿? = ∑ 𝐼𝑆𝑚 ∈ [0,10]4𝑚=1 ,   (39) 
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with a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 10 (refer to 4.5 Appendix A.3 for 
an example of PMI quality evaluation). 
PMI Sub-index 1: Management attention (𝑰𝑺̅̅ ̅ ) 
This index covers information about the acquiring firm’s management and its 
perception during the integration period of the merger or acquisition. It is essential 
for all stakeholders that the management has a clear focus on the post-acquisition 
integration process and the ongoing activities. Therefore, management itself should 
have an interest in PMI proceeding smoothly and communicating its confidence. The 
following criteria and questions are included in the index: 
Management 
Focus  
(pmi_mgmt) 
Is there any statement regarding the PMI within the annual report’s 
CEO letter to the shareholders? 
If yes, then 1. 
If no, then 0. 
Management 
Confidence 
(pmi_conf) 
Is there any positive communication, for example, within the annual 
report’s CEO letter to the shareholders, about PMI progress or PMI 
goal attainments, for instance, about the amount of synergy 
realization? 
If yes, then 1. 
If no, then 0. 
 
PMI Sub-index 2: Stakeholder information (𝑰𝑺̅̅ ̅ ) 
To keep primary stakeholders informed about what is going on during the post-
merger period and how integration tasks are implemented, the acquiring firm should 
inform stakeholders about its PMI plan, strategy and integration objectives. In 
addition, overall degree of information (i.e. disclosure and transparency) within the 
annual report, 10-K filing, or press news is important. The sub-index PMI stakeholder 
information maps the following aspects.  
Integration 
Plan 
(pmi_plan) 
Is there any statement in the annual report or publicly available 
information about an integration plan or a restructuring program? 
If yes, then 1. 
If no, then 0. 
Integration 
Objective 
(pmi_object) 
Is there any statement in the annual report or publicly available 
information about the objectives or the strategy of the integration? 
Are synergies or other targets communicated? 
If yes, then 1. 
If no, then 0. 
General 
Transparency 
(pmi_transp) 
Measures the general degree of stakeholder information within the 
analyzed publicly available documents, i.e. whether a detailed 
information of the PMI or the M&A transaction is reported? 
If yes, then 1. 
If no, then 0. 
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PMI Sub-index 3: Integration support and governance (𝑰𝑺̅̅ ̅ ) 
To simultaneously enable a smooth and efficient post-merger integration, professional 
PMI consultants or integration teams should support the entire PMI process from the 
first day on. Moreover, the PMI should be supervised by a Chief Information Officer 
(CIO) or an Integration Committee. To avoid unproductive or aimless integration 
activities, incentives can help to quicken the goal attainment.  
Consultants/ 
Integr. Team 
(pmi_consult) 
Is there any statement, e.g., within the annual report that 
consultants were hired to accompany the PMI process? Or 
alternatively, was an integration team installed to focus on the PMI? 
If yes, then 1. 
If no, then 0. 
Integration 
Incentives 
(pmi_incent) 
Are incentives for a successful PMI set within the management 
compensation? Are any other incentives or targets regarding PMI 
defined? 
If yes, then 1. 
If no, then 0. 
PMI 
Governance 
(pmi_gov) 
Is a Chief Integration Officer or an Integration Committee installed? If yes, then 1. 
If no, then 0. 
 
PMI Sub-index 4: Risk awareness (𝑰𝑺̅̅ ̅ ) 
The integration process comprises a lot of risks. Thus, it is important that the 
acquiring firm is aware of specific integration risks and additionally, of risks that 
impact stakeholder relationships. The PMI risk awareness sub index depicts 
transaction and stakeholder specific integration risks. 
Integration Risks 
(pmi_risk) 
Is there any section, for example, in the annual report 
available that informs about integration risks and threats or 
difficulties regarding the respective M&A transaction? 
If yes, then 1. 
If no, then 0. 
Stakeholder Risks 
(pmi_stakeh) 
Are there any potential conflicts with stakeholder interests 
due to the M&A communicated? 
If yes, then 1. 
If no, then 0. 
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Table 22 summarizes the four PMI sub-indexes with the respective criteria and 
index scores. 
Table 22: PMI Quality Sub-Indexes 
The table presents the four PMI sub-indexes, its criteria and maximum index scores 
 Management 
Attention 
Stakeholder 
Information 
Support and 
Governance 
Risk Awareness 
 1. Management 
Focus, 
2. Management 
Confidence 
1. Integration Plan, 
2. Integration Objective, 
3. Degree of 
Transparency 
1. Integration Team, 
2. Integration Incentives, 
3. PMI Governance 
1. Integration risks, 
2. Stakeholder risks 
Max. 
Score 
2 3 3 2 
 
4.2.4 Methodology 
This paper applies long-term return measures in the empirical study. On the one 
hand, buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) are used as a dependent financial 
performance variable. On the other hand, to investigate the long-run effects on the 
acquirer’s operating performance, abnormal operating cash flow returns (AOCFR) 
are calculated.  
The BHARs for a 12-, 24-, and 36-month holding period of each sample acquirer 
firm are computed through comparison of the acquirer’s compounded holding return 
to the return of a reference portfolio matched by firm size (market capitalization) and 
book-to-market ratio (following the approach of Barber and Lyon, 1997; Barber et al., 
1999). Reference portfolios consist of NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX-listed firms not 
operating in the Finance, Insurance, or Real Estate industry (SIC Codes 60-67) that are 
not identified as acquirers during the whole period 2005-2014 of the initial data 
sample and the preceding and following three years. In June of each year from 2005-
2014, all reference firms are ranked on market capitalization into ten size deciles. In 
each size decile, reference firms are further sorted into five quintiles based on book-
to-market ratios in December of the previous calendar year. As a result of this 
procedure, fifty equally-weighted portfolios are created in each year, i.e. a total of five 
hundred portfolios in the ten year period from 2005 to 2014. Finally, each event firm 
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is matched to one reference portfolio according to size and book-to-market ratio at 
the end of the latest June prior the deal completion date. 
The buy-and-hold abnormal return is calculated as the difference between the 
acquirer buy-and-hold return and the long-run buy-and-hold return of its matched 
reference portfolio: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑇 = ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡) − 1 − 𝑅𝑝𝑇
𝑇
𝑡=0 ,  (40) 
where 𝑡 = 0 is the month following the month of deal closing and 𝑇 the overall 
holding period in months. 𝑅𝑖𝑡 in the formula above is the return of event firm 𝑖 in 
month 𝑡, and 𝑅𝑝𝑇 the return of the reference portfolio 𝑝, calculated as 
𝑅𝑝𝑇 = ∑
[∏ (1+𝑅𝑗𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=0 ]−1
𝑛
𝑛
𝑗=1 ,  (41) 
where 𝑅𝑗𝑡 is the return of reference firm 𝑗 in month 𝑡, and 𝑛 equals the number of 
reference firms included in portfolio 𝑝. The present analysis mainly tests 36-month 
post-merger stock price performance but for robustness reasons 24 and 12-month 
BHARs are also computed. Since BHARs are compounded and not cumulative, a 
common documented disadvantage of this approach is the positively skewed 
distribution of the returns which can lead to a misspecification of test statistics. This 
skewness-bias is controlled for by applying a bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-
statistic when testing for statistical significance as described by Barber et al. (1999). 
The second return measure, a firm’s AOCFR, is computed by the following 
procedure (Megginson, 2004; Healy et al., 1992). Firstly, acquirers’ and reference 
firms’ pre-tax operating cash flow returns (OCFR) as the ratio of earnings before 
interest and taxes (EBIT) to market value of assets are computed in each of the three 
years before and the three years following the effective year of the transaction.14 
Market value of assets is defined as market value of equity (number of shares 
outstanding multiplied with share price) plus book value of net debt, where net debt 
                                                     
14 According to Healy et al. (1992) the year of the merger t=0 is excluded from the return calculation 
because in year 0 the merging entities are consolidated for financial reporting purposes only from 
effective date (the day where the M&A was officially closed) to end of the financial year. In addition, 
year 0 is affected by one-time merger costs making a comparison with other years difficult. 
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equals total debt minus cash and cash equivalents plus minority interests plus 
preferred stock. Secondly, for each reference portfolio the mean OCFR in year 𝑡 ∈
[−3; 3]\{0} is calculated. Thirdly, the AOCFR of event firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 is calculated by 
deducting the matched portfolio mean OCFR in year 𝑡 from the event firm’s OCFR in 
year 𝑡. Finally, acquirers’ mean post-merger AOCFR are compared to the mean pre-
merger AOCFR. 
4.3 Acquirer Long-Term Returns and PMI Quality 
In this section, the descriptive and empirical results of the research analysis are 
presented. After showing that there seems to exist a clear relationship between PMI 
quality and acquirer long-term M&A performance, the study continues with in-depth 
univariate subgroup analyses for certain acquirer and deal characteristics. High-
quality PMI is compared to low quality integration and  the resulting abnormal return 
differences are tested for statistical significance. Finally, two multivariate regression 
models are defined. The first one aims to prove that PMI quality has a significant 
effect on acquirers’ long-term financial and operating performance. The second one 
focuses on the identification of dominant factors that drive PMI quality: 
𝐴𝑅 = 𝛽0 + 𝑃𝑀𝐼 ∗ 𝛽1+. . . +𝐹𝑛  ∗ 𝛽𝑛 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑛+1 ∗ 𝛽𝑛+1+. . . +𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑚 ∗ 𝛽𝑚,  (42) 
𝑃𝑀𝐼 = 𝛽0 + 𝐹1 ∗ 𝛽1+. . . +𝐹𝑛  ∗ 𝛽𝑛 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑛+1 ∗ 𝛽𝑛+1+. . . +𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑚 ∗ 𝛽𝑚, (43) 
where 𝐴𝑅 is either BHAR or AOCFR, 𝑃𝑀𝐼 equals the respective PMI index scores 
𝐼?̅?1, 𝐼?̅?2, 𝐼?̅?3, 𝐼?̅?4 and 𝐼?̿?, 𝐹𝑗 are the explanatory variables (PMI quality, deal and 
acquirer controls, and stakeholder commitment variables) with 𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝑛] and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙 
with 𝑙 ∈ [𝑛 + 1,𝑚] are further control variables incorporated in the model. 
4.3.1 Descriptive Results 
The average sample’s acquirer post-merger performance is significantly negative. 
Financial performance measured by 36-month BHAR is -8.6% and -10.1% for 24-
month BHAR, and -8.4% for 12-month BHAR, respectively. The average three-year 
operating performance is also negative (-2.2%) and statistically significant. These 
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findings confirm the documented evidence of a highly negative acquirer outcome in 
M&A literature. 
The PMI quality for each of the 425 merger events is measured according to the 
index criteria and information collected from publicly available sources. The sample’s 
average PMI quality amounts to 2.2. The minimum sample score equals 0 and the 
highest sample score that is measured equals 9, i.e. the maximum PMI quality score 
of 10 is not reached by any of the analyzed 425 transactions. The year 2008 is the year 
of the highest average PMI quality (2.8) followed by 2012 (2.7) and 2014 (2.3). A 
possible explanation for the high average PMI quality in 2008 may be the 
consequences of the financial crisis, leading to a stronger stakeholder orientation 
during the post-acquisition integration. The descriptive results in Table 23 show that 
the lion’s share of acquiring firms (65% for BHARs; 57% for AOCFRs) conduct a PMI 
of low quality, i.e. where the index score is equal to or smaller than the sample’s 
median cut-off point of 2. This means that the majority of acquirer management fails 
to focus on stakeholder interests during the integration period, probably resulting in 
value-deteriorating post-merger stakeholder conflicts. As one can see, both acquirer 
BHAR and AOCFR are more negative if PMI quality is low, i.e. equal to or smaller 
than 2. For example, the mean 36-month BHAR is -16.4% and average three-year 
AOCFR equals -3.5%. Yet, an increasing PMI quality yields in higher (less negative) 
abnormal returns for the acquirer. 36-month BHAR improves by +4.3% to -12.1% if 
PMI quality is equal to or lower than 4, and even by +7.8% to -8.6% if PMI quality is 
equal to or lower than 9. Thus, acquirers that focus on stakeholders during the PMI 
achieve positive abnormal returns, for instance of +8.3% for a PMI quality scored with 
4, or +10.1% for a PMI quality of 7, whereas companies that do not focus on PMI 
destroy value. The same is valid for operating performance, where returns improve 
from -3.5% (PMI quality ≤ 2) to -2.2% (PMI quality ≤ 9). There is a clearly recognizable 
positive linear relationship between acquirer returns and stakeholder orientation in 
PMI. As integration quality improves, BHAR and AOCFR also improve. 
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Table 23: Acquirer Returns and PMI Quality 
The table reports BHAR and AOCFR according to the PMI quality 
PMI 
Quality 
% 
share 
12-month  
BHAR 
24-month  
BHAR 
36-month  
BHAR 
% 
share 
3-year  
AOCFR 
0 26.6 -0.122 -0.145 -0.101 30.5 -0.051 
≤ 1 50.0 -0.130 -0.174 -0.166 50.1 -0.035 
≤ 2 64.9 -0.116 -0.171 -0.164 57.2 -0.035 
≤ 3 75.3 -0.110 -0.155 -0.145 76.3 -0.030 
≤ 4 84.0 -0.102 -0.140 -0.121 84.6 -0.029 
≤ 5 89.2 -0.090 -0.120 -0.105 89.5 -0.028 
≤ 6 96.0 -0.089 -0.110 -0.096 96.2 -0.022 
≤ 7 98.3 -0.086 -0.105 -0.092 98.4 -0.022 
≤ 8 99.1 -0.087 -0.102 -0.087 99.2 -0.022 
≤ 9 100.0 -0.084 -0.101 -0.086 100.0 -0.022 
 
A similar picture is observable for the respective sub-indexes (Table 24). If the 
index score is zero, 36-month BHAR is the most negative, but improves once certain 
criteria are fulfilled. For instance, if acquirer management does not put any attention 
on post-merger integration, the return is on average -5.7% more negative (-14.3% vs. 
-8.6%). 
Table 24: 36-Month BHAR and PMI Quality Sub-Indexes 
The table reports BHAR and AOCFR according to the PMI quality 
Index Score PMI 1 
Management 
Attention 
PMI 2 
Stakeholder 
Information 
PMI 3 
Integration 
Support 
PMI 4 
Risk  
Awareness 
0 -0.143 -0.146 -0.115 -0.137 
≤ 1 -0.123 -0.111 -0.086 -0.123 
≤ 2 -0.086 -0.090 -0.087 -0.086 
≤ 3 n.a. -0.086 -0.086 n.a. 
 
The average sample index scores of the sub-indexes 1 to 4 are 0.62 for management 
attention, 0.66 for stakeholder information, 0.21 for PMI support, and 0.67 for risk 
awareness, respectively. Hence, Sub-index 4 (integration risk awareness) has the 
highest relative average index score with a degree of achievement of 33.5%, whereas 
Sub-index 3 (integration support and governance) shows the lowest relative score 
with a degree of no more than 7%. 
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As theorized and assumed, one can state that there exists a mitigating effect of 
stakeholder-oriented PMI measures. In the following Subsections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3, it is 
further analyzed whether PMI quality has a statistically positive impact on long-term 
acquirer returns or not. So far, descriptive results strongly support this assumption. 
4.3.2 Subgroup Analysis 
At first, a subgroup analysis is applied through the division of the full sample into 
M&A of high and low PMI quality. The results of the univariate test are presented in 
Table 25. Acquirers that fail to implement stakeholder-oriented integration measures 
do significantly underperform regardless of whether the investment horizon is 12, 24 
or 36 months long, or the operating return measure is applied. For example, the return 
difference in 36-month abnormal stock returns equals on average 22%, which is 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level (20% for 24-month BHAR and 9% 
for 12-month BHAR). AOCFR are also significant different at the 1% level. High-
quality PMI firms achieve a +4% higher operating return compared to bidders with 
low quality integration. More important, high-quality PMI acquirers do not just 
reduce a negative return compared to low-quality PMI firms, they even achieve 
positive M&A performance results: +5.6% (+3.0%) in 36-month (24-month) BHAR 
and +0.5% in three-year AOCFR. As a result of the subgroup analysis, the descriptive 
findings outlined in Section 4.3.1 can be confirmed. 
Table 25: PMI Quality High vs. Low – Univariate Analysis 
The sample consists of 425 completed US mergers and acquisitions in the period 2005-2014 
Performance 
Measures  
High-
quality PMI 
(N=149) 
 Low- 
quality PMI 
(N=274) 
 Test of Difference 
(High – Low)   
Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  t-statistic  
36-month BHAR 0.056  -0.164  0.220  3.71 *** 
24-month BHAR 0.030  -0.171  0.202  3.95 *** 
12-month BHAR -0.026  -0.116  0.090  2.64 *** 
3-year AOCFR 0.005  -0.035  0.040  2.94 *** 
(Cut-off point: Median of PMI quality by variable pmi: 2, i.e. high > 2; low ≤ 2) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01          
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In a next step, this paper further details the empirical analysis by taking certain 
acquirer and deal characteristics into account. A univariate test of return differences 
in 36-month BHAR between high and low PMI quality is applied through further 
division of the M&A sample into the subgroups high vs. low growth acquirers, high 
vs. low synergy expectation, small vs. large deals, and high vs. low deal frequency.  
Results are reported in the following Table 26. 
Table 26: Subgroup Analysis PMI Quality High vs. Low and SCF on 36-Month BHAR 
The sample consists of 425 completed US mergers and acquisitions in the period 2005-2014 
36-month BHAR  
High-quality 
PMI 
 Low-quality 
PMI 
 Test of Difference 
(High – Low)   
Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  t-statistic  
 (N/t-statistic)  (N/t-statistic)      
High growth acquirer 0.046  -0.281  0.326  4.17 *** 
N=208 / bm > 0.44 (78/0.82)  (130/-5.02)      
Low growth acquirer 0.069  -0.058  0.127  1.41  
N=215 / bm ≤ 0.44 (71/0.94)  (144/-1.11)      
High synergy expectation 0.115  -0.223  0.338  4.04 *** 
N=202 / goodw_to_dv > 0.53 (72/1.76)  (130/-4.23)      
Low synergy expectation 0.002  -0.111  0.112  1.34  
N=221 / goodw_to_dv ≤ 0.53 (77/0.03)  (144/-1.97)      
High deal size -0.006  -0.239  0.233  2.62 *** 
N=208 / deal_size > 0.21 (95/-0.11)  (113/-3.41)      
Low deal size 0.166  -0.111  0.277  3.14 *** 
N=215 / deal_size ≤ 0.21 (54/2.15)  (161/-2.54)     
High deal frequency 0.076  -0.227    0.304  3.88 *** 
N=212 / deal_frequ > 0 (74/1.22)  (138/-4.86)      
Low deal frequency 0.037  -0.100    0.136  0.56  
N=211 / deal_frequ = 0 (75/0.56)  (136/-1.61)     
(Cut-off point: Median of PMI quality by variable pmi: 2, i.e. high > 2; low ≤ 2) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
The analysis finds that value acquirers (undervalued firms with high book-to-
market ratio) do significantly destroy shareholder value if they fail to focus on 
stakeholder interests during the PMI. The average return difference equals -32.6% 
compared to high growth firms with a high-quality integration. This finding 
implicates that post-merger conflicts, which are supposed to be less decisive in M&A 
where the bidder firm has high growth prospects, are highly underestimated, thus 
wasting returns and impairing acquirers’ financial M&A performance. For low book-
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to-market acquirers (glamour or overvalued firms), there does not exist any 
significant difference in BHARs. 
Next, acquirers’ synergy expectation is investigated. It is computed by dividing 
the transaction’s reported goodwill by its deal value. In mergers with high synergy 
expectation, PMI quality plays a decisive role. Acquiring firms that miss out on 
focusing on their primary stakeholder groups achieve a significant negative return of 
-22.3%. This is 33.8% lower compared to bidders that implement a high-quality PMI. 
Therefore, one can conclude that PMI towards stakeholders considerably matters in 
acquisitions where management perceives high synergy potentials. On average, well 
integrated M&A with high synergies yield +11.5% in a 36-month BHAR.  
According to the post-merger stakeholder conflict hypothesis, post-acquisition 
synergy realization is influenced by size differences between acquirer and target. The 
present study reveals that low PMI quality leads to significant lower abnormal 
returns, independently of relative target size. Yet, the return difference of 27.7% 
(compared to 23.3%) is stronger for the acquisition of smaller targets (low deal size). 
This confirms the hypothesis that stakeholders of small targets have higher incentives 
to fight for their interests, hence making it important to focus on them during the 
PMI. 
At the end, return differences between high vs. low PMI are analyzed for the 
subgroup deal frequency. The result is unmistakable. Acquirers that often engage in 
mergers (high deal frequency, i.e. low integration capacity) do lose -22.7% in BHAR 
if they do not integrate towards primary stakeholder interests. Compared to high 
PMI-quality acquirers’ return of +7.6%, the resulting difference of 30.4% is statistically 
significant. This means that stakeholder interests and the integration towards 
stakeholders are of high importance in M&A where the acquirer has executed several 
previous deals. 
The univariate findings in this article emphasize the importance of PMI quality in 
general but also for specific subgroups as outlined in this section, including among 
others value acquirers, M&A with high synergies (or relatively large goodwill), low 
deal size (small targets) and high deal frequency (low integration capacity).  
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4.3.3 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
In this subsection, multivariate regression methodology is applied to test the joint 
impact of PMI quality and further variables on long-term financial and operating 
M&A performance. In addition, factors are analyzed that drive acquirer PMI quality. 
Table 27 reports the outcome of the regression of 36-month BHAR on the 
respective PMI sub-index and firm and deal characteristics. Model 1 to 4 show that 
management attention criteria during the PMI (pmi_1), stakeholder information 
(pmi_2), integration support and governance aspects (pmi_3), and risk awareness 
(pmi_4) have a significant positive impact on financial profitability. The t-statistic of 
PMI Sub-index 2 is the highest (4.08, which is significant at the 1% level) whereas Sub-
index 3 has the lowest (2.59 at the 5% significance level). In all four regression models, 
the variables acquirer size (ln_mv_acqu), synergy expectation (goodw_to_dv), cross-
border deals (cb), and geographic distance (geo) have a consistent and either 
statistically positive (ln_mv_acqu, geo) or negative (goodw_to_dv, cross-border) impact 
on BHARs. Interestingly, high synergy expectation is negatively related to long-term 
stock returns. In addition, the coefficients are relatively large. A possible reason might 
be the fact that investors do not share managements’ synergy perceptions or believe 
that the premiums paid are too high.  In combination with the univariate finding in 
Section 4.3.2, it is concluded that a high PMI quality is essential if reported synergy 
expectation is high. Yet, an overpayment outweighs the positive impact of PMI 
quality. Cross-border M&A do also significantly negatively influence returns. Thus, 
missing complementarity in terms of economic congruency encourages stakeholder 
conflicts. Apart from Regression Model 1, the variable deal frequency (deal_frequ) 
shows a statistically significant negative impact in the regressions 2 to 4. 
Consequently, a reduced acquirer integration capacity reinforces post-merger 
synergy deterioration. In Model 2 a higher acquirer growth perspective and thus, a 
lower decisiveness of conflict additionally, negatively influences abnormal stock 
returns. This is contradictory to the general assumption about decisiveness of conflict 
in the theoretical framework of post-merger stakeholder conflicts.  
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Table 27: Regression Results (V) 
Regression of 36-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) on PMI quality sub-indexes and firm and deal 
characteristics 
Model 
Dep. variable 
1 
BHAR_36 
 2 
BHAR_36 
 3 
BHAR_36 
 4 
BHAR_36 
 
         
pmi_1 0.127 ***    
 (3.63)        
pmi_2  0.116 ***   
   (4.08)      
pmi_3   0.161 **  
     (2.59)    
pmi_4    0.142 *** 
       (3.37)  
ln_mv_acqu 0.045 * 0.046 * 0.047 * 0.050 * 
 (1.76)  (1.78)  (1.82)  (1.96)  
goodw_to_dv -0.263 ** -0.281 *** -0.290 *** -0.257 ** 
 (-2.53) (-2.64) (-2.69) (-2.42) 
bm -0.166 -0.196 * -0.150 -0.143 
 (-1.55) (-1.78)  (-1.40) (-1.34) 
cd -0.020 -0.017 -0.019 -0.022 
 (-1.09) (-0.94) (-1.01) (-1.17) 
deal_frequ -0.015 -0.021 * -0.022 ** -0.021 * 
 (-1.44) (-1.84) (-1.98) (-1.92) 
deal_size 0.043 0.051 0.063 0.035 
 (0.53) (0.64) (0.78) (0.46) 
cb -0.216 * -0.241 ** -0.241 ** -0.219 ** 
 (-1.96)  (-2.14)  (-1.92)  (-2.02)  
geo 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 
 (2.41)  (2.47)  (2.37)  (2.43)  
priv 0.068 0.095 0.060 0.076 
 (0.77) (1.07) (0.67) (0.85) 
pay 0.100 0.108 0.106 0.110 
 (1.50) (1.61) (1.58) (1.65) 
relate_2sic 0.016 -0.005 0.004 -0.001 
 (0.26) (-0.08) (0.07) (-0.02) 
constant -0.632 ** -0.643 ** -0.569 * -0.649 ** 
 (-2.08)  (-2.04) (-1.84)  (-2.16) 
Industry control yes  yes  yes  yes  
N 423  423  423  423  
R² 0.106  0.109  0.094  0.105  
Adjusted R² 0.067  0.069  0.054  0.065  
Overall p-value 0.001  0.001  0.004  0.002  
t statistics in parentheses       
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
 
Table 28 reports the results of extended regression analyses. Models 5 and 6 
present the regression of BHAR on total PMI quality. On the one hand, the total PMI 
index score is regressed (Model 5). On the other hand, Model 6 includes all four PMI 
sub-indexes.  
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Table 28: Regression Results (VI) 
Regression of 36-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) on PMI quality sub-indexes, stakeholder 
commitment variables, and firm and deal characteristics 
Model 
Dep. variable 
5 
BHAR_36 
 6 
BHAR_36 
 7 
BHAR_36 
 8 
BHAR_36 
 
         
pmi 0.067 ***  0.066 *** 0.0602 *** 
 (5.21)    (4.96)  (4.55)  
pmi_1  0.068 *   
   (1.68)      
pmi_2  0.060   
   (1.63)      
pmi_3  0.039   
   (0.56)      
pmi_4  0.094 **   
   (2.13)      
ln_mv_acqu 0.043 * 0.044 * 0.040 0.043 * 
 (1.72) (1.74) (1.59) (1.78) 
goodw_to_dv -0.290 *** -0.283 *** -0.264 ** -0.279 ** 
 (-2.79) (-2.71) (-2.53) (-2.41) 
bm -0.180 * -0.176 -0.160 -0.168 
 (-1.71) (-1.62) (-1.48) (-1.63) 
cd -0.019 -0.020 -0.022 -0.024 
 (-1.04) (-1.08) (-1.23) (-1.38) 
deal_frequ -0.018 -0.018 -0.016 -0.016 
 (-1.64) (-1.62) (-1.48) (-1.45) 
deal_size 0.025 0.020 0.012 0.018 
 (0.30) (0.25) (0.15) (0.23) 
cb -0.219 ** -0.219 ** -0.144 -0.146 
 (2.02)  (-2.04)  (-1.47)  (-1.49)  
geo 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 
 (2.52)  (2.51)  (2.31)  (2.33)  
priv 0.092 0.094 0.098 0.112 
 (1.05) (1.05) (1.08) (1.24) 
pay 0.117 * 0.118 * 0.131 * 0.138 ** 
 (1.77) (1.77) (1.95) (2.16) 
relate_2sic -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.012 
 (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.03) (-0.20) 
customer   0.197 0.190 
     (1.35)  (1.32)  
employee   0.213 0.213 * 
     (1.64)  (1.68)  
constant -0.695 ** -0.707 ** -0.458 -0.500 ** 
 (-2.29)  (-2.32)  (-1.51)  (-2.01) 
Industry control yes  yes  yes  no  
N 423  423  414  414  
R² 0.127  0.128  0.135  0.125  
Adjusted R² 0.088  0.082  0.091  0.094  
Overall p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
t statistics in parentheses       
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
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Again one can conclude – according to the regression outcome of Model 5 – that 
PMI quality drives value creation in M&A (the variable pmi is highly significant at the 
1% significance level). Nevertheless, Model 6 reveals that the PMI sub-indexes 1 and 
4 (management attention and integration risk awareness) are most important and 
statistically significant at the 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. Again, the 
determinants ln_mv_acqu, goodw_to_dv, cb, and geo show strong effects on 
performance. Moreover, purely cash-financed transactions are positively related to 
36-month BHARs. 
The Regression Models 7 and 8 incorporate the stakeholder commitment variables 
customer and employee to further investigate the indirect impact of stakeholder 
orientation in PMI on acquirer M&A performance. Both parameters have a positive 
coefficient, yet are not statistically significant once industry belonging is controlled 
for. When the industry control is excluded, at least the variable employee shows a 
statistically positive impact at the 10% level. Controlling for cross-sectional 
dependency (not reported here) and inclusion of industry dummies in the regressions 
confirms the statistical impact of the variable employee at the 10% significance level. In 
other words, a positive change in employee productivity (sales per employee) post-
merger compared to pre-merger signals higher employee commitment which in turn 
reveals that their interests are aligned post-merger. Therefore, one can indirectly 
conclude that quality or stakeholder orientation in PMI drives performance through 
increased stakeholder commitment to the merged firm. Combined with the direct 
measurement of PMI quality and its effect on long-term acquirer returns, one can 
eventually conclude that PMI has an outstanding role in M&A.  
The empirical analysis proceeds with the investigation of whether the impact of 
PMI quality is similar on acquirer operating performance. The outcome of the 
regressions reported in Table 29 and 30 are slightly mixed but on the whole they 
document the same conclusion. Independently analyzing the impact of each PMI sub-
index on operating returns, all sub-indexes except for Sub-index 1 (pmi_1) show a 
statistically significant positive influence. Here, integration risk awareness (pmi_4) 
has the strongest impact with a t-statistic of 3.49 (1% significance level). The variables 
deal frequency (deal_frequ) and cross-border M&A (cb) are highly negatively related 
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in all four Regression Models 9 to 12. Compared to the previous analyses of BHAR, 
acquirer synergy expectation is not statistically significant, however the coefficients 
remain negative. Investors expectation about synergies or overpayment seems 
therefore not in line with post-acquisition operating performance. 
Table 29: Regression Results (VII) 
Regression of AOCFR on PMI quality sub-indexes and firm and deal characteristics 
Model 
Dep. variable 
9 
AOCFR 
 10 
AOCFR 
 11 
AOCFR 
 12 
AOCFR 
 
         
pmi_1 0.011    
 (1.16)        
pmi_2  0.014 *   
   (1.81)      
pmi_3   0.030 **  
     (1.97)    
pmi_4    0.039 *** 
       (3.49)  
goodw_to_dv -0.017 -0.019 -0.022 -0.013 
 (-0.57) (-0.65) (-0.74) (-0.46) 
bm -0.038 -0.042 -0.038 -0.032 
 (-1.39) (-1.57) (-1.41) (-1.26) 
cd 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 
 (1.00) (1.12) (1.06) (0.76) 
deal_frequ -0.004 ** -0.004 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** 
 (-2.15) (-2.29) (-2.48) (-2.28) 
deal_size 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.010 
 (1.01) (1.00) (1.10) (0.58) 
cb -0.064 ** -0.066 ** -0.063 ** -0.064 ** 
 (-2.17)  (-2.23)  (-2.13)  (-2.24)  
geo 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.46)  (1.55)  (1.49)  (1.62)  
priv 0.024 0.028 * 0.024 0.030 * 
 (1.49) (1.69) (1.46) (1.88) 
pay 0.024 0.021 0.022 0.024 * 
 (1.41) (1.43) (1.52) (1.66) 
relate_2sic -0.019 -0.020 -0.019 -0.021 
 (-1.30) (-1.40) (-1.35) (-1.50) 
constant -0.027 -0.032 -0.022 -0.049 
 (-0.45)  (-0.53) (-0.36)  (-0.80) 
Industry control yes  yes  yes  yes  
N 371  371  371  371  
R² 0.083  0.088  0.088  0.118  
Adjusted R² 0.038  0.044  0.044  0.075  
Overall p-value 0.013  0.002  0.006  0.004  
t statistics in parentheses       
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
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Table 30: Regression Results (VIII) 
Regression of AOCFR on PMI quality sub-indexes and stakeholder commitment variables 
Model 
Dep. variable 
13 
AOCFR 
 14 
AOCFR 
 15 
AOCFR 
 16 
AOCFR 
 
         
pmi 0.010 ***  0.009 *** 0.010 *** 
 (2.93)    (2.68)  (2.78)  
pmi_1  -0.000   
   (-0.05)      
pmi_2  0.003   
   (0.34)      
pmi_3  0.014   
   (0.91)      
pmi_4  0.036 ***   
   (2.82)      
goodw_to_dv -0.021 -0.017 -0.014 -0.012 
 (-0.70) (-0.58) (-0.46) (-0.42) 
bm -0.041 -0.034 -0.043 -0.033 
 (-1.54) (-1.35) (-1.57) (-1.34) 
cd 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 
 (1.01) (0.82) (0.76) (0.45) 
deal_frequ -0.004 ** -0.005 ** -0.004 ** -0.004 ** 
 (-2.22) (-2.37) (-2.26) (-2.07) 
deal_size 0.015 0.011 0.014 0.012 
 (0.77) (0.58) (0.77) (0.68) 
cb -0.063 ** -0.063 ** -0.037 -0.034 
 (-2.14)  (-2.18)  (-1.53)  (-1.47)  
geo 0.000 0.000 * 0.000 0.000 
 (1.64)  (1.65)  (0.96)  (1.15)  
priv 0.030 * 0.031 * 0.028 * 0.035 ** 
 (1.83) (1.88) (1.71) (2.25) 
pay 0.023 0.025 * 0.025 * 0.021 
 (1.61) (1.72) (1.79) (1.55) 
relate_2sic -0.020 -0.021 -0.020 -0.023 * 
 (-1.38) (-1.50) (1.43) (-1.70) 
customer   0.070 ** 0.071 ** 
     (2.28)  (2.24)  
employee   0.057 * 0.055 * 
     (1.90)  (1.78)  
constant -0.049 -0.052 0.041 -0.024 
 (-0.81)  (-0.85)  (0.69)  (-0.77) 
Industry control yes  yes  yes  no  
N 371  371  363  363  
R² 0.103  0.121  0.116  0.089  
Adjusted R² 0.059  0.070  0.067  0.056  
Overall p-value 0.001  0.002  0.000  0.000  
t statistics in parentheses       
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
 
According to the regression results of Model 13 and 14 it becomes obvious that 
integration risk awareness (pmi_4) is the most important criteria for operating cash 
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flow returns. Overall PMI quality shows a statistically positive impact on AOCFR, 
however as shown in Model 14, only Sub-index 4 is highly significant at the 1% 
significance level. Acquiring firms that integrate potential transaction and 
stakeholder specific integration risks into its PMI measures improve long-term 
operating profitability. Moreover, controlling for stakeholder commitment of 
employees and customers, both Regression Models 15 and 16 reveal a positive 
relationship between the variables employee/ customer and AOCFR performance. 
Furthermore, acquirer deal frequency remains negatively related to AOCFR 
whereas cross-border M&A become insignificant. In case of operating performance, 
the target’s public status plays an important role. The acquisition of private targets 
improves long-run AOCFR. This is in line with previous M&A performance studies 
on acquisitions of private vs. public targets (Fuller et al., 2002; Draper and Paudyal, 
2006). Reasons for the favorable impact of private targets on performance are private 
information of management, less public visibility and information disclosure. 
A further area of interest is the identification of factors that drive PMI quality 
(stakeholder orientation) in the integration process. Therefore, overall PMI quality 
and the independent impact of each PMI sub-index are analyzed. The respective 
index scores 𝐼?̅?𝑚, with 𝑚 ∈ {1,2,3,4} are regressed on several firm and deal variables. 
The findings reported in Table 31 are interesting. Management attention in PMI is 
highly influenced by deal frequency (deal_frequ) and deal size (deal_size). The former 
variable has a negative, the latter factor a positive impact on the underlying quality 
criteria. It seems to be obvious that active acquirers on the M&A market dealing with 
several previously executed transactions are about to lose its focus on the present 
merger or acquisition. This justifies the negative coefficient of the factor deal 
frequency. In contrast, the larger the target compared to the acquirer, the higher the 
management attention. This can not only be explained through the higher complexity 
of integrating larger targets but also through the larger synergy potential. In addition, 
acquisitions of material size usually enjoy higher publicity, which in turn should also 
encourage management attention.  
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Table 31: Regression Results (IX) 
Regression of PMI quality sub-indexes on firm and deal characteristics 
Model 
Dep. variable 
17 
Mgmt. 
Attention 
 18 
Stakeholder 
Information 
 19 
Integration 
Support 
 20 
Risk 
Awareness 
 
         
bm 0.087  0.413 ** -0.010 -0.021 
 (0.74) (2.46) (-0.12) (-0.19) 
goodw_to_dv 0.121 0.355 * 0.241 * 0.124 
 (0.80) (1.85) (1.89) (0.93) 
deal_frequ -0.037 ** 0.002 0.009 0.002 
 (-2.30) (0.11) (0.80) (0.15) 
deal_size 0.198 ** 0.147 * 0.039 0.255 *** 
 (2.55) (1.83) (0.95) (4.05) 
cd 0.007 -0.019 -0.007 0.008 
 (0.47) (-1.30) (-1.27) (0.37) 
cb -0.100 0.078 -0.082 -0.085 
 (-0.65)  (0.49)  (-1.24)  (-0.55)  
geo -0.000 -0.000 * -0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.21)  (-1.85)  (-0.77)  (-0.49)  
priv -0.137 -0.361 *** -0.022 -0.083 
 (-1.51) (-3.92) (-0.48) (-1.08) 
pay -0.062 -0.119 -0.082 * -0.082 
 (-0.74) (-1.24) (-1.79) (-1.16) 
relate_2sic -0.066 0.124 0.017 0.058 
 (-0.77) (1.32) (0.34) (0.80) 
constant 0.618 *** 0.344 ** 0.118 0.552 *** 
 (4.45)  (2.13)  (1.37)  (4.08) 
Industry control no  no  no  no  
N 425  425  425  425  
R² 0.064  0.101  0.048  0.067  
Adjusted R² 0.041  0.079  0.025  0.044  
Overall p-value 0.000  0.000  0.018  0.001  
t statistics in parentheses       
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
 
Sub-index 2 “stakeholder information” is positively related to acquirer growth 
perspective (bm), indicating that an increasing acquirer growth prospect improves 
stakeholder information about integration plan, objective and so on. This finding is 
confusing because it was expected that instead, bidders with low growth 
opportunities are more likely to inform stakeholders due to the higher importance or 
decisiveness of potential stakeholder conflict. Synergy expectation (goodw_to_dv) also 
has a significant positive effect on PMI stakeholder information mainly due to higher 
pressure on management to realize anticipated merger synergies, thus making it 
necessary to keep primary stakeholders on track and informed about the integration 
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progress to avoid costly stakeholder conflicts. Furthermore, deal size (deal_size) 
favorably influences stakeholder information. The reasoning is more or less the same 
as for Sub-index 1 (see above). However geographic distance (geo, as proxy for 
decisiveness of conflict) and the acquisition of private targets (priv) are negatively 
related to the information quality of stakeholders. The former factor seems reasonable 
due to less direct confrontation and probably less perceived necessity for information, 
which go hand in hand with greater geographic distance. The latter factor, namely 
the acquisition of private targets, is more interesting. It reveals that non-publicly 
listed firms are somewhat of a black-box, making it difficult for the acquiring firm’s 
management to disclose all potential information to its stakeholders. There is a high 
degree of information asymmetry when it comes to the takeover and integration of 
privately held firms.  
The next sub-index under investigation is “integration support and governance” 
(Model 19). Here, synergy expectation (goodw_to_dv) plays a decisive role with a 
highly positive impact on the respective index criteria. This result seems to be clear if 
one considers the pressure placed on managements’ shoulders to deliver promised 
merger synergies. Management therefore either hires consultants or installs an 
integration team, designates a Chief Integration Officer, or an integration committee. 
In contrast, cash-financed deals (pay) deteriorate PMI support and governance mainly 
because of a lack of financial funding.  
Finally, integration risk awareness (PMI Sub-index 4; Model 20) is positively 
driven by deal size (deal_size). A possible explanation lies in the increasing complexity 
of integrating large or even equally-sized targets into the organization. There are a lot 
of sources for potential stakeholder conflict, thus encouraging acquirer management 
to deal with specific integration and stakeholder risks throughout the entire post-
merger integration process. 
Table 32 reports the regression results for the overall PMI quality. When industry 
controls are excluded (Model 21), the main quality drivers are acquirer synergy 
expectation (positive at the 10% significance level), deal size (positive at the 1% 
significance level) and the acquisition of private targets (negative at the 1% 
significance level). Once industry controls are included in Model 22 synergy 
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expectation becomes insignificant whereas, in addition, geographic distance 
(decisiveness of conflict) and cash-financed deals negatively impact PMI quality.  
Table 32: Regression Results (X) 
Regression of PMI quality index on firm and deal characteristics 
Model 
Dep. variable 
21 
PMI 
Quality 
 22 
PMI 
Quality 
 
     
bm 0.047 0.335 
 (1.34) (1.00) 
goodw_to_dv 0.841 * 0.584 
 (1.83) (1.25) 
deal_frequ -0.024 -0.019 
 (-0.70) (-0.55) 
deal_size 0.639 *** 0.642 *** 
 (3.15) (3.22) 
cd -0.011 -0.010 
 (-0.27) (-0.23) 
cb -0.189 -0.093 
 (-0.49)  (-0.24)  
geo -0.001 -0.001 * 
 (-1.60)  (-1.81)  
priv -0.602 *** -0.577 ** 
 (-2.66) (-2.45) 
pay -0.344 -0.376 * 
 (-1.61) (-1.73) 
relate_2sic 0.132 0.128 
 (0.60) (0.58) 
constant 1.633 *** 1.178 ** 
 (4.37)  (2.36)  
Industry control no  yes  
N 425  425  
R² 0.111  0.150  
Adjusted R² 0.090  0.117  
Overall p-value 0.000  0.000  
t statistics in parentheses   
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
 
Several robustness tests are applied to verify the statistical inference of the 
reported empirical findings. Firstly, the BHARs and AOCFRs are winsorized at the 
2.5% and 97.5% level to control for potential outliers (see Table 2 and 3 in 4.5 
Appendix A.2). Secondly, to avoid a so-called “bad model bias” a different 
benchmarking procedure is applied to calculate abnormal stock returns. Instead of 
the reference portfolio approach, a control firm approach is used by matching each 
event firm to a single reference firm (instead of a portfolio of several firms) of similar 
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size and book-to-market ratio. Finally, this paper controls for cross-sectional 
dependency by excluding multiple acquisitions by the same acquirer within any 
three-year period (see Table 4 to Table 9 in 4.5 Appendix A.2). The multivariate 
regression results are largely robust against the applied robustness checks.  
4.4 Conclusion 
This paper aims to present evidence in answer to the question of whether PMI quality 
improves long-term performance of US acquirers or not. It defines PMI quality as the 
degree of stakeholder orientation towards certain stakeholder integration criteria, 
which are assigned to four dimensions: (i) management attention, (ii) stakeholder 
information, (iii) integration support, and (iv) integration risk awareness. To achieve 
a metric scale that enables the measurement and evaluation of PMI quality, four PMI 
sub-indexes are constructed that cover the dimensions and aspects mentioned above.  
The outcome of the empirical analysis leads to a strong support of the mitigating 
effect of PMI in post-merger stakeholder conflicts as theorized in the post-merger 
stakeholder conflict hypothesis which derives from Hirshleifer’s paradox of power 
(Hirshleifer, 1991). US acquirers that fail to conduct a stakeholder-oriented PMI 
significantly underperform compared to high-quality integrators of M&A. On 
average they lose 22% in buy-and-hold abnormal returns and 4% in abnormal 
operating cash flow returns. A further separation of the data sample into high vs. low 
growth acquirers, high vs. low synergy expectation, high vs. low deals size, and high 
vs. low deal frequency reinforces the decisive role of PMI, in particular, the value-
enhancing effect of stakeholder orientation in PMI.  
Finally, the outcome of multivariate regressions confirms the positive relationship 
between PMI quality and acquirer abnormal returns for both measures BHARs and 
AOCFRs. Among the investigated PMI sub-indexes, the criteria combined under the 
index “integration risk awareness” have the strongest impact on both financial and 
operating performance. This finding underscores the need for acquirer management, 
firstly, to reveal transaction and stakeholder specific PMI risks, secondly to 
understand them, and thirdly, in the case of emerging post-merger stakeholder 
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conflict, to avoid these risks. For that reason, it is indispensable to run a 
comprehensive stakeholder analysis that concretizes primary stakeholder interest 
and claims.  
In addition, it is shown that long-term performance is also impacted by a positive 
change of stakeholder commitment post-merger compared to pre-merger. An 
increasing employee and customer commitment yields higher acquirer abnormal 
operating cash flow returns and partially higher financial performance. Moreover, the 
presented empirical study does also confirm the relevance of certain stakeholder 
conflict variables while analyzing post-acquisition performance. Among others, 
acquirer integration capacity and cross-country transactions deteriorate long-term 
M&A performance, whereas geographic proximity mitigates synergy-impairing 
stakeholder conflicts.   
Based on the assessment of different stakeholder integration criteria, further 
variables are identified that significantly impact PMI quality. Acquirer synergy 
expectation, relative target size, and the target’s public status drive stakeholder 
orientation during the PMI of corporate takeovers and mergers.  
Altogether, the presented empirical study provides a compelling evidence that the 
mere focus on shareholder value in M&A is outdated. What really counts in the post-
acquisition period of M&A is the effective integration management towards all 
primary stakeholders, i.e. employees, customers, suppliers, debt-holders, and so on. 
They have either direct or indirect influence on the firm’s future cash flows and its 
merger synergies. Therefore, it is important to align their interests to the new 
circumstances and conditions in the post-merger period.  
The empirical analysis in this paper is limited in several ways. Firstly, the focus is 
on US acquirers only. For future research it might be interesting to examine whether 
PMI quality has such a mitigating mechanism and value-increasing effect in other 
developed M&A markets, e.g. in UK or Germany. Secondly, the degree of stakeholder 
orientation in PMI might not be fully covered by the defined ten criteria in this paper. 
In addition, there might exist further dimensions and aspects worth investigating in 
more detail. Moreover, the data sources of collecting PMI information might be not 
sufficient enough due to the possibility that not every piece of information is 
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communicated or documented in the annual reports, 10-K SEC filings, press news, or 
ad-hoc announcements. The applied approach of assessing PMI quality in this paper 
does not cover first-hand information. Thus, a survey approach might be worth 
conducting in future research to either confirm or reject the outcome of the high-level 
procedure within this article. Finally, due to the high effort of collecting relevant 
integration data, the underlying M&A sample only comprises 425 effective 
transactions. The small sample size might be prone to biased statistical inferences. 
Therefore, researchers are encouraged to re-examine the relevance of PMI quality in 
M&A in their future work through application of a sufficiently large data sample.  
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4.5 Appendix 
A1: Variable definition 
 
Table 1 
Variable definition 
Variable Description 
I     M&A Financial Performance Variables 
BHAR_36 
36-month buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) derived with reference portfolio 
approach 
BHAR_24 24-month BHAR derived with reference portfolio approach 
BHAR_12 12-month BHAR derived with reference portfolio approach 
mBHAR_36 36-month BHAR derived with matching control firm approach 
mBHAR_24 24-month BHAR derived with matching control firm approach 
mBHAR_12 12-month BHAR derived with matching control firm approach 
wBHAR_36 
36-month BHAR derived with reference portfolio approach – winsorized 2.5%/ 97.5% 
levels 
wBHAR_24 
24-month BHAR derived with reference portfolio approach – winsorized 2.5%/ 97.5% 
levels 
wBHAR_12 
12-month BHAR derived with reference portfolio approach – winsorized 2.5%/ 97.5% 
levels 
wmBHAR_36 
36-month BHAR derived with matching control firm approach – winsorized 2.5%/ 
97.5% levels 
wmBHAR_24 
24-month BHAR derived with matching control firm approach – winsorized 2.5%/ 
97.5% levels 
wmBHAR_12 
12-month BHAR  derived with matching control firm approach – winsorized 2.5%/ 
97.5% levels 
II    M&A Operating Performance Variables 
AOCFR 
Three year average abnormal operating cash flow return (AOCFR) compared to pre-
merger 
wAOCFR Three year average AOCFR compared to pre-merger – winsorized 2.5%/97.5% levels 
III   Firm and Deal Characteristics 
deal_size 
Relative deal size defined as ratio between deal value and acquirer’s market value at 
effective year 
deal_frequ 
Acquirer’s deal frequency: defined as number of transactions with minimum deal value 
of 100 million USD  - executed within the previous 5 years 
cd 
Culture distance between acquirer's and target’s nation: measured by Kogut and Singh 
formula and with 5 culture distance dimensions of Hofstede 
bm 
Acquirer firm’s book-to-market ratio (high ratio = undervalued acquirer, low ratio = 
overvalued acquirer) 
ln_mv_acqu Natural logarithm of the acquirer’s market value 
priv 
Binary variable that equals 1 if target firm is a private firm, otherwise 0 if it is publicly 
listed 
pay Binary variable that equals 1 if the acquirer pays in cash, otherwise 0 
relate_2sic 
Binary variable that equals 1 if acquirer’s and target’s first 2-digit SIC codes are 
identical, otherwise 0 
goodw_to_dv Reported transaction goodwill divided by deal value (acquirer synergy expectation) 
cb 
Binary variable that equals 1 if the transaction takes place cross-border, otherwise 0 if 
US domestic 
geo Geographic distance in miles between acquirer’s headquarter and target’s headquarter 
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IV   Stakeholder Engagement Variables 
employee Employee productivity as the ratio of net sales to number of employees 
customer Sales growth as the ratio of net sales at end of year to net sales beginning of year 
V    Industry and Year Controls 
sic_b 
Binary variable that equals 1, if acquirer operates in the SIC division B: mining, 
otherwise 0 
sic_c 
Binary variable that equals 1, if acquirer operates in the SIC division C: construction, 
otherwise 0 
sic_d 
Binary variable that equals 1, if acquirer operates in the SIC division D: manufacturing, 
otherwise 0 
sic_e 
Binary variable that equals 1, if acquirer operates in the SIC division E: transportation, 
communications, electric, gas, and sanitary services, otherwise 0 
sic_f 
Binary variable that equals 1, if acquirer operates in the SIC division F: wholesale trade, 
otherwise 0 
sic_g 
Binary variable that equals 1, if acquirer operates in the SIC division G: retail trade, 
otherwise 0 
sic_i 
Binary variable that equals 1, if acquirer operates in the SIC division I: services, 
otherwise 0 
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A2: Robustness tests 
 
Table 2 
Robustness check: Winsorized BHAR at 2.5% and 97.5% level. Regression of 36-month buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns (BHAR) on PMI quality sub-indexes, stakeholder engagement variables, and firm and deal characteristics 
Model 
Dep. variable 
6 
BHAR_36 
 6.1 
wBHAR_36 
 7 
BHAR_36 
 7.1 
wBHAR_36 
 
         
pmi   0.066 *** 0.063 *** 
     (4.96)  (5.24)  
pmi_1 0.068 * 0.073 *   
 (1.68)  (1.91)      
pmi_2 0.060 0.057   
 (1.63)  (1.63)      
pmi_3 0.039 0.0331   
 (0.56)  (0.50)      
pmi_4 0.094 ** 0.086 **   
 (2.13)  (2.11)      
ln_mv_acqu 0.044 * 0.042 * 0.040  0.039 * 
 (1.74) (1.92) (1.59) (1.77) 
goodw_to_dv -0.283 *** -0.235 *** -0.264 ** -0.218 ** 
 (-2.71) (-2.60) (-2.53) (-2.40) 
bm -0.176 -0.179 * -0.160 -0.162 
 (-1.62) (-1.82) (-1.48) (-1.66) 
cd -0.020 -0.009 -0.022 -0.011 
 (-1.08) (-0.68) (-1.23) (-0.91) 
deal_frequ -0.018 -0.016 -0.016 -0.014 
 (-1.62) (-1.51) (-1.48) (-1.39) 
deal_size 0.020 0.004 0.012 0.002 
 (0.25) (0.06) (0.15) (0.03) 
cb -0.219 ** -0.177 * -0.144 -0.110 
 (-2.04)  (-1.80)  (-1.47)  (-1.22)  
geo 0.001 ** 0.000 *** 0.001 ** 0.000 *** 
 (2.51)  (2.99)  (2.31)  (2.61)  
priv 0.094 0.089 0.098 0.095 
 (1.05) (1.17) (1.08) (1.24) 
pay 0.118 * 0.103 * 0.131 * 0.116 * 
 (1.77) (1.75) (1.95) (1.95) 
relate_2sic -0.006 -0.003 -0.002 -0.006 
 (-0.01) (-0.06) (-0.03) (-0.10) 
customer   0.197 0.183 
     (1.35)  (1.38)  
employee   0.213 0.174 
     (1.64)  (1.47)  
constant -0.707 ** -0.665 ** -0.458 -0.426 
 (-2.32)  (-2.41)  (-1.51)  (-1.54) 
Industry control yes  Yes  yes  yes  
N 423  423  414  414  
R² 0.128  0.121  0.135  0.125  
Adjusted R² 0.082  0.075  0.091  0.080  
Overall p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
t statistics in parentheses       
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
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Table 3 
Robustness check: Winsorized AOCFR at 2.5% and 97.5% level. Regression of abnormal operating cash flow returns 
(AOCFR) on PMI quality sub-indexes, stakeholder engagement variables, and firm and deal characteristics 
Model 
Dep. variable 
14 
AOCFR 
 14.1 
wAOCFR 
 15 
AOCFR 
 15.1 
wAOCFR 
 
         
pmi   0.009 *** 0.008 *** 
     (2.68)  (2.82)  
pmi_1 -0.000 -0.001   
 (-0.05)  (-0.16)      
pmi_2 0.003 0.006   
 (0.34)  (0.74)      
pmi_3 0.014 0.017   
 (0.91)  (1.12)      
pmi_4 0.036 *** 0.026 **   
 (2.82)  (2.48)      
goodw_to_dv -0.017 -0.027 -0.014 -0.022 
 (-0.58) (-1.18) (-0.46) (-0.93) 
bm -0.034 -0.026 -0.043 -0.034 
 (-1.35) (-1.18) (-1.57) (-1.43) 
cd 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.82) (0.80) (0.76) (0.78) 
deal_frequ -0.005 ** -0.004 ** -0.004 ** -0.004 ** 
 (-2.37) (-2.31) (-2.26) (-2.21) 
deal_size 0.011 0.011 0.014 0.013 
 (0.58) (0.91) (0.77) (1.09) 
cb -0.063 ** -0.051 ** -0.037 -0.035 
 (-2.18)  (-2.16)  (-1.53)  (-1.57)  
geo 0.000 * 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.65)  (1.61)  (0.96)  (1.00)  
priv 0.031 * 0.029 ** 0.028 * 0.027 * 
 (1.88) (2.00) (1.71) (1.82) 
pay 0.025 * 0.021 0.025 * 0.020 
 (1.72) (1.65) (1.79) (1.59) 
relate_2sic -0.021 -0.019 -0.020 -0.019 
 (-1.50) (-1.54) (1.43) (-1.47) 
customer   0.070 ** 0.073 ** 
     (2.28)  (2.24)  
employee   0.057 * 0.041 * 
     (1.90)  (1.80)  
constant -0.052 -0.047 0.041 0.030 
 (-0.85)  (-0.83)  (0.69)  (0.61) 
Industry control yes  yes  yes  yes  
N 371  371  363  363  
R² 0.121  0.112  0.116  0.115  
Adjusted R² 0.070  0.061  0.067  0.066  
Overall p-value 0.002  0.001  0.000  0.000  
t statistics in parentheses       
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
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Table 4 
Robustness check: Cross-sectional dependency. Regression of 36-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) on 
PMI quality sub-indexes and firm and deal characteristics 
Model 
Dep. variable 
23 
BHAR_36 
 24 
BHAR_36 
 25 
BHAR_36 
 26 
BHAR_36 
 
         
pmi_1 0.130 ***    
 (3.43)        
pmi_2  0.133 ***   
   (4.35)      
pmi_3   0.153 **  
     (2.29)    
pmi_4    0.151 *** 
       (3.20)  
ln_mv_acqu 0.039 0.038 0.041 0.043 
 (1.37)  (1.32)  (1.43)  (1.52)  
goodw_to_dv -0.283 ** -0.298 *** -0.303 *** -0.269 ** 
 (-2.51) (-2.59) (-2.61) (-2.35) 
bm -0.249 ** -0.299 *** -0.229 ** -0.228 ** 
 (-2.41) (-2.83)  (-2.17) (-2.19) 
cd -0.017 -0.013 -0.015 -0.018 
 (-0.88) (-0.73) (-0.81) (-0.99) 
deal_frequ -0.003 -0.007 -0.009 -0.010 * 
 (-0.27) (-0.59) (-0.79) (-0.83) 
deal_size 0.055 0.061 0.074 0.046 
 (0.67) (0.77) (0.91) (0.60) 
cb -0.209 * -0.225 * -0.208 * -0.215 * 
 (-1.80)  (-1.88)  (-1.75)  (-1.87)  
geo 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 
 (2.28)  (2.35)  (2.24)  (2.32)  
priv 0.056 0.086 0.046 0.062 
 (0.61) (0.95) (0.50) (0.68) 
pay 0.695 0.072 0.077 0.086 
 (0.97) (1.00) (1.06) (1.20) 
relate_2sic -0.000 -0.017 -0.009 -0.008 
 (-0.00) (-0.26) (-0.13) (-0.12) 
constant -0.342 -0.295 -0.349 -0.425 
 (-1.03)  (-0.90) (-1.06)  (-1.28) 
Industry control yes  yes  yes  yes  
N 377  377  377  377  
R² 0.109  0.117  0.094  0.108  
Adjusted R² 0.064  0.073  0.048  0.063  
Overall p-value 0.003  0.001  0.02  0.007  
t statistics in parentheses       
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
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Table 5 
Robustness check: Cross-sectional dependency: Regression of 36-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) on 
PMI quality sub-indexes, stakeholder engagement variables, and firm and deal characteristics 
Model 
Dep. variable 
27 
BHAR_36 
 28 
BHAR_36 
 29 
BHAR_36 
 30 
BHAR_36 
 
         
pmi 0.080 ***  0.069 *** 0.064 *** 
 (5.05)    (4.79)  (4.48)  
pmi_1  0.068   
   (1.55)      
pmi_2  0.082 **   
   (2.06)      
pmi_3  0.001   
   (0.01)      
pmi_4  0.095 *   
   (1.91)      
ln_mv_acqu 0.038 0.038 0.033 0.039 
 (1.35) (1.35) (1.17) (1.54) 
goodw_to_dv -0.304 *** -0.292 *** -0.281 ** -0.301 
 (-2.71) (-2.62) (-2.47) (-2.40) 
bm -0.272 *** -0.278 *** -0.259 ** -0.260 *** 
 (-2.66) (-2.64) (-2.48) (-2.60) 
cd -0.016 -0.016 -0.019 -0.022 
 (-0.86) (-0.88) (-1.07) (-1.24) 
deal_frequ -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 
 (-0.34) (-0.35) (-0.18) (-0.22) 
deal_size 0.038 0.033 0.026 0.031 
 (0.47) (0.42) (0.32) (0.38) 
cb -0.208 * -0.214 * -0.122 -0.126 
 (-1.81)  (-1.87)  (-1.19)  (-1.23)  
geo 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 
 (2.40)  (2.40)  (2.19)  (2.20)  
priv 0.081 0.087 0.085 0.098 
 (0.91) (0.96) (0.93) (1.06) 
pay 0.082 0.081 0.093 0.087 
 (1.15) (1.14) (1.30) (1.28) 
relate_2sic -0.010 -0.011 -0.009 -0.015 
 (-0.16) (-0.16) (-0.14) (-0.23) 
customer   0.199 0.176 
     (1.24)  (1.13)  
employee   0.229 * 0.243 * 
     (1.69)  (1.78)  
constant -0.366 -0.371 -0.179 -0.405 
 (-1.13)  (-1.12)  (-0.46)  (-1.57) 
Industry control yes  yes  yes  no  
N 377  377  369  369  
R² 0.131  0.133  0.143  0.133  
Adjusted R² 0.087  0.081  0.093  0.099  
Overall p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
t statistics in parentheses       
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
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Table 6 
Robustness check: Cross-sectional dependency. Regression of abnormal operating cash flow returns (AOCFR) on 
PMI quality sub-indexes and firm and deal characteristics 
Model 
Dep. variable 
31 
AOCFR 
 32 
AOCFR 
 33 
AOCFR 
 34 
AOCFR 
 
         
pmi_1 0.008    
 (0.79)        
pmi_2  0.012   
   (1.42)      
pmi_3   0.029  
     (1.65)    
pmi_4    0.048 *** 
       (3.84)  
goodw_to_dv -0.018 -0.019 -0.022 -0.011 
 (-0.56) (-0.60) (-0.68) (-0.38) 
bm -0.032 -0.037 -0.032 -0.027 
 (-1.12) (-1.30) (-1.13) (-1.02) 
cd 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 
 (1.06) (1.15) (1.10) (0.73) 
deal_frequ -0.004 * -0.004 * -0.004 * -0.004 * 
 (-1.77) (-1.84) (-1.95) (-1.90) 
deal_size 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.007 
 (0.87) (0.87) (0.92) (0.36) 
cb -0.071 ** -0.072 ** -0.069 ** -0.072 ** 
 (-2.16)  (-2.17)  (-2.10)  (-2.27)  
geo 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.50)  (1.55)  (1.53)  (1.79)  
priv 0.020 0.023 * 0.020 0.027 * 
 (1.19) (1.35) (1.16) (1.67) 
pay 0.023 0.022 0.024 0.028 * 
 (1.45) (1.43) (1.52) (1.76) 
relate_2sic -0.017 -0.018 -0.017 -0.016 
 (-1.05) (-1.09) (-1.06) (-1.06) 
constant -0.028 -0.033 -0.027 -0.063 
 (-0.46)  (-0.54) (-0.43)  (-1.00) 
Industry control yes  yes  yes  yes  
N 329  329  329  329  
R² 0.083  0.087  0.089  0.134  
Adjusted R² 0.033  0.037  0.039  0.086  
Overall p-value 0.026  0.006  0.006  0.004  
t statistics in parentheses       
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
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Table 7 
Robustness check: Cross-sectional dependency. Regression of abnormal operating cash flow returns (AOCFR) on 
PMI quality sub-indexes, stakeholder engagement variables, and firm and deal characteristics 
Model 
Dep. variable 
35 
AOCFR 
 36 
AOCFR 
 37 
AOCFR 
 38 
AOCFR 
 
         
pmi 0.010 ***  0.009 ** 0.010 ** 
 (2.67)    (2.46)  (2.52)  
pmi_1  -0.003   
   (-0.29)      
pmi_2  -0.002   
   (0.23)      
pmi_3  0.014   
   (0.73)      
pmi_4  0.048 ***   
   (3.30)      
goodw_to_dv -0.021 -0.013 -0.014 -0.017 
 (-0.65) (-0.42) (-0.45) (-0.55) 
bm -0.037 -0.026 -0.037 -0.026 
 (-1.31) (-0.99) (-1.29) (-1.00) 
cd 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (1.04) (0.73) (0.69) (0.36) 
deal_frequ -0.004 -0.005 * -0.004 ** -0.003 
 (-1.64) (-1.96) (-1.66) (-1.31) 
deal_size 0.013 0.007 0.011 0.009 
 (0.65) (0.38) (0.58) (0.48) 
cb -0.069 ** -0.071 ** -0.039 -0.039 
 (-2.11)  (-2.23)  (-1.47)  (-1.55)  
geo 0.000 0.000 * 0.0004 0.000 
 (1.67)  (1.78)  (1.00)  (1.31)  
priv 0.025 0.026 0.024 0.032 * 
 (1.51) (1.58) (1.43) (1.93) 
pay 0.024 0.028 * 0.026 * 0.018 
 (1.55) (1.81) (1.73) (1.22) 
relate_2sic -0.017 -0.016 -0.019 -0.021 
 (-1.05) (-1.05) (1.20) (-1.43) 
customer   0.048 0.052 
     (1.39)  (1.46)  
employee   0.081 *** 0.077 ** 
     (2.66)  (2.42)  
constant -0.052 -0.060 0.049 -0.025 
 (-0.83)  (-0.96)  (0.76)  (-0.72) 
Industry control yes  yes  yes  no  
N 329  329  322  322  
R² 0.102  0.135  0.123  0.084  
Adjusted R² 0.053  0.079  0.067  0.045  
Overall p-value 0.002  0.004  0.001  0.003  
t statistics in parentheses       
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
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Table 8 
Robustness check: Cross-sectional dependency. Regression of PMI quality sub-indexes on firm and deal 
characteristics 
Model 
Dep. variable 
39 
Mgmt. 
Attention 
 40 
Stakeholder 
Information 
 41 
Integration 
Support 
 42 
Risk 
Awareness 
 
         
bm 0.106  0.528 *** -0.007 0.003 
 (0.85) (3.11) (-0.08) (0.03) 
goodw_to_dv 0.134 0.301 0.208 0.099 
 (0.86) (1.50) (1.57) (0.73) 
deal_frequ -0.051 ** -0.022 -0.006 -0.003 
 (-2.46) (-1.20) (0.68) (-0.20) 
deal_size 0.186 ** 0.125 0.035 0.251 *** 
 (2.36) (1.61) (0.87) (3.93) 
cd 0.006 -0.017 -0.006 0.010 
 (0.37) (-1.23) (-1.03) (0.47) 
cb -0.090 0.014 -0.084 -0.058 
 (-0.54)  (0.08)  (-1.17)  (-0.37)  
geo -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.17)  (-1.49)  (-0.71)  (-0.80)  
priv -0.152 -0.368 *** -0.026 -0.085 
 (-1.64) (-3.89) (-0.56) (-1.09) 
pay -0.021 -0.015 -0.061 -0.080 
 (-0.23) (-0.14) (-1.24) (-1.07) 
relate_2sic -0.033 0.103 0.015 0.029 
 (-0.37) (1.03) (0.31) (0.38) 
constant 0.580 *** 0.294 * 0.133 0.564 *** 
 (3.99)  (1.71)  (1.48)  (3.92) 
Industry control no  no  no  no  
N 379  379  379  379  
R² 0.063  0.109  0.041  0.070  
Adjusted R² 0.037  0.084  0.015  0.044  
Overall p-value 0.002  0.000  0.067  0.002  
t statistics in parentheses       
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
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Table 9 
Robustness check: Cross-sectional dependency. Regression of PMI quality index 
 on firm and deal characteristics 
Model 
Dep. variable 
43 
PMI 
Quality 
 44 
PMI 
Quality 
 
     
bm 0.047 0.335 
 (1.34) (1.00) 
goodw_to_dv 0.841 * 0.584 
 (1.83) (1.25) 
deal_frequ -0.024 -0.019 
 (-0.70) (-0.55) 
deal_size 0.639 *** 0.642 *** 
 (3.15) (3.22) 
cd -0.011 -0.010 
 (-0.27) (-0.23) 
cb -0.189 -0.093 
 (-0.49)  (-0.24)  
geo -0.001 -0.001 * 
 (-1.60)  (-1.81)  
priv -0.602 *** -0.577 ** 
 (-2.66) (-2.45) 
pay -0.344 -0.376 * 
 (-1.61) (-1.73) 
relate_2sic 0.132 0.128 
 (0.60) (0.58) 
constant 1.633 *** 1.178 ** 
 (4.37)  (2.36)  
Industry control no  yes  
N 425  425  
R² 0.111  0.150  
Adjusted R² 0.090  0.117  
Overall p-value 0.000  0.000  
t statistics in parentheses   
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
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A3: PMI quality evaluation example: Merger between Republic 
Services Inc. and Allied Waste Industries in 2008 (Total index score: 
9 of 10) 
 
1. Sub-Index: PMI Management Attention (Score: 2 of 2) 
A. Management Focus on PMI: (YES=1) 
 “We are well aware that some mergers in our industry, and other industries, failed because 
they did not focus enough on integration. We recognized this challenge and began to develop 
our integration process and strategy as soon as we announced our merger...[...]. We made 
successful integration a high priority and identified specific integration tasks at every level 
throughout the combined organization.” (Data Source: Republic Services 2008 Annual 
Report, Letter to Shareholders) 
“Our integration work centered on controlling costs and realizing the savings the merger 
promised.” (Data Source: Republic Services 2009 Annual Report, Letter to 
Shareholders) 
“Finally, in 2010 we successfully completed the two-year integration of Republic and Allied.” 
(Data Source: Republic Services 2010 Annual Report, Letter to Shareholders) 
B. Management Confidence about PMI (YES=1) 
“..., we believed we could capture $150 million in annual run-rate savings by the end of 2010. 
However, by the second quarter 2009, it was clear we could do better. We then increased that 
goal to a range of $165 to $175 million, again by the end of 2010. As 2009 ended, we had 
already reached annual run-rate savings of $150 million and were well on our way to 
achieving our new target.” (Data Source: Republic Services 2009 Annual Report, Letter 
to Shareholders) 
“The integration achieved a total of approximately $190 million in annual run-rate synergy 
savings – well above the $150 million we originally targeted.” (Data Source: Republic 
Services 2010 Annual Report, Letter to Shareholders) 
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2. Sub-Index: Stakeholder Information (Score: 3 of 3) 
A. Integration Plan (YES=1) 
“We spent more than 35,000 man-hours to develop our integration plan and to ensure that 
each and every employee was engaged and understood his or her role in this process.” (Data 
Source: Republic Services 2008 Annual Report, Letter to Shareholders) 
B. Integration Objective (YES=1) 
“Merger Integration Strategy. ... [...] ... – Timely and Focused Integration Process. ... [...] ... 
– Significant Synergies. (Data Source: Republic Services 2008 Annual Report, Item 1. 
Business, Operating Strategy, p. 4-5) 
“Upon the completion of the integration of Allied, our goal is to maintain our selling, general 
and administrative costs at no more than 10.0% of revenue, which we believe is appropriate 
given our existing business platform.” (Data Source: Republic Services 2008 Annual 
Report, Item 7. Management’s discussion, Consolidated Results of Operations, p. 49) 
C. General Transparency (YES=1) 
“..., the merger is expected to generate total annual run-rate integration synergies, primarily 
resulting from operating efficiencies, economies of scale, and leveraging corporate and 
overhead resources of approximately $150.0 million by the end of 2010. We have identified 
and are on track to realize in 2009 approximately $100.0 million, or 67% of the total expected 
annual run-rate synergies. (Data Source: Republic Services 2008 Annual Report, Item 1. 
Business, Overview, p. 1) 
 
3. Sub-Index: Integration Support and Governance (Score: 3 of 3) 
A. Consultants / Integration Team (YES=1) 
“During December 2008, we incurred $82.7 million of restructuring charges associated with 
integrating our operations with Allied. These charges primarily consist of severance and other 
employee termination and relocation benefits and consulting fees paid to outside parties.” 
(Data Source: Republic Services 2008 Annual Report, Item 7. Management’s 
discussion – Merger with Allied Waste Industries, Inc., p. 39) 
B. Integration Incentives (YES=1) 
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“Consequently, we have developed and implemented incentive programs that help focus our 
entire company on the realization of key financial metrics of ... [...], as well as achieving 
integration synergies.” (Data Source: Republic Services 2008 Annual Report, Item 1. 
Business – Financial Strategy, p. 2) 
“Furthermore, in conjunction with the merger with Allied, we have developed integration 
metrics to be achieved by our executive management team and key employees based upon 
targeted annual run-rate synergies...” (Data Source: Republic Services 2008 Annual 
Report, Item 1. Business, Compensation, p. 14) 
C. PMI Governance (YES=1) 
“Allan C. Sorensen Chairman, Integration Committee” (Data Source: Republic Services 
2008 Annual Report, Board of Directors 2009, p. 175) 
 
4. Sub-Index: Integration Risk Awareness (Score: 1 of 2) 
A. Integration Risks (YES=1) 
“The actual integration may result in additional and unforeseen expenses, and 
the anticipated benefits of the integration plan may not be realized. We may not be able to 
accomplish the integration process smoothly, successfully or on a timely basis. We may 
experience difficulties integrating Allied’s business... [...]... The necessity of coordinating 
geographically separated organizations, information systems and facilities, and addressing 
possible differences in business backgrounds, corporate cultures and management 
philosophies, may increase the difficulties of integration... [...]...Employee uncertainty and lack 
of focus during the integration process may also disrupt our business. The inability of our 
management to successfully and timely integrate the operations of Republic and Allied could 
have a material adverse effect on the business and results of operations of the combined 
company.” (Data Source: Republic Services 2008 Annual Report, Item 1A. Risk Factors, 
p. 15-16) 
B. Stakeholder Risks during PMI (NO=0) 
No information found by textual analysis. 
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5 Concluding Remarks 
Many M&A-transactions destroy value on a massive scale due to the lack of 
appropriate and effective PMI measures. Arguably the biggest mistake still made by 
acquiring firm managers is their mere focus on shareholder interests and the required 
rate of return on shareholder equity. Managers miss out on focusing on the overall 
picture while executing an acquisition or a merger. They fail to manage all relevant 
stakeholders and their primary interests during the PMI. This misstep can be 
disastrous as outlined and empirically proven in this doctoral thesis. 
This dissertation provides valuable guidance for future M&A decision makers by 
emphasizing stakeholder interests and the primary stakeholders’ role during the 
post-merger integration process. Firstly, it outlines the relevance of PMI to mitigate 
detrimental post-acquisition developments caused by stakeholder struggle through 
the development of the “post-merger stakeholder conflict hypothesis”. Secondly, it 
examines the justification of the established theoretical framework by confirming the 
existing evidence of US acquirers’ underperformance, and empirically analyzing the 
impact of stakeholder conflict factors on long-run financial and operating M&A 
profitability. Thirdly, it tests the developed theory through construction of a PMI 
index (consisting of the four dimensions: management attention, stakeholder 
information, integration support, and integration risks) that evaluates PMI quality, 
and through the empirical assessment of PMI quality and its impact on M&A 
performance. It shows which dimension is most important when it comes to 
stakeholder orientation during the PMI.  
This dissertation covers the general threat of value-decreasing stakeholder 
conflicts in the post-acquisition period of M&A and suggests that a stakeholder-
oriented PMI mitigates synergy impairment. However, more understanding is 
needed with regard to the effective application of stakeholder specific integration 
measures, for example, what exact kind of activities, their positive impact, when and 
to what extent they should be used. Moreover, it is advantageous to know which 
stakeholder group is most important for post-merger management and integration in 
order to avoid detrimental conflict and power struggle associated with M&A failure. 
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Thus, future research is needed to delve deeper into PMI and its favorable role in 
M&A with focus on primary stakeholders and their interests to be aligned.  
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